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Abstract 
Banking institutions within the financial system are very vulnerable to insider threats and require 
special security management because of the severe negative externalities to society once they fail. In 
this regard, the research aimed to investigate the characteristics of occupational fraud and to devise 
effective anti-fraud strategies by comparing two different financial sectors (commercial banks vs 
community banking institutions) in South Korean banking industry. For that, the study narrowed the 
scope of analysis in terms of two core banking services and focused on the three variables of interest: 
‘gender’, ‘position’ of bankers, and ‘financial sector’ of banks. Adopting a mixed method approach, 
the study administered two different questionnaires to more than 450 participants and conducted 16 
semi-structured interviews with the bankers and counter-fraud experts in the financial industry. 
The study discovered evidence that ‘position’ and ‘sector’ play a more crucial role on occupational 
fraud than ‘gender’. ‘Position’ had a significant effect on the characteristics of fraud in a sense that 
perpetrators in high positions at financial institutions were significantly associated with corruption, 
which caused more serious damage to the organization. In a similar vein, the ‘financial sector’ had a 
significant effect on the perceived risk of fraud and counter-fraud effectiveness. That is, the 
respondents in the community banking institutions had significantly lower awareness of the problem 
and control effectiveness than those in the commercial banks.  
Next, the study found important evidence that perceived ‘opportunity reduction’ was negatively 
associated with fraud occurrence in the banking industry. In addition, the study verified that the 
perception of an improved ethical culture was negatively associated with the frequency of 
occupational fraud. Simply put, if the bank employees agreed more that they had more elevated 
corporate culture, the frequency of occupational fraud was significantly lower in the institution. This 
implies that ‘reducing opportunity’ and ‘developing anti-fraud culture’ should be two axial measures 
when managing the risk of occupational fraud at financial institutions. 
Finally, a new counter-fraud model and a devised strategy were proposed based on the findings of the 
study, which encompasses comprehensive problem-oriented methods to manage occupational fraud 
risk in South Korean banking institutions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
The financial system of a country is the lifeblood of the economy and commercial banking is a 
significant part of the financial system, providing core financial services such as savings accounts, 
investments, loans, mortgages and other services to ordinary people (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). 
The employees who serve these banking institutions are exposed to a range of opportunities to 
commit financial crimes and related acts (Hollow, 2014; Mitchell et al., 1992). White-collar crime in 
the banking sector breaches public trust in the financial system and can have a very detrimental effect 
on the whole economy. For example, the Savings and Loan (hereafter, S&L) scandal in the 1980’s in 
the US had a significant impact on the US economy and is regarded as the worst example of white-
collar crime because fraud and illegal activities involving the executives and managers of S&L 
institutions were so prevalent that they led to financial catastrophe (Friedrichs, 2010; Krugman and 
Wells, 2015). It has been estimated that the bail-out of the bankrupt S&L institutions will have cost up 
to $500 billion by 2021 (Calavita and Pontell, 1991). The directors and managers of S&L institutions 
threw extravagant parties and purchased luxury villas or yachts from embezzled money. The S&L 
scandal led some to conclude that “the best way to rob a bank is to own one” and the term ‘collective 
embezzlement’ was coined to explain the failure of the financial institutions (Black, 2013; Pontell, 
2005). 
South Korea (hereafter, Korea) is also not immune from white-collar crime within its banking 
institutions. In 2011, more than 20 savings banks went bankrupt or were suspended from trading by 
the financial authorities due to occupational fraud and illegal activities (Min, 2012). The number of 
victims reached 100,000 people with losses estimated at around $26 billion. The crisis resulted in many 
working-class families losing their life-long savings. In some cases there was also  tragic loss of life, by 
some working class families committing suicide (The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2012). The collapse of the 
financial institutions was attributed to internal fraud and corruption. Investigations revealed that 
some politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats were implicated in the failure. For instance, the elder 
brother of the then Korean President and a leading congressman were arrested for receiving bribes 
from the director of a savings bank to reduce government regulations, demonstrating that ‘regulatory 
capture’ (Hardy, 2006) was also a contributing factor (KBS News, 2012). Aside from the Savings Bank 
Scandal, official statistics recorded 147 embezzlement cases by bank employees in Korea, amounting 
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to £30.6 million1 between 2011 and 2015. The average loss to embezzlement by bank employees was 
estimated at £210,000 per case (Kim, 2015).  
Risk in the banking industry is the potential loss that might occur to the bank due to the occurrence 
of some adverse events. Risk takes place because of the uncertainty associated with incidents that 
have the possibilities to trigger loss. Risk can be categorized into financial risk and non-financial risk. 
Financial risk in the banking industry includes credit risk, market risk and operational risk (Ghosh, 
2012). Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
process, people and systems or from external events” (BIS, 2011) and it includes fraud risk. In order 
to combat occupational fraud in the banking industry, risk recognition or assessment is the first step 
to be taken. Fraud risk assessment is a process aimed at proactively identifying and addressing 
organizational vulnerabilities to both internal and external fraud (ACFE, 2015).  
 
1.2 Research aims and questions 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (hereafter, ACFE), the largest anti-fraud organization in 
the world, explores the characteristics of occupational fraud by asking their certified fraud examiners 
about the cases they investigate. ACFE has published their Report to the Nations on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse biennially since 1996. According to the 2016 report (ACFE, 2016), the typical company 
loses approximately five percent of annual revenue to occupational fraud (Button and Gee, 2013). The 
total loss of the cases in the 2016 report exceeds $6.3 billion, an average loss per case of $2.7 million. 
Furthermore, the 2016 report revealed that the banking and financial service industry had the most 
occurrences of all industries. Some argue that the very existence of ‘finance capitalism’, where people 
trust their money to others to increase profits, increases the risk of financial crimes and other illegal 
activities (Black, 2013; Calavita and Pontell, 1991).  
The serious and detrimental impacts of occupational fraud in the financial industry are not only 
confined to the institutions but also affect the whole of society, causing a chain reaction to all parties 
in the market. If the banking sector loses public trust, nobody would want to deposit funds and a 
vicious cycle could spread out slowing economic growth (Ghosh, 2012; Hollow, 2014; Mitchell et al., 
1992). The S&L Debacle in the US, the Barings Bank fiasco in the UK, the Savings Banks collapse in 
Korea and the sub-prime mortgage crisis all around the world have demonstrated how significant the 
consequences of financial meltdown can be (FCIC, 2011; Krugman and Wells, 2015; Min, 2012). 
                                                          
1 One pound (£) is calculated at 1,500 Korean won (₩) in this study. 
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However, like other white-collar crimes, the invisible and secretive nature of fraud inside banking 
institutions has limited the empirical analysis so far undertaken in this field (Suh et al., 2018). Because 
of this lack of research, there is no clear evidence about the characteristics, profiles and seriousness 
of occupational fraud in the Korean banking sector.  
Therefore, the aim of research is to investigate the characteristics of occupational fraud and to gauge 
employees’ perceptions of fraud risk and the effectiveness of counter-fraud measures by comparing 
the differences between the various types of banking institutions. The researcher also aims to devise 
and suggest more effective counter-fraud strategies and methods to reduce occupational fraud in the 
Korean banking industry. 
 
 To be specific, the research aims are: 
1. What are the characteristics of occupational fraud committed in South Korean banking industry? 
Is there any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking industry? 
2. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk? Is there any evidence 
that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived risk of occupational 
fraud? 
3. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls? Is there 
any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of anti-fraud controls? 
4. Is there any statistically significant association among the perceived risk, counter-fraud 
effectiveness, and frequency (occurrence) of occupational fraud? 
5. What and how can systems be improved to reduce occupational fraud in South Korean banking 
industry?  
 
1.3 The scope of research 
Financial institutions fraud is sometimes known by the more generic term of bank fraud. Bank fraud 
can include a variety of financial crimes such as credit card fraud, cheque fraud, embezzlement, money 
laundering, ATM fraud, and money transfer fraud (ACFE, 2015). However, the present study 
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concentrates on occupational fraud relating to core banking activities such as deposits and loan 
services. Specialized banks refer to government-affiliated policy banks such as the Export and Import 
Bank of Korea, which do not provide core banking services to ordinary people (The Bank of Korea, 
2011), and thus are excluded from the research. In other words, the main focus of the study will be 
occupational fraud related to the ‘core’ banking services such as asset misappropriation 
(embezzlement) and corruption (loan fraud).   
Secondly, the current study focuses on occupational fraud which occurred in depository institutions 
(hereafter, DI) including commercial banks, credit unions and savings institutions. They are in common 
because a significant portion of their funds comes from customer deposits. Non-depository 
institutions entail insurance companies, securities firms, investment banks, finance companies, and 
mutual funds (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Such organizations are beyond the scope of the present 
study.  
Commercial banks constitute the largest group of DI measured by asset size and have operated as 
more diversified organizations like holding commercial loans, corporate bonds, and corporate stock, 
etc. In Korea, there are two types of commercial banks; nationwide banks and regional banks. 
Nationwide banks operate all around the country, but regional banks are subject to certain geographic 
restrictions in their business operations (The Bank of Korea, 2011). As of 1st October, 2017, seven 
nationwide banks (Shinhan, Woori, Standard Chartered Bank Korea, KEB Hana, Citibank Korea, NH 
Bank, and KB Kookmin Bank) and six regional banks (Daegu, Busan, Gwangju, Jeju, Jeonbuk, and 
Gyongnam) are operating (FSS, 2017).  
Credit institutions are nonprofit institutions, mutually organized and owned by their members who 
share a common place of residence, workplace, organization, community or other association. Their 
primary objective is to satisfy the depository and lending needs of their members (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2008). In Korea, there are three main types of credit institutions; local agricultural and fishery 
cooperatives, community credit cooperatives and credit unions (FSS, 2017). 
Finally, savings institutions were created in response to commercial banks’ concentration on serving 
the needs of business enterprises, rather than the needs of individuals requiring funds to purchase 
homes. Therefore, savings institutions have historically been concentrating primarily on residential 
mortgages (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Savings banks in Korea are the regulated DIs that provide 
retail and small business banking in limited scale. Although they are deposit-taking institutions and 
carry on commercial banking, they are not classified as banks for supervision purposes because they 
are regulated under the Mutual Savings and Finance Company Act, not under the Banking Act, as is 
the case for the commercial banks in Korea (FSS, 2017). 
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Interestingly, Koreans commonly categorize financial institutions by number. Commercial banks in 
Korea are referred to the ‘first financial sector’ and the rest of financial institutions are referred to the 
‘second financial sector’. While the organizations in the first financial sector comprises large or major 
commercial banks, the institutions in the second financial sector are mainly composed of small and 
medium-sized community banks, which have a smaller number of staff or employees compared to 
those in the first financial sector (FSC, 2017). However, the institutions in both sectors are supervised 
and regulated by Korean Financial Supervisory Service (hereafter, FSS), a quasi-governmental 
supervisory authority created for integrated financial supervision (FSS, 2017).  This situation is 
summarised in Table 1-1 
 
Table 1-1: Depository financial institutions in South Korea (The Bank of Korea, 2011) 
Financial sector Type Subtype 
First sector Commercial banks 
Nationwide banks 
Regional banks 
Second sector 
Credit institutions 
Local agricultural and fishery 
cooperatives 
Community credit cooperatives 
Credit unions 
Savings institutions Savings banks 
 
Thirdly, there is a temporal limitation on the scope of the present research. The Bank of Korea, the 
central bank that issues Korean Won (₩), was established in 1950 after the nation’s independence 
from the Japanese occupation. After liberation, Korea developed so fast, making an economic miracle 
from the ashes of the Korean War. Within a half century, Korea achieved not only an economic success 
but also realized democracy. It now is the world’s 11th biggest economy and the financial industry 
accounted for approximately 6.7% of GDP in 2012 (The Hankyoreh, 2013). However, Korea has also 
fluctuated with many challenges such as 1997 Asian financial crisis and 2008 global financial crisis. For 
the present study, the occupational fraud cases occurred only within the last ten years will be the 
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scope of this research, which given the dynamic nature of financial services was considered an 
appropriate time period for a study of this type.  
1.4 Structure of thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter 1 explains the background, aims, research questions and 
scope of the study. Chapter 2 examines previous theories on security, fraud and counter-fraud from 
the perspectives of industry security, criminology, and business ethics, etc. Additionally, a theoretical 
framework for counter-fraud is formulated for the study from the literature review. Chapter 3 
discusses the research methods employed in this study: an explanatory sequential mixed method that 
entails questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, ethical issues and 
analytical strategy are considered. 
Chapter 4 contextualizes occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry. The definition of fraud, 
regulations and structure of the banking sector are discussed in the Korean context. Moreover, the 
Savings Bank Scandal in 2011, and the two bank-fraud cases collected from the mass media outlets 
are analysed in terms of offender profile, cause and impact. The reason of selecting the scandal cases 
is that they are good examples of counter-fraud failures that show the significance of the problem and 
can give lessons for financial industry security. 
Chapter 5 examines the characteristics of occupational fraud in South Korean banking industry. The 
profiles of perpetrators, types, corruptive and collusive nature of fraud, and the responses of the 
Korean criminal justice system are analysed based on the real fraud cases investigated by the Korean 
national police within a decade. Semi-structured interviews with 16 financial professionals in the 
Korean banking sector are applied and the differences of financial sectors on fraud characteristics are 
explored as well. 
Chapter 6 investigates the employees’ perceptions of fraud risk and counter-fraud effectiveness in 
their organizations. The effects of gender, position and financial sector on these perceptions are 
analysed through the data collected from 395 employees of the Korean banking institutions. In-depth 
qualitative interviews with banking professionals are examined to underpin the quantitative findings 
as well.  
Chapter 7 explores the impacts of organizational investment on the occupational fraud thorough the 
mediating effects of ethical corporate culture and monitoring control effectiveness. Chapter 8 gives 
an overview of the qualitative findings and Chapter 9 integrates the quantitative and qualitative 
findings. From this integration, the managerial implications are drawn out to manage fraud risk 
effectively for the Korean banking industry. Furthermore, contributions to the extant theory and 
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literature are discussed. Finally, chapter 10 gives a review of research questions, summarizes main 
findings and suggest policy recommendations for financial industry security. The limitations of the 
study and required areas for the future research are also discussed.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite Sutherland’s insight and ground breaking contribution to the neglected spectrum of crimes 
(Sutherland, 1961), ‘white-collar crime’ has been criticized by many scholars for the lack of clear 
definition (Coleman, 1987; Felson, 2002; Friedrichs, 2010; Haelterman, 2016). Yet Marcus Felson, the 
Routine Activity Theorist defined white-collar crime in a novel way as ‘crimes of specialized access’ 
(Felson, 2002: 119). According to him, occupations, professions, and organization provide offenders 
with practical routes to their targets and legitimate features of the work-role offer a chance to do 
misdeeds. For instance, knowing passwords helps in breaking into accounts and the responsibility of 
control of organizational assets provides an opportunity to misuse them (Felson, 2002). Coleman also 
claimed that white-collar crimes are violations of the law committed in the course of a legitimate 
occupation and the goal of the vast majority of white-collar criminals is economic gain or occupational 
success that may lead to economic gain (Coleman, 1987: 407-408). In this regard, banking sector is 
one of the perfect arenas that may provide likely offenders with ‘legitimate’ and ‘specialized’ access 
to many opportunities such as tremendous daily financial transactions at work (Hollow, 2014). 
As a result, banking institutions are commonly a subject of study from the various academics ranging 
from finance, business administration, business ethics, to criminal justice studies (Black, 2013; Ghosh, 
2012; Mitchell et al., 1992; Saunders and Cornett, 2008). For example, a number of economists have 
proposed that financial crises, such as failures of banks, are not anomalies, but are inherent and 
cyclical features of advanced economies (Minsky, 2008; Roubini and Mimh, 2010). According to 
Minsky’s financial instability theory, “success breeds excess, excess breeds failure.” In time of 
economic prosperity, banks make more loans to finance speculative ventures, ignoring the lessons of 
previous financial crises (Minsky, 2008: 236-237). 
Because of these cross-disciplinary interests, various approaches have been adopted to prevent bank 
failures, such as the concept of risk management (Ghosh, 2012). However, empirical analyses have 
been surprisingly rare especially in this field probably because of the difficulty of obtaining relevant 
data (Button, 2008). The definition and typology of ‘occupational fraud’ developed by Wells (1997), 
the founder of ACFE, has provided a powerful way of analysing white-collar crime at a workplace level 
(Holtfreter, 2008). After having served as the FBI special agent investigating thousands of fraud cases, 
Wells categorized ‘occupational fraud’ into three different categories; asset misappropriation, 
corruption and fraudulent financial statement (Wells, 1997). Using this classification, the literature 
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review will discuss the specialness of financial industry security, definition and typology of 
occupational fraud, Fraud Triangle Theory, ethical corporate culture, anti-fraud controls and 
investment in them. Finally, a theoretical framework of counter-fraud will be suggested from the 
literature review.  
 
2.2 Financial industry security 
Corporate security or industrial security helps a company mitigate or manage any developments that 
may threaten the resilience and continued survival of a corporation (Briggs and Edwards, 2006). The 
importance of more effective ‘financial industry security’ is being emphasized by the rise of high profile 
financial scandals such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the bail out of insurance company AIG, 
and the US government takeover of mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in the wake of the 
Subprime mortgage crisis (Tillman, 2015). In Trusted Criminals: White-collar crime in Contemporary 
Society, Friedrichs defined ‘finance crime’ as ‘large-scale illegality that occurs in the world of finance 
and financial institutions’ and argued that various kinds of ‘finance crime’ played a significant role in 
all of these failures. (Friedrichs, 2010: 168-169). Many studies of banking crises also concluded that 
fraud and abuse were prominent causal factors (Black, 2005; Calavita et al., 1997; Tillman, 2015). 
Therefore, it is pivotal to secure ‘security’ from within the financial industry because tens of millions 
of investors, taxpayers, homeowners, and consumers are likely to suffer from the failures, as the 
victims of ‘finance crime’ as clearly demonstrated in the first decade of the 21st century, if it occurs 
once again (Friedrichs, 2010; Krugman and Wells, 2015).  
Firstly, security can be defined as “the objective condition of being without threat: the hypothetical 
state of being absolute security”. Secondly, it is defined by the neutralization of threats: the state of 
being protected from. Thirdly, it is a form of avoidance or non-exposure to danger (Zedner, 2003: 155).” 
George and Button (2000) maintained that security is used to protect four main areas: the protection 
of (1) people, (2) physical assets, (3) information and (4) reputation. With regard to protection of 
physical assets, people start to find a ‘secure’ place to keep them safely after ‘surplus wealth’ was 
produced in industrial capitalism. As a result, financial institutions, especially banks were established 
for the protection of physical assets such as cash and gold. Moreover, the use of money as a medium 
of market exchange established financial institutions as the trustees of other people’s money and as 
the intermediary agents between the demanders and suppliers of fund (Coleman, 1987). 
Following industrial capitalism, however, ‘finance capitalism’ has emerged producing ‘vast wealth’ and 
sometimes a criminogenic condition where profits are created from speculative investment, not 
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production (Calavita and Pontell, 1991; Tillman, 2015). Some argue that unlike industrial capitalism 
where customers receive real goods for their money, in ‘finance capitalism’ clients receive a mere 
promise that their money will be protected and insured by deposit insurance. Ironically, deposit 
insurance itself is blamed for motivating ‘moral hazard’ of the financial sector, a situation where one 
party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other party 
will incur the cost (Krugman and Wells, 2015). Some even argue that a financial institution itself can 
become a ‘weapon’ or ‘vehicle’ to commit fraud when control over an organization is realized, which 
is referred to ‘control fraud’ (Black, 2005). As a result, analyses of fraud in financial institutions have 
focused on the roles of deregulation and corruption in producing systemic incentives for ‘insiders’ to 
loot their institutions (Calavita et al., 1997; Tillman and Indergaard, 2005). 
In this regard, numerous examples around the world demonstrated the internal vulnerabilities of the 
financial industry.  Within the five-year period from 2010 to 2014, there were 361 cases of employee 
embezzlement detected in Korean commercial banks, insurance and securities companies. The total 
loss of the embezzlement cases amounted to £103 million (Koo and Lee, 2016). The fraud of Nick 
Leeson contributed to the collapse of Barings Bank with £850 million loss in the UK (Button, 2008). A 
trader, Jerome Keviel in Societe Generale Bank in France caused a loss of approximately £4 billion and 
he was found guilty of forgery, unauthorised computer use and breach of trust (BBC News, 2010). 
Between 2008 and 2011, 355 commercial banks and 57 thrift institutions were declared insolvent and 
closed by the US federal authorities and these failures will have cost approximately $90 billon of 
deposit insurance, which surprisingly resembles the epidemic of failures of S&L in the 1980s (Tillman, 
2015).  
Importantly, it should be noted that the more severe the potential consequences of adverse events 
occurring, the greater is the level of security required. In Figure 2-1 below, the horizontal line covers 
the level of security required, ranging from minimal to absolute security. The vertical continuum 
ranges from environments where there are strong commercial pressures to those there are no such 
pressure (Button, 2008). In the current highly globalized world, many financial institutions face strong 
challenges not only domestically but also internationally to compete against each other, which 
sometimes cause high pressures to financial institutions (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Therefore, 
banking institutions are located in the right bottom of Figure 2-1 representing the specialness of 
financial industry security. 
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Figure 2-1: Four model of security (Source: Button (2008: 127)) 
Minimum security No commercial pressure Absolute security 
Local museum 
Housing estate 
Hospital 
Political infrastructure 
Military infrastructure 
Nuclear plant 
Supermarket Airport and airline 
Banking institutions 
 
Minimum security Commercial pressure Absolute security 
 
Security systems have traditionally focused on physical security to prevent unauthorized access to 
equipment, installations and valuables and to safeguard against crime and damage (Aleem et al., 2013). 
For example, cash-in-transit (CIT) is crucial for the success of the financial industry because cash must 
be safely transferred from one bank to another. However, CIT belongs to private security industry, not 
to financial industry, thus, was excluded in the study. Plus, the value of informational assets has 
increased substantially as advanced IT has brought new threats such as identity theft and cyber 
breaches. For example, in the US, hackers accessed customer records on as many as 146 million 
Americans, including personal details, such as social security numbers that finance companies typically 
use to verify customers (The Financial Times, 2017). 
As a consequence, ‘converged security’ for corporate risk management has been highlighted as a 
means of addressing blended threats (Aleem et al., 2013). Despite evolving security threats, one 
element always remains as a constant fragility of security systems: the human element, especially, 
insiders of corporations who can have a significant impact on security systems not only as ‘capable 
guardians’ but also as ‘likely offenders’ (Button, 2008; Felson, 2002; Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). 
For instance, customer data in banks can be breached or stolen with the assistance of those who have 
privileged  access to the data, who are employees. Even in nuclear security systems that are very highly 
guarded, insider threats have been the most serious challenges because most thefts of nuclear 
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materials were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders (Bunn and Sagan, 2014). 
Therefore, by the same token, in the current study, ‘financial industry security’ is investigated from 
the perspective of protecting an organization from the constant inside vulnerability, occupational 
fraud. This attempt can be a very valuable endeavour considering the scarcity of research on banking 
sector especially in security studies, which have mostly focused on other business areas, such as retail 
industry (Hollinger, 1997; Langton and Hollinger, 2005).  
A security system should be founded on the primary measures of ensuring crime never happens. 
Therefore, security systems are eventually about the ‘power’ to get people to behave, or not to 
behave in a particular way (Button, 2008). According to Lukes (1974), the first dimension of power is 
about the ability of one person to achieve compliance by others, as a result of the power being exerted. 
The second dimension is about setting and changing an agenda, which influences other’s decision-
making. The last dimension of power is about ‘thought control’, or manipulation of others’ decision-
making without them even realizing it. Whilst the first two dimensions of power describe how it can 
be overtly used to get someone to do something, the third dimension of power refers to how power 
can covertly manipulate others to do something (Lukes, 1974). Button (2008) applied Lukes’ three 
dimensions of power to a security setting and claimed that the third-dimensional power should be the 
primary basis for security systems. Nonetheless, he also argued that the ultimate security system 
should be built upon all three dimensions. The application of three dimensional power in a security 
setting is summarized in Figure 2-2 below. 
 
Figure 2-2: Luke’s three-dimensional model of power applied to security (Source: Button (2008:145)) 
THIRD DIMENSION 
 
Primary measures 
Creating mentalities to achieve outcomes subconsciously 
 
Changing malefactors’ behaviour 
Social measures 
Deterrence 
 
Refocusing the behaviour of malefactors 
Situational measures 
Design 
Image and reputation 
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SECOND DIMENSION 
 
Secondary measures 
 
Presence 
 
Officer presence 
Product presence 
FIRST DIMENSION 
 
Tertiary measures 
Effective human element 
 
Verbal questions 
↓ 
Verbal requests 
(making use of universal and select legal tools) 
↓ 
Verbal threats 
↓ 
Coercion 
↓ 
Call the manager and/or police 
 
2.3 Savings and Loan Crisis in the US 
The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a severe crisis among US savings and lending institutions 
(commonly called the S&L Debacle). More than 2,100 savings institutions and commercial banks failed, 
the largest number since the Great Depression (Tillman, 2015). The savings and loan industry was 
rescued from total collapse with a $125 billion, taxpayer-funded bailout. It was estimated that it would 
cost $500 billion to bail out insolvent savings and loan institutions by the year 2021. While estimates 
varied on the exact proportion of this financial crisis that was attributable to crime and fraud, there 
was widespread consensus that bank fraud enabled one of the costliest series of white-collar crimes 
in history (Calavita and Pontell, 1991). The US federal agency calculated that fraud was the cause of 
the insolvencies of 40 percent of the 450 savings and loan institutions. In 1987 and 1988, the federal 
thrift regulatory agency referred over 11,000 savings and loan cases to the Justice Department for 
possible criminal prosecution. The analyses of the crisis focused on the roles that deregulation, 
corruption, and criminogenic market structure played in creating incentives for insiders to loot their 
institutions, sometimes called ‘control fraud’ or ‘collective embezzlement’ (Black, 2005; Calavita et al., 
1997; Tillman, 2015). 
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Late twentieth-century capitalism in the US was decreasingly characterized by production and 
manufacturing activity and was increasingly centred on financial transactions. In this ‘finance 
capitalism’, profits were made by so-called ‘fiddling with money’. The new means of production 
entailed corporate takeovers, land speculation, currency trading, real estate ventures, futures trading, 
and land swaps. Given the significance of the economic and organizational structure in the broader 
economy, the qualitatively different ‘production’ process in finance capitalism generated new forms 
of corporate crime in response to new sets of ‘pressure’ and ‘opportunities’.  The variety of criminal 
activity that was uncovered in thrift institutions was seemingly endless. However, the most blatant 
form was ‘collective embezzlement’, siphoning off of funds from an institution by that institution’s top 
management (Calavita et al., 1997; Calavita and Pontell, 1991). 
Different from the traditional embezzlers described by Cressey (1953), the offenders of ‘collective 
embezzlement’ were not lone lower-level employees but institutions’ owners and operators, acting 
within networks of conspirators inside or outside the institution. Collective embezzlement ranged 
from an outright looting of an institution’s cash or other resources, to business practices where the 
sole purpose was the generation of personal profits for management, despite their negative effect on 
the health of the bank. Throwing lavish parties, travelling around the world in private planes, and 
buying expensive antiques and yacht, thrift executives spent billions of dollars on personal luxuries. 
Plus, transactions were fabricated in order to receive fees and commissions, profits were inflated to 
extract additional dividends, and executive salaries were padded. The most widespread form of 
embezzlement used ‘land flips’, transfers of land between related parties to fraudulently inflate the 
value of land (Tillman and Indergaard, 2005). After analysing the crisis, Calavita and Pontell (1991) 
suggested that these financial institutions had a number of fundamental characteristics in common, 
but the most obvious one was that they functioned as the organizations handling other people’s 
money; the opportunity structure and the composition of risk as defined by regulation and 
enforcement activity provided the causal context for the preparation of wide spread embezzlement 
and other financial crimes, creating criminogenic conditions in the US financial industry (Tillman, 2015).  
 
2.4 Occupational fraud and Fraud Triangle Theory 
2.4.1 Fraud and occupational fraud 
Two principal methods exist to get something illegally from others: by physical force or by deceitful 
trickery. The first type of crime is called robbery and the second type is called fraud (Albrecht et al, 
2015). Webster’s New World Dictionary (1964) defined fraud as “a generic term, and embraces all the 
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multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one individual, to get 
an advantage over another by false representations. No definite invariable rule can be laid down as a 
general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which 
another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those which limit human knavery”.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary (1961) also defined fraud as “intentional deception by concealing or 
misrepresenting information that harms the financial interest of another person(s) and benefit the 
financial interests of the perpetrator.”  
There are various ways of categorizing fraud: (1) fraud committed between individuals, (2) fraud 
committed against business, (3) fraud committed against government, and (4) fraud committed by 
business (Kass-Shraibman and Sampath, 2011). More simply, fraud can be divided into (1) fraud 
committed against organizations and (2) fraud committed on behalf of organizations. Fraud against 
organization by members of the company is referred to ‘occupational fraud’ and these types of fraud 
are so common that nearly every organization experiences occupational fraud (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
Occupational fraud is sometimes called ‘internal’, ‘insider’ or ‘employee’ fraud (Bonny et al., 2015; 
Edge, 2016; Gunduz and Onder, 2013; Rossi, 2012) or just referred to as fraud (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; 
Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Murphy and Free, 2016). 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) defines occupational fraud as “the use of one’s 
occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization’s resources or assets” (ACFE, 2012: 6-7). Occupational fraud can be committed by all 
members of an organization from ordinary employees to executives and it entails three major 
categories: (1) asset misappropriation, which includes the theft or misuse of an organization’s asset; 
(2) corruption, where employees use their influence in business transaction to obtain unauthorized 
benefits contrary to their duties to employers; (3) making fraudulent financial statements, which 
normally involves making reported financial statements look better than they really are (Albrecht et 
al., 2015). In the first two categories of crime, the employers are normally the ‘victims’ whereas in the 
last category, fraudulent financial statement commonly takes the form of a corporate crime or 
unethical pro-organizational behavior, which generally benefits the organization and the general 
public and society become the ‘victims’ (Holtfreter, 2005b; Friedrichs, 2010).  
According to the ACFE’s biennial reports, the typical organization loses approximately 5 percent of its 
annual revenue due to occupational fraud with the median loss of one case estimated at around 
$150,000. The median length of the fraud schemes was 18 months from the beginning until detection 
and they are more likely to be detected by ‘tips and complaints’ than other means such as internal, 
external audit, or internal controls. Among the three categories, asset misappropriation was the most 
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frequently committed fraud followed by corruption and fraudulent financial statement. However, in 
terms of losses, the order was reversed. Fraudulent financial statements caused the largest losses, 
followed by corruption and asset misappropriation (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Lokanan (2015) criticized 
the ACFE’s conceptualization of fraud because it defined fraud as a dishonest act, rooted in the 
individual’s frail morality, failing to consider the effects of wider societal and historical influences. 
However, the researcher believes that definition and typology of the ACFE’s ‘occupational fraud’ 
provided a useful tool of analyzing white-collar crime at a workplace level, especially in financial 
industry by including corruption in fraud. By the same token, many studies adopted the ACFE’s 
definition and typology for their analysis of fraud (Greenlee et al., 2007; Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 
2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; Timofeyev, 2015). Therefore, the researcher also adopts the ACFE’s 
definition of occupational fraud for this study. The sub-categories of each type of occupational fraud 
are summarized below. 
 
Table 2-1: Types of occupational fraud (Source: Fraud Tree, ACFE)2 
Type Sub-type 
Asset misappropriation Cash, inventory, information, securities 
Corruption Conflict of interest, bribery, illegal gratuities, extortion 
Financial statement fraud 
Net worth/Income overstatement, 
Net worth/Income understatement 
 
Firstly, organizational assets can be misappropriated by employees, vendors, and customers in mainly 
three ways: (1) they can steal receipts of cash and other assets before them being recorded in the 
company’s accounting system as coming into an organization (called skimming); (2) they can steal cash, 
inventory, and other assets that are on hand through larceny or embezzlement; (3) they can commit 
disbursement fraud by having the organization pay for something it should not pay for or overpay for 
purchases, which is commonly called as ‘padding the expense’ (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
                                                          
2 http://www.acfe.com/fraud-tree.aspx 
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The second type of occupational fraud, corruption, is one of the oldest white-collar crimes known to 
human history. The tradition of paying off public officials or company insiders for preferential 
treatment has been embedded in illegal business practices for a long time. Many types of occupational 
fraud involve ‘commercial’ bribery, which is something of value offered to influence a business 
decision such as kickbacks. Another form of corruption, a conflict of interest occurs when an employee, 
a manager, or an executive has an undisclosed economic or personal interest in a transaction that 
adversely affects the company. Economic extortion and illegal gratuities are the flip side of bribery. 
Instead of vendor offering a payment to an employee to influence a decision, the employee demands 
a payment from a vendor to make a decision in that vendor’s favor (Albrecht et al., 2015; Goldstraw-
White and Gill, 2016). 
The last type of occupational fraud is financial statement fraud, also known as ‘management fraud’. 
Financial statement fraud almost always involves company management and is the result of pressures 
to meet internal and external expectation. This type of fraud results in large losses for investors, lack 
of trust in the market and even the fall of the company (Albrecht et al., 2015). There are numerous 
examples of how management have ‘cooked their books’ including Enron, the US energy giant 
company and Daewoo, once the third largest Korean conglomerate (Albrecht et al, 2010). The 
disciplines of auditing and forensic accounting have developed much research to prevent financial 
statement fraud in organizations (Free, 2015; Singleton and Singleton, 2010).  
2.4.2 Fraud Triangle Theory 
Donald Cressey’s Fraud Triangle Theory (1953, 1971) depicts that there is a high probability of fraud 
when pressure (incentive), opportunity, and rationalization (attitude) intermingle at the same time. 
However, some imply that all three elements only apply to ‘first time’ or ‘accidental’ offenders and 
not to repeat offenders, who are known as ‘predators’ (Dorminey et al., 2012). In the case of the latter, 
only one condition is necessary to commit fraud, which is opportunity. Although challenges and 
caveats have been made to Fraud Triangle Theory (Dorminey et al., 2012; Lokanan, 2015; Schuchter 
and Levi, 2016), the three elements of the Fraud Triangle have been established in the official fraud 
risk assessment framework for anti-fraud practitioners, especially for auditors and accounting 
professionals as expressed below in the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 (AICPA, 2002). 
“Three conditions generally are present when fraud occurs. First, management or other employees 
have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, 
circumstances exist. For example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of 
management to override controls that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. Third, 
those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act.” 
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The first element of the triangle, ‘pressure’, can be divided into three main categories: (1) financial, 
(2) vices, (3) work-related pressures. Either financial or vice-related pressures represent the majority 
of fraud motives. Work-related pressure such as job dissatisfaction or a desire to ‘beat’ the system 
comprises a relatively small proportion of motives (Albrecht et al., 2015). Financial pressure usually 
stems from greed, living beyond one’s means, personal debt, or poor credit (Wilks and Zimbelman, 
2004). The financial motivation is sometimes created by vices such as gambling, drugs, alcohol, and 
lavish extramarital relationships (Albrecht et al., 2015). The ‘luxury fever’ of living in an era of excessive 
spending in the contemporary social context can pressure people into wanting more luxury goods and 
believing that being a ‘success’ is more important than having ‘integrity’ (Coleman, 1987; Frank, 2001). 
Therefore, pressure is regarded as controllable to some extent through ethics (Dorminey et al., 2012; 
Rodgers et al., 2015; Schuchter and Levi, 2016).  
The second element, ‘opportunity’ indicates that controls are weak and the chances of detection and 
punishment are distant (Dorminey et al., 2010; Rodgers et al., 2015). Contrary to pressure and 
rationalization which are hard to observe, ‘opportunity’ can be observed by measuring the 
effectiveness of controls and its detection capability. Having an effective internal control is the first 
step for any organizations that wish to prevent, detect and deter occupational fraud (Albrecht et al., 
2015). An effective system of control, with the right balance of preventive and detective measures, 
can significantly decrease an organization’s vulnerabilities to fraud (ACFE, 2015).  
The final element of the triangle, ‘rationalization’ is an attempt to diminish the cognitive dissonance 
within a decision-maker arising from the act of committing fraud (Festinger, 1957; Ramamoorti, 2008). 
When ordinary laymen first contemplate committing fraud, they have to be able to bend their moral 
standards, maintaining their self-identity as moral people so as to minimize any distress. The ordinary 
person never wants to see themselves as a criminal. One of the most common rationalization methods 
for embezzlers is the ‘temporary loan’ justification (Cressey, 1971; Goldstraw-White, 2012). Fraudsters 
begin to steal money from the company by assuring themselves that the money will be paid back in 
the near future, but fall into a slippery slope and continue to defraud the organisation (Albrecht et al., 
2015; Levi, 2008). However, Zeitz (1981) found that for female embezzlers, ‘just borrowing’ 
rationalization was less frequent than an urgent need for funds involving family’s desperation.  
Afterwards, Albrecht et al (1984) replaced ‘rationalization’ with ‘personal integrity’ developing the 
Fraud Scale Theory. Personal integrity refers to the individual code of ethical behavior such as honesty. 
Because rationalization is the least observable factor among the elements (AICPA, 2002: Sec. 316.35), 
the benefit of using personal integrity instead of rationalization is that it may be more easily 
observable through the scrutiny of an employee’s daily decision making and can be used to assess the 
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likelihood of the employee’s involvement in fraud (Dorminey et al., 2010). Furthermore, Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) added capability to the triangle proposing Fraud Diamond Theory. Capability 
includes the individual know-how to circumvent detection, the authoritative position in an 
organization, confidence and ego and resistance to stress, etc.  Moreover, additional motives of fraud 
such as M.I.C.E, (money, ideology, coercion and ego) were suggested to broaden a framework beyond 
pressure and rationalization by considering an expanded set of motivator (Kranacher et al., 2010). 
Recently, collusive nature of fraud, which was not adequately addressed by Fraud Triangle was 
explored to explain fraud more accurately (Button et al., 2018; Free and Murphy, 2015).  
 
Table 2-2: Fraud triangle (scale) elements with regard to observability and domain of control 
Domain of control Observability 
Relatively hard  Relatively easy 
Ethics Rationalization Pressure Integrity 
Rationality   Opportunity 
(Weak internal control or 
Low risk of getting caught) 
 
 
Although Fraud Triangle Theory has some weaknesses and limitations, the Theory is cemented as a 
useful framework not only because it heuristically explains the causes of fraud but also because it 
pragmatically presents ways of countering fraud (ACFE, 2015; Albrecht et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 
2012; Free, 2015; Schuchter and Levi, 2016). Opportunity can be reduced by strengthening a control 
system to increase the probability of detection and punishment. According to perceptual deterrence 
theory, if the perceived certainty of detection and punishment is high, there is a lower probability of 
involvement in criminal activities (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Hollinger and Clark, 1983).  
However, many studies also argue that another important factor should be incorporated to prevent 
employees’ fraud in organizations. An individual’s intention to commit crime is affected not only by 
anticipation of certain punishment but also by moral and ethical inhibition (Paternoster and Simpson, 
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1996; Simpson et al., 2013; Trevino, 1986). Therefore, having an ethical environment is suggested as 
a solution to eliminate the elements of ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ in the Fraud Triangle (Albrecht 
et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 2012; Murphy and Free, 2016). Additionally, screening out ethically 
problematic job-applicants, is stressed as a first step in combatting fraud (Button and Brooks, 2008; 
Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). After hiring new workers, organizations must prevent employees’ 
moral disengagement, and its potential effect on ‘rationalization’, by nurturing an ethical environment 
through effective ethics education and codes of conduct (Detert et al., 2008; Shu and Gino, 2012). 
Figure 2-3 presents a diagram for fraud prevention. 
 
 Figure 2-3: A diagram for fraud prevention (adapted from Albrecht et al. (2015: 124)) 
 
2.5 Ethics 
2.5.1 Anti-rationalization  
People make unethical decisions when moral self-regulatory processes that generally inhibit unethical 
behaviour are turned off by adopting several interrelated cognitive mechanisms collectively named as 
‘moral disengagement’ (Bandura, 1986). For instance, rationalization such as denial of responsibility, 
denial of injury, and denial of victim was attributed to facilitate fraud and corruption (Anand et al., 
2005).  However, Bandura’s moral disengagement framework is not entirely new to other research 
area such as organizational behaviour, accounting theory and criminal justice studies (Coleman, 1987; 
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Goldstraw-White, 2012; Free, 2015). For example, the use of accounting theory in criminology has to 
date mainly on neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Developed from Sutherland’s (1961) 
theory of differential association, Sykes and Matza attempted to elucidate how a person’s sense of 
moral obligation, normally constrained by the law and the group norms, may be temporarily freed and 
may allow individuals float into deviant behaviours (Goldstraw-White, 2012; Matza, 1964).  
Significantly, the timing related to fraud rationalization is very important because it might impact on 
anti-fraud programmes. Generally, the fraud triangle’s construct of rationalization is thought to occur 
before the fraudulent act (Cressey, 1971; Dorminey et al., 2010; 2012) or may concurrently form the 
part of motivation (ACFE, 2015; Coleman, 1987: 406). 
“Similarly, one in somewhat the same position could conceivably be sharply aware of the fact that his 
disgrace could be avoided if he violated his trusted position, yet he would not necessarily violate that 
position. He must first apply to the situation a verbalization which enables him to violate the trust and, 
at the same time, to look upon himself as a non-violator (Cressey, 1971: 31-32).” 
As a corollary, anti-rationalization is frequently addressed in counter-fraud effort through training and 
awareness (Free, 2015). Anti-rationalization is likely to be especially important in organizational 
settings because hierarchical structures and the division of labour in a company can lead to more 
‘moral disengagement’ mechanisms, which should be curbed to prevent unethical behaviours in 
organizations (Bandura, 1986; Detert et al., 2008).  
For fraud inherently includes deception or false representation, there are violations of ethics, trust, 
and responsibility at the core (Clement, 2006). Therefore, ethics cope with rationalization (Dorminey 
et al., 2010; Rodgers et al., 2015). Furthermore, rationalization is a final judgemental step which 
completes fraudulent activities (Rodgers et al., 2015). Pressure and opportunity can open the gate but 
rationalization enables the fraudster to finally walk through the gate. As mentioned already, Fraud 
Scale Theory slightly edited Fraud Triangle by replacing rationalization with more observable personal 
integrity (Albrecht et al., 1984). Integrity can be defined as ‘honesty, sincerity, fairness, and adherence 
to high moral standards’ (Audi and Murphy, 2006: 14). Because rationalization can be moderated or 
mediated by personal integrity, it is generally believed that employees with higher integrity would not 
easily rationalize unethical behaviours. In other words, rationalization can be suppressed by 
encouraging a strong sense of integrity and cultivating a positive organizational culture (Albrecht et 
al., 1984: Albrecht et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 2012). 
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2.5.2 Ethical corporate culture  
Schuchter and Levi (2016) interviewed fraudsters in Switzerland and Austria and found that they had 
a ‘fraud-inhibiting inner voice’ before committing fraud and those fraudsters argued that this voice 
was highly influenced by the ‘corporate culture’ and waned as fraud was taking place. In a similar vein, 
Murphy and Free (2016: 52) defined an instrumental climate as ‘one in which employees make 
decisions in their own or the organization’s best interests to the exclusion of ethical concerns’ and 
found that an instrumental climate was present when 40 percent of fraud was perpetrated in their 
survey. This climate was also associated with particular elements of the fraud triangle including 
motives such as a malevolent work environment and pressures as well as rationalization. 
The concepts of culture and climate are sometimes interchangeably used to explain organizational 
behavior, especially unethical behavior. The culture is the members’ beliefs about how the 
organization should behave and operate, whereas the climate is a shared perception of how the 
organization is currently operating (Agarwal and Malloy, 1999). Therefore, ethical culture is more 
aimed at influencing behavior whereas ethical climate is more likely associated with attitude (Trevino 
et al., 1998). Trevino defines ethical culture as “a subset of organizational culture, representing a 
multidimensional interplay among various formal and informal systems of behavioral control that are 
capable of promoting either ethical or unethical behavior. Formal cultural systems embrace factors 
such as policies, leadership, authority structures, reward systems, and training programs. Informal 
systems involve factors such as peer behavior and ethical norms (Trevino et al., 1998: 451).” By the 
same token, Schwartz (2013) argued that three essential elements must be present if illegal or 
unethical activities within or on behalf of the corporation are to be minimized through maintaining an 
ethical corporate culture. The three elements entail (1) the existence of a set of core ethical values 
embedded throughout the corporation in its policies, process, and practices; (2) the establishment of 
a formal ethics programme such as a code of ethics, ethics training, and an ethics hotline; (3) the 
continuous presence of ethical leadership, which is an appropriate ‘tone at the top’ as reflected by 
the board of directors, senior executives, and managers. 
Several studies have found that ethical corporate culture not only prevents illegal or unethical 
behaviors but also produces more appropriate outcomes in organizations (Schwartz, 2013; Trevino 
and Weaver, 2001). For example, the Ethics Resource Center (2010) found that in stronger ethical 
cultures, (1) much fewer employees feel pressure to commit misconduct (4% versus 15%), (2) the rates 
of observed misconduct are much smaller (39% versus 76%), (3) employees who witness unethical 
behavior are more likely to whistle-blow it (43% versus 28%), and (4) those who whistle-blow unethical 
behavior are less likely to experience retaliation (4% versus 24%). If a strong ethical culture is not 
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established within an organization, especially when the ‘tone at the top,’ the ethical leadership is poor, 
the atmosphere can disseminate all around the organization resulting in rampant frauds. Similarly, 
Coleman (1987) stressed normative restraints such as honesty, fair play, and ethical culture as 
constraints on the spread of white-collar crime. He argued that work-related subcultures sometimes 
allow certain criminal activities to be seen as acceptable or even required behavior, while they are 
strongly condemned by a whole society. Other studies also implicated a high probability of employee 
misconduct when employees feel ‘underpaid’ by a company or ‘insecure’ about their job stability (Gill 
and Goldstraw-White, 2010; Greenberg, 1990; Lawrence and Kacmar, 2017).  
Significantly, based on Kohlberg’s moral development model as a guideline of individual integrity 
(Kohlberg, 1969), Trevino (1986) suggested the person–situation interaction model to predict ethical 
decision making.  At stages one and two (the pre-conventional level), an individual is concerned with 
concrete consequences, particularly external rewards and punishments, and his or her own immediate 
interests. At stages three and four (the conventional level), ‘right’ is that which conforms to the 
expectations of good behavior of the larger society, a family or peer group. Finally, at stages five and 
six (the principled level), ‘right’ is determined by universal values or principles. These principled 
individuals are expected to be ethical despite situational pressures toward unethical behavior. At the 
same time, theory and research related to the situational effects on ethical behavior offer strong 
support for situational variables having a profound effect on ethical behavior in most people. Hence, 
it is inappropriate for organizations to rely solely on individual integrity to guide behavior. Therefore, 
organizations must provide a context that supports ethical conduct such as ethical training 
programmes and ethical codes of conducts and discourages unethical behaviours (Trevino, 1986).  
Warren et al (2014) studied the effects of training on ethical organizational culture before and after 
the introduction of formal ethics training in an organization. Two years after the training, they found 
sustained effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture such as observed unethical behavior 
and perceptions of organizational efficacy in managing ethics. Generally, formal ethics training takes 
two forms; value-oriented and compliance-oriented programmes (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). 
Weaver and Trevino (1999) found that value-oriented programmes focusing on ethical values have a 
stronger influence on reducing employees’ misconduct than compliance-oriented programmes 
emphasizing threats of punishment. Plus, they discovered that both types of programmes are not 
mutually exclusive but interact for the same end. With regard to empirical evidence of a corporate 
code of conduct, McCabe et al (1996) found that self-reported unethical behavior was lower for 
respondents who work in an organization with a code of conduct than those working without it. 
Furthermore, the self-reported unethical behavior was inversely associated with the implementation 
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strength and embeddedness of the code of conduct in the company. The result gave companies very 
important insight that in order for a corporate code of conduct to be effective in preventing unethical 
behavior, it must be more than just ‘window dressing’ (Trevino, 1990).  
 
2.6 Opportunity reduction 
Coincidentally, a similar expression exists between western and eastern societies underscoring the 
role of opportunity for promoting crime.  “Opportunity makes the thief” is to English what “seeing is 
wanting (견물생심, 見物生心)” is to Korean. While most criminological theories have traditionally 
been concerned about explaining why certain individuals are more likely to engage in criminal 
behaviors compared to others, recent ‘opportunity’ theories of crime have argued that “opportunity 
is a root cause of crime (Felson and Clarke, 1998).” The opportunity theories aim to change the 
environment in which crime takes place in order to affect assessments made by potential offenders 
about the costs and benefits associated with committing particular offences (Clark, 1997: 5). As 
individual behavior is a product of an interaction between the person and the setting, the traditional 
criminological theories attempted to unravel only the individual factors of ‘criminality’ have been 
criticized for their lack of integration of individual and environmental explanatory approaches 
(Haelterman, 2016; Wikström, 2004). Felson and Clarke (1998: 2) also argued that theories about how 
‘setting’ causes crime are more fruitful in gaining empirical verification than the theories that only 
considered the individual factors. Therefore, the theory of crime settings rests on a principle that easy 
or tempting opportunities entice people into criminal action and crime can be prevented by 
eliminating opportunities (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). In other words, crime opportunities could 
be designed out. The theories, thus, are also referred to environmental criminology and these include 
routine activity theory, rational choice model and situational crime prevention strategy (Felson and 
Clark, 1998; Haelterman, 2016).  
The routine activity approach assumed that for crime to occur there must be a convergence in time 
and space of three essential elements: a ‘likely offender’, a ‘suitable target’, and the ‘absence of 
capable guardian’. These three elements are commonly called as the Basic Crime Triangle (Felson, 
1998). For rational choice theorists, deterring crime is considered an important means of decreasing 
crime opportunities. In other words, rational choice theory is based on the expected utility principle 
in economics, stating that people will make rational decisions based on the extent to which they 
expect the choice to maximize their benefits or minimize losses. If the costs of exploiting a criminal 
opportunity are perceived as bigger than the expected gain, the offender will cease the activity (Akers 
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and Sellers, 2009). This rational choice model is also closely linked to situational crime prevention, 
which is explicitly designed to reduce crime opportunities by (1) increasing the perceived effort of 
crime, (2) increasing the perceived risk of crime, (3) reducing the anticipated rewards, (4) reducing 
provocations, (5) removing excuses (Felson and Clark, 1998). 
Similarly, deterrence theory is also based on the rational choice model, which posits that individuals 
make decisions when the expected benefit outweighs expected cost. Perceptual deterrence theory 
implies that perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment will decide the rational actor’s 
chances of involving criminal or delinquent activities through the expected utility calculation (Erickson 
et al., 1977; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Paternoster, 1989). The more certain, severe, and swifter the 
punishment can be perceived by individuals, the more deterrence of crimes can be achieved as a 
corollary of perceptual deterrence. Since Beccaria’s seminal work of On Crimes and Punishments 
(2009), three significant findings are summarized from the deterrence research. Firstly, between the 
certainty and severity of punishment, indeed, consensus has been made that perceived certainty is 
more effective than severity to deter crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011; Klepper and Nagin, 1989). Secondly, 
not only legal punishments but also informal social sanctions such as loss of reputation or other 
informal social costs are sometimes more effective in deterring crime than formal sanctions (Hollinger 
and Clark, 1982; Paternoster, 1989; Simpson et al., 2013). Lastly, not with real punishments but merely 
with credible deterrent threats, crime can be controlled (Kleiman, 2009). It is also important to note 
that the perceptions of certainty can be simultaneously divided into two; the perceived certainty of 
‘detection’ and the perceived certainty of ‘punishment’. Both work in tandem because the perceived 
certainty of detection cannot be effective without the fear of following punishment and punishment 
threats are in vain if detection is far distant (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). 
Interestingly, the Fraud Triangle Theory is also based on the ‘opportunity reduction’ approach to 
prevent crime. Opportunity in the Fraud Triangle is commonly defined as (1) a control weakness is 
present, and (2) the likelihood of being caught is remote (Dominey et al., 2012: 558). Enhancing 
deterrence can also reduce opportunity by increasing the perceived probability of detection and 
punishment (ACFE, 2015; Albrecht et al., 2015). Because of their reliance on the assumption that 
opportunity is a causal factor of crime, many similarities and interconnectedness are found between 
Fraud Triangle Theory and Routine Activity Theory. However, because the Fraud Triangle Theory is 
more based on the individual perception level, the theory can be explained more dynamically by being 
dovetailed by the Basic Triangle of Routine Activity Theory, which is constructed on more wide-ranging 
settings. For example, ‘pressure’ and ‘rationalization’ can have a significant impact on ‘likely offender’ 
whereas ‘opportunity’ can be affected by ‘suitable target’ and the ‘absence of guardian’. Figure 2-4 
below illustrates the dynamics and interconnectedness between the two triangles. 
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Figure 2-4: The Relationship between the Basic Crime Triangle and Fraud Triangle.  
 
 
2.7 Anti-fraud control and investment 
2.7.1 Anti-fraud control 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has established a 
common internal control framework that most organizations implement. The Committee defines 
internal control as “a process affected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating 
to operations, reporting, and compliance” (COSO, 2013: 3). Out of the three objectives, the present 
study mainly focuses on its goal of compliance such as detecting and preventing occupational fraud in 
the Korean banking sector. As a matter of fact, the COSO integrated control framework was 
established in response to S&L failures in the US to mitigate fraud more effectively (Singleton and 
Singleton, 2010: 300) and it comprises five components: control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. This implies that very broad domains are 
encompassed in the framework including corporate governance, ethics, and opportunity reduction. 
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However, internal control can be differently categorized by various criteria: preventive and detective 
controls (ACFE, 2015; Christ et al., 2012), pre-employment and post-employment controls (Holtfreter, 
2005a), situational prevention controls (Tunley et al., 2018), and opportunity- and rationalization-
reduction controls (Dorminey et al., 2010). Anti-fraud controls in organizations can be summarized 
like Table 2-3 below (Giles, 2012). 
 
Table 2-3: Anti-fraud controls (Source: Giles, 2012) 
Generic Anti-fraud Controls 
Segregation of duties 
Authorization limits 
Physical security over assets 
Specific Preventive Controls 
Staff vetting procedures 
(criminal, credit, certification verifications) 
Mandatory vacation 
Anti-fraud policy statement (Code of conduct) 
Employee support programmes 
Anti-fraud education 
Management review of internal controls 
Specific Detective Controls 
Surprise audit 
Whistle-blowing hotline 
Reward for whistle blowers 
Computerized constant monitoring 
 
Segregation of duties is pivotal to a financial institution’s system of checks and balances and a key 
component of internal control, which means that no one individual should have absolute autonomy 
or unrestricted powers of decision-making because the fraud risks increase significantly where the 
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power is concentrated on a single person (Albrecht et al., 2015). The Baring Bank case of Leeson is a 
classic example where an absence of segregation of duties finally caused the bank into bankruptcy 
(Button, 2008). In addition, the authorization limits are another essential control that the maximum 
authority for each level of the organization’s hierarchy should be clearly specified and checked. The 
example of Jerome Kerviel at the French bank of Societe Generale represented that the breach of the 
authorization limits was devastating where he was trading far beyond his authorized limit and was not 
checked, thus enormous losses were brought to the bank (Giles, 2012). Physical security is the 
protection of assets from circumstance and events that can cause serious loss and damage to banks. 
The traditional measures range from locks, safes, alarms, CCTV, access controls, and guarding officers 
(Button, 2008; Giles, 2012).   
Staff vetting is a very important anti-fraud control to verify the credentials of new employees such as 
an applicant’s criminal records, financial history, and academic or professional qualifications before 
hiring a new employee (Albrecht et al., 2015). Mandatory vacation is a form of short-term job rotation 
based on the assumption that while the employee is on vacation, it is more likely that any illegal 
activity, if it is taking place, will be detected (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Giles, 2012). Anti-fraud policy 
statement or a code of conduct demonstrates that fraud is treated seriously at the top and shows 
clearly the organization’s commitment to fraud prevention, deterrence and detection (Giles, 2012). 
The policy should also apply to third parties that have a business relationship with the organization 
(ACFE, 2015; McCabe et al., 1996). Employee support programmes aim to help employees by means 
of confidential counselling in areas such as addiction, family problems, mental health issues, stress, 
and financial difficulties, which can alleviate pressure or motivation to commit fraud (Albrecht et al., 
2015). Anti-fraud education is the foundation of preventing and detecting occupational fraud (Warren 
et al., 2014). All managers, staff, and employees should be trained in what fraud actually is, how fraud 
damages, and how to report any suspicious activities (ACFE, 2015; Giles, 2012). Management review 
of internal control is a central part of the modern governance and risk management. The review of 
internal control should extend to line manager and team leader. Without visible and proactive 
monitoring by management, organizations will remain at risk of suffering occupational fraud (Giles, 
2012). 
Surprise audit is when the audit team’s arrival is not be notified in advance, so that no time to prepare 
for the visit is given. By giving no time to organize, it can increase the perception of detection and 
finally can deter occupational fraud amongst everybody working in their organization (Giles, 2012; 
ACFE, 2016). A whistleblowing hotline is the key anti-fraud detective control, which can alert 
organisations to a wide variety of illegal, corrupt, or fraudulent practice that might be happening in 
the organization (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Johansson and Carey, 2016). The whistle-blower who 
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reports incidents in good faith should be protected from any form of disciplinary action, retaliation or 
victimisation. Rewards for whistle-blowers is a method of encouraging whistle-blowing to report 
suspicious incidents (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 of the US provides a 
programme within the Securities and Exchange Commission to encourage people to notify securities 
violations creating rewards up to 30 percent of funds recovered for information (Giles, 2012). 
Computerized constant monitoring (also called as fraud pattern analysis) is a data monitoring system 
to identify triggering points and risk indicators within large data on a continuous or real time basis. 
This programme searches for red flags and anomalies that require further investigation. It will enable 
management or auditors to identify and report fraudulent activity much quicker, thereby reducing the 
cost of fraud (ACFE, 2016; Giles, 2012). 
Many studies imply that control weakness is a major contributory factor to occupational fraud by 
creating opportunity (Albrecht et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 2010; 2012; Rodgers et al., 2015). 
Therefore, it is vital to assess the effectiveness of controls with respect to detecting and preventing 
occupational fraud. There can be various proxy measures to gauge its effectiveness. One of the most 
common methods is to compare the median loss and detection period (ACFE, 2012; 2014; 2016), or 
the employees’ perception of the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls between one organization which 
is implementing a specific measure such as whistle-blowing programme and the other which is not 
(Tunley et al., 2018). For example, it takes an average of 18 months for fraud to be detected and the 
earlier detection is associated with the smaller losses in companies (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Despite 
the various measurement methods, control implementation and control design should be 
continuously monitored to ensure their efficacy to cope with trend changes in fraud and illegal 
activities (COSO, 2013; Holtfreter, 2005a; Lee, 2013). Furthermore, it should be always noted that 
there is a possibility that any control system can be bypassed or overridden by ‘collusion’ or 
‘management override’, which thus referred to the Achilles’ heel of fraud prevention (AICPA, 2016; 
Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012; Tipgos, 2002). 
 
2.7.2 Anti-fraud investment 
The hidden and secretive nature of occupational fraud makes it difficult for executives or managers of 
companies to realize the necessity of investment in countering fraud (ACFE, 2015). However, it should 
be noted that occupational fraud is a very expensive hidden cost (Button and Gee, 2013). For example, 
if one inventory item was stolen by an employee and the profit margin is 20 percent in the company, 
the losses (cost plus lost profit) can be recovered only after selling 5 additional items at a regular price 
(ACFE, 2015). In a current fiercely contested market situation, a competitive advantage can be 
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achieved by investing in counter-fraud measures to reduce this hidden cost (Button and Gee, 2013). 
Generally, small and medium sized organizations have limited resources and budgets to invest in anti-
fraud measures compared to large corporations. Therefore, small and medium sized organizations can 
suffer more from ‘fraud iceberg’ phenomenon suggesting that more fraud is hidden and ongoing 
because of the staffing and budget limitations on counter-fraud activity (Johansson and Carey, 2016).  
Findings from a Global Survey of Economic Crime (Bussman and Werle, 2006) showed that the number 
of controls and detection measures was one of the most significant explanatory variables for the 
detection of economic crimes. For example, companies that reported no victimization had significantly 
fewer anti-fraud measures, whereas a company assigning more employees to internal control related 
tasks was more likely to detect possible frauds (Choi et al., 2013). Lee (2013) found that the percentage 
of personnel responsible for monitoring and detecting fraud is positively associated with a good 
earnings ‘quality’: where company earnings comprise of real cash flows rather than account 
receivables. The potential benefits of anti-fraud investment can be demonstrated with reference to 
NHS in the UK, which adopted a holistic system to tackle fraud. The system has saved the NHS £811 
million from fraud, amounting to a 12 to 1 return on the investment in the NHS Counter Fraud Security 
Management Service (NHSCFSMS, 2007). Nevertheless, despite the importance of anti-fraud 
investment in corporations, the empirical academic research of the impact of anti-fraud investments 
has been very thin.  
 
2.8 Counter fraud framework 
Cressey’s fraud triangle (1953) as outlined earlier, indicated that there are three interrelated elements 
that enable someone to commit fraud: the incentive or pressure that drives a person to want to 
commit the fraud, the opportunity that facilitates him or her to commit the fraud, and the ability to 
rationalize the fraudulent behaviour. The vulnerability that an organization faces from the people 
capable of conjoining all three elements is ‘fraud risk’ (ACFE, 2015). There are various factors 
influencing fraud risk that a company faces: (1) the nature of its business, (2) the environment in which 
it operates, (3) the effectiveness of its controls, and (4) the ethics and values of the company (ACFE, 
2015). To develop a holistic security system to counter fraud risk, three stages were suggested by 
Button (2008). The first embraces strategies to identify the problem, such as risk assessment. The 
second part entails the development of strategies to address the problem such as risk management. 
Finally, monitoring the problem and adopting the system accordingly is vital as well as engaging in 
active learning (Button, 2008). This cyclical model is depicted in Figure 2-5 below.   
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Figure 2-5: A model for the development of a holistic security system (Adapted from Button, 2008: 125) 
 
Button and Gee (2013) also proposed the Fraud, Resilience and Culture Model fusing individual 
fraudsters, organizational structure and culture, and national level resilience together. At the heart of 
the model is the individual fraudster. Central to the individual is the Fraud Triangle of pressure, 
opportunity and rationalization, as discussed already. An organization always confronts a security 
system with malefactor, a person who does bad or illegal things (Button, 2008: 19). Fraud malefactors 
can be differently categorized: (1) pre-planned fraudsters, (2) intermediate fraudsters, and (3) 
slippery-slope fraudsters (Levi, 2008), or (1) predators and (2) accidental fraudsters (Dorminey et al., 
2010, 2012). These different types of malefactor element should be considered when devising 
counter-fraud strategy at a primary level. 
However, the individuals do not exist in a vacuum and there is a diversity of influences that have 
effects on them. For instance, organizational and national cultures were highlighted in influencing 
whether a person perpetrates fraud or not. In other words, the strategies to counter fraud at both 
organizational and national levels are very important (Button and Gee, 2013). By the same token, 
Ramamoorti et al. (2009) proposed the A-B-C model for the analysis of fraud: a bad Apple, a bad Bushel, 
and a bad Crop. The bad apple is an individual, the bad bushel addresses collusion and the bad crop 
refers to cultural and societal mechanisms that influence the incidence of fraud.  One of the significant 
contributions of A-B-C model is the concept of the bad Crop, which suggests a deficiency of morals at 
the top of the organization, and this decay is contagious throughout the organization and possibly 
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culture and society, making fraud endemic such as S&L crisis (Dorminey et al., 2012). In sum, Figure 2-
6 combines all these factors together for suggesting an integrated counter fraud model (Button and 
Gee, 2013). 
 
Figure 2-6: The fraud, Resilience and Culture Model (Adapted from Button and Gee, 2013:65) 
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The present study mainly focuses on organizational-level counter-fraud methods in the Korean 
banking industry. Drawn from the Fraud Triangle Theory, the counter-fraud framework for the present 
study is summarized in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2-4: Counter fraud framework (Adapted from Dorminey et al., 2010: 23) 
Anti-fraud environment 
to deflate possible rationalizations 
and pressures 
Setting proper tone at the top 
Strong ethical corporate culture 
Integrity of workplace  
Meaningful code of conduct 
Anti-fraud training programmes 
Anti-fraud controls 
to reduce perceptions of 
opportunity 
Good design of internal control 
Internal control operational as designed 
Continuous monitoring 
Effective auditing software tools 
Punishment protocol 
Open communication with employees, vendors, and 
customers 
Proper employee activity monitoring 
Effective tip hotlines 
Whistle-blower protections 
Monitoring of contractual parties 
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2.9 Conclusion 
Banking institutions in financial systems are very vulnerable to insider threat and require special 
security measures because of the severe impact on society if they fail. Occupational fraud and 
corruption have been attributed to one of the contributing factors of serious banking crises such as 
the S&L Debacle, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis in the history of finance (FCIC, 2011; Friedrichs, 
2010; Krugman and Wells, 2015; Tillman, 2015). Cressey’s Fraud Triangle Theory (1971) has been 
established as a valuable framework to explain fraud. It depicts that there is a high probability of fraud 
when pressure (incentive), opportunity, and rationalization (attitude) combine simultaneously. 
Inferred from the theory, ‘opportunity’ is suggested to be reduced by strengthening a control system 
to increase the probability of detection and punishment. The other elements of the Triangle, 
‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ are proposed to be suppressed by nurturing an ethical corporate 
environment (Albrecht et al, 2015; Dorminey et al., 2012; Murphy and Free, 2016). ‘Ethical culture’ 
and ‘opportunity reduction’ are not only the discrete measures for financial industry security but also 
can interact producing a synergy effect to the same end of countering fraud (Paternoster and Simpson, 
1996; Weaver and Trevino, 1999). The current study will thoroughly investigate the effects of two 
primary counter-fraud factors (ethical culture and opportunity reduction) on occupational fraud in the 
Korean banking sector.  
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Working on his PhD, Donald Cressey interviewed 133 embezzlers in three US prisons and formulated 
the seminal model for the occupational offender. This was published in Other people’s money: A Study 
in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement (Cressey, 1953, 1971).  His work has developed into the 
Fraud Triangle Theory. Student Cressey, then under the supervision of E. Sutherland who originated 
the phenomena, white-collar crime, began his study by a simple question: why do people embezzle 
(Schuessler, 1954). His proposed theory was that “Trusted persons become trust violators when they 
conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable, are aware that his 
problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply 
to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of 
themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds 
or property (Cressey, 1971: 30).” 
Significantly, Cressey’s theory was formed as a result of inductive reasoning, in which general 
principles are developed from specific observations which are the 133 inmate interviews in his case. 
Another good example of inductive reasoning is evolution theory by Charles Darwin, who established 
the theory through observations on his 5-year HMS Beagle voyage around the world (Darwin, 2008). 
On the other side of coin, deductive reasoning is the logical model in which specific expectations of 
hypothesis are made on the basis of general principles (Babbie, 2007: 22). In the deductive approach, 
the researcher draws on theoretical ideas in order to infer hypotheses that should then be subjected 
to empirical verification (Bryman, 2016: 21). These two approaches both function as valid paths to 
science because the deductive findings are fed back into the original principle and the theory is 
sequentially revised and strengthened. This research cycle is illustrated in Figure 3-1 below. 
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Figure 3-1: The Wheel of Science (Source: Babbie (2007:23)) 
 
 
Surprisingly, Fraud Triangle Theory, despite its significance, has not been exposed to much statistical 
scrutiny. To the best of my knowledge, quantitative studies of the Fraud Triangle have been very thin 
especially in the existing criminological literature. However, Cressey (1971: 32) also suggested that 
further studies should be made to verify his generalization. The reason for the lack of statistical 
verifications might be due to the difficulty of measuring three legs of the triangle such as perceived 
‘pressure’, ‘opportunity’, and ‘rationalization’. Especially from researchers’ point of view, individual 
level ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ are very hard to measure because they are happening in a 
subjective human mind. In this regard, the present study attempts to apply Fraud Triangle Theory by 
measuring ‘opportunity’ and ‘ethical culture’ rather than directly assessing offenders’ perceived 
‘pressure’ and ‘rationalization’ and further exploring any associations with the perceived frequency of 
fraud in organizations. The venture will contribute to the further refinement of the Theory and the 
importance of the study rests in this novel attempt.     
 
3.2 Research philosophy and approach 
The researcher’s design can be summarized as a mixed method approach. The triangulated 
methodology can elevate the rigors of research and robustness of investigation (Anderson et al, 2011). 
In terms of research philosophy, ‘pragmatism’ underpins the mixed method design. In epistemological 
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orientation, a ‘quantitative’ approach is generally based on ‘positivism’ whereas ‘qualitative’ research 
is commonly grounded on ‘interpretivism’. In ontological perspective, the former is likely to be based 
on ‘objectivism’ whereas the latter is likely to be centred on ‘constructionism’ (Bryman, 2016). 
However, ‘pragmatists’ believe in an external world independent of the minds (objectivism) as well as 
that wedged in the mind (constructionism). Hence, ‘pragmatism’ is not committed to any one system 
of philosophy, but it is open to multiple methods, worldviews and different assumptions. Instead of 
focusing on methods, ‘pragmatists’ highlight the research problem and utilize all approaches available 
to understand the problem (Rossman and Wilson, 1985). ‘Pragmatists’ believe that truth is what works 
at the time, thus, in mixed method approach, investigators take advantage of both ‘quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative’ data because they serve to provide the best understanding of a research problem 
(Creswell, 2014).  
There are various types of mixed method designs. Out of those, explanatory sequential mixed method 
approach was utilized for this research. Explanatory sequential mixed method is a design that 
integrates a two-stage project where the researcher gathers quantitative data in the first place, 
analyses the results, and then employs the outcomes to conduct the qualitative research. The overall 
purpose of the design is to have qualitative data to assist in explaining in more detail the initial 
quantitative outcomes. A typical procedure might involve collecting survey data in the first stage, 
analysing the data, and then conducting qualitative interviews (Creswell, 2014).  
For the first phase of this study, the researcher employed two different types of self-administered 
questionnaires. One questionnaire was designed for the Korean police officers who have investigated 
fraud cases in the banking industry within the last decade. Because fraud is hidden and not every fraud 
is disclosed, one alternative way to explore fraud is to ask fraud investigators about its characteristics. 
(ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). The other questionnaire was distributed to the employees in the banking 
industry to gauge their perceptions of fraud risk and control effectiveness in their organizations. 
For the second phase of the study, the researcher used the qualitative research method, which is an 
investigative process to make sense of a social phenomenon by contrasting, comparing, cataloguing 
and classifying the object of study (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Based on the analyses of the 
perceptions, vulnerabilities, and associations discovered by the first quantitative study, the research 
question, “What and how to be improved to reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry?” will 
be explored by semi-structured interviews with bank managers and employees. The approach and 
design of the present study are summarized in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1: Research approach and design 
No Research Questions Target 
Respondent 
Methods and 
Approach 
1 “What are the characteristics of occupational fraud committed 
in South Korean banking industry? Is there any evidence that 
gender; positon; financial sector had an effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking industry?” 
Police 
investigators 
Survey 
Questionnaire 1 
(Quantitative) 
2 “What are the bank employees’ perceptions of fraud risk? Is 
there any evidence that gender; position; financial sector had 
an effect on the perceived risk of occupational fraud?” 
Bank 
employees 
Survey 
Questionnaire 2 
(Quantitative) 
3 “What are the bank employees’ perceptions of the 
effectiveness of counter-fraud controls? Is there any evidence 
that gender; position; financial sector had an effect on the 
perceived effectiveness of counter-fraud?” 
4 “Is there any significant association among the perceived risk, 
counter-fraud effectiveness, and frequency of occupational 
fraud?” 
5 “What and how can systems be improved to reduce 
occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry?” 
Bank 
employees 
Supervisory 
officials (FSS), 
Policy makers 
and Counter-
fraud experts 
Semi-structured 
Interview 
(Qualitative) 
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3.3 Research methods 
3.3.1 Self-administered survey questionnaires 
A survey questionnaire is a type of the cross-sectional research design that entails the collection of 
samples at a single point in time to gather a body of quantitative data in connection with two or more 
variables, which are then examined to discover any associations (Bryman, 2016: 53). For this study, a 
comparative design method was adopted, based on the assumption that social phenomenon can be 
better understood when two or more contrasting cases are compared at the same time (Bryman, 2016: 
65). Two different financial sectors (commercial banks/community banking institutions) are compared 
because the two sectors can provide valuable insights on managing occupational fraud in terms of  
organizational characteristics such as size, regulation, and governance structure. The differences 
between two Korean financial sectors will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter. The study’s 
comparative data collection strategy is illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
  
Figure 3-2: A comparative design (Adapted from Bryman (2016:65)) 
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3.3.1.1 The first questionnaire to Korean police officers 
To answer the first research question about the characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking 
industry, a self-completion questionnaire was administered to Korean police officers, who have 
investigated occupational fraud in the industry within the last 10 years. Korea has a central national 
police system and total number of the Korean national police is approximately 120,000 including 
patrol officers, riot police and traffic officers, etc. Within this number there are approximately 20,000 
police investigators all around the country. Among the 20,000 police investigators, approximately half 
are working in an economic crime division in every police station around the country and they are 
responsible for fraud investigation in his/her jurisdiction (Korean National Police Agency, 2016). 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) also adopts the same approach that the 
researcher employed. Every two years, ACFE releases the Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse.  As part of the survey, the respondents, who are certified fraud examiners (CFE), are asked 
to provide details of the fraud case they have investigated. The individual questions in the survey were 
adapted from the ACFE reports (2012, 2014, 2016) and the researcher asked the police investigators 
to participate in a self-administered questionnaire about the details of occupational fraud cases 
investigated by them.  
The cases answered by the police officers were required to meet the following three criteria: 
1. The case must be occupational fraud in the banking industry. 
2. The investigation must have been conducted in the last 10 years. 
3. The investigation and prosecution must have been completed at the time of survey 
participation. 
The survey was administered to the police investigators who attended the Korean Police Investigation 
Academy (KPIA) 3 , the official training institution for the Korean police investigators, where the 
researcher had served as a professor before coming to the UK. The academy was founded by the 
National Police Agency for educating investigators to sharpen their investigative methods and skills. 
The academy offers various training opportunities regarding the investigation of all kinds of crime 
including homicide, violent crime, cyber-crime, and white-collar crime. Every year, approximately 
4,000 police investigators in total attend a number of courses in the academy all year round. The 
courses range from 1 to 24 weeks depending on the education programme and each class has around 
30 officers. During the course, the officers are exempt from their daily duty and usually stay in the 
                                                          
3 http://www.kpia.go.kr 
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dormitory focusing on training. Every police investigator should attend at least one course during the 
five-year period of their duty as a requirement to maintain their status as investigator. The chance of 
attendance is evenly distributed to all police investigators nationwide. Therefore, the researcher 
selected the academy as a sampling place that is likely to represent all police investigators. The survey 
questionnaire was composed of three sections and twenty five questions. The first section was about 
the characteristics of occupational fraud, the second about the profiles of perpetrators, and the third 
section about the responses from the Korean criminal justice system. The survey data were collected 
from July to November, 2016 and totalled 53 valid responses. The information sheet, survey invites 
and questionnaire are all included in the Appendix. 
3.3.1.2 The second questionnaire to the current bank employees  
In order to answer Research Questions 2, 3, and 4 (the bank employees’ perceptions of occupational 
fraud risk, the effectiveness of counter-occupational fraud in their organization, any significant 
associations between the variables), the individual questions in the survey questionnaire were 
developed from KPMG Fraud Survey (2009) and a self-completion questionnaire was administered to 
the bank employees in two different Korean financial sectors. A convenience sampling method was 
adopted for the survey. Convenience sampling is a term that capture all forms of sampling that are 
not conducted according to the principles of probability sampling. Probability sampling is usually 
regarded as an ideal method because a sample is selected randomly, so that each unit in the 
population has a known chance of selection. However, probability sampling can be costly and time 
consuming. Furthermore, random sampling is only possible when there is a proper sampling frame: a 
listing of all units in the population from which the sample is selected. (Bryman, 2016). Unfortunately, 
the current study could not obtain a sampling frame because the Korean banking industry is so large 
and complex. However, given the exploratory nature of the study and the limitation of time and 
funding, convenience sampling was selected as the second best option. Even probability sampling can 
have a bias (Babbie, 2007: 188-189; Bryman, 2016: 176) and in the real world of research, there is 
widespread use of convenience and other non-random samples (Robson, 2011: 277).  
Out of convenient sampling, proportional quota and snowball sampling methods were adopted for 
the study. Proportional quota sampling allows researchers to sample a subgroup of interest and is 
sometimes claimed by some practitioners to be almost as good as probability sampling (Bryman, 2016: 
187-190). If a study aims to investigate a characteristic of a certain subgroup, this type of sampling can 
be a useful technique when probability sampling is impossible. The researcher aimed to compare the 
differences between the bank workers in two different sectors. Mutually exclusive proportional sub-
categorization was enabled according to the types of bank, because the approximate population of 
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the bank employees was obtained from the statistics of FSS4 and federations of each type of financial 
institutions5. The Korean bank employee population and percentage is outlined in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2: The summary of Korean bank employee population and percentage 
Sector Type 
Approximate 
Number of 
Employees 
Percentage 
The First  Financial 
Sector 
Nationwide banks 90,000 53.25% 
Regional banks 11,000 6.51% 
The Second Financial 
Sector 
Local agricultural and 
fishery cooperatives  
35,000 20.71% 
Community credit 
cooperatives  
15,000 8.88% 
Credit unions 10,000 5.92% 
Savings banks 8,000 4.73% 
Total  169,000 100% 
 
The survey questionnaire used a web-based platform of Survey Monkey, and was accessed through a 
URL (https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/HZLRF3G) from June to September, 2016. The researcher is 
a member of Korean anti-money laundering working group6, founded to educate workers of the 
financial industry to anti-money laundering. There are approximately 2,000 members, most working 
in banking institutions. The researcher had the last known email addresses and mobile phone numbers  
available for members of the group and used these for the survey. Participants were invited to 
contribute thorough an invitation letter. They were also asked to distribute the survey to their 
colleagues , using a snowball sampling method.  
                                                          
4 http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/bbs/list.jsp?bbsid=1207396624018andurl=/fss/kr/1207396624018 
5 https://www.kfcc.co.kr/ 
6 http://www.nfsi.or.kr/main.asp 
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The survey questionnaire was composed of five sections and sixty three questions. The first section 
was about the perceived fraud risk, the second section about the specific anti-occupational fraud 
controls and their effectiveness, the third section about the perception of counter-occupational fraud 
such as perceived ‘opportunity’ and ‘anti-fraud culture’ in their organization, the fourth section  about 
the frequency/loss due to occupational fraud in the last 5 years, and the last section about socio-
demographic questions. In total, 395 valid responses were obtained. The information sheet, survey 
invite, consent and questionnaire are all included in Appendices A-2. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interview  
For the second phase of the study, a qualitative research method was conducted from December 2016 
to April 2017 based on the results of analyses of the first stage of the quantitative study. The last 
research question, “what and how can systems be improved to reduce occupational fraud in the 
banking industry?” was explored by a semi-structured interview. Interviews were scheduled with 
managers and employees of each type of bank, supervisory officials of the FSS, a policy maker of the 
Bank of Korea and a university professor, who all had a keen interest and experience in managing 
occupational fraud. Snowball sampling method was also adopted (Babbie 2007: 185).  
After the target interviewee was selected, the host organization of the prospective participant was 
contacted by a formal letter with full information of the study and a request that they consent to their 
employee being approached. If permission was given from the host organization, this initial approach 
was followed up by a written briefing and invitation to the target participant. Face to face semi-
structured interviews were arranged in a meeting room or a nearby coffee shop if preferred. If agreed 
by the participant interviews were recorded. Interview places were selected carefully to provide 
participants with comfortable and confidential environment and the researcher began interviews 
after building up rapport with participants, such as a small talk. The invitations, consent, information 
sheet and semi-structured interview questions, all appear at Appendix B. The interview list is 
summarized in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3: Semi-structured interview list 
Type of institution Number of Interviewees Interview Topic 
Nationwide banks 5 
“What and how 
to be improved to 
reduce 
occupational 
fraud in the 
banking 
industry?” 
Regional banks 1 
Specialized banks 1 
Local agricultural and fishery 
cooperatives 
1 
Community credit cooperatives  1 
Credit unions 1 
Savings banks 2 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 2 
The Bank of Korea 1 
University (professor) 1 
Total 16 
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3.4 Hypotheses and analyses  
3.4.1 Quantitative study 
For the first phase of quantitative study, descriptive statistics, chi-square tests (contingency tables), 
independent sample t-tests and regression analyses were conducted through SPSS to compare the 
differences between the two financial sectors and to discover any relation between the variables. For 
the analysis, some variables were measured thorough 5-point Likert scale in the surveys (Bryman, 
2016). The goal of the Likert scale is to measure intensity of attitudes or feelings about the areas in 
question. Like other typical format of a Likert scale, the surveys comprise a series of statements that 
focus on a certain theme of occupational fraud, and each respondent was asked to indicate his or her 
level of agreement with the statement. In the study, the format utilized the very common 5-point 
Likert scale going from (1) ‘strongly disagree’, (2) ‘disagree’ to (4) ‘agree’, and (5) ‘strongly agree’. In 
the middle, there was a positon indicating (3) ‘neutrality’ on the issue. Each respondent’s reply on 
each item was scored, and the scores for each item were aggregated to form an overall score. 
Since the scale assessed intensity, the scoring was carried out to analyse whether a high level of 
intensity of perception was correlated with other variables, such as the gender, position or financial 
sector of the respondent (Bryman, 2016: 154). As the Likert scale used had at least 5 points, the 
underlying concept was assumed to be continuous, and the intervals between points were conceived 
as equal. This enabled parametric tests to be conducted (Carifio and Perla, 2007; Glass et al, 1972). 
The following hypotheses in Table 3-4 were tested using SPSS and more detail is discussed in the later 
chapters. 
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Table 3-4: Hypotheses and Choice of Analysis for quantitative study 
 
 
‘Gender’ was selected as an explanatory variable because a relatively large number of employees in 
the banking industry are composed of women compared to male-dominant industries such as the 
construction or engineering industries. Interestingly, since Cressey (1953) had only interviewed male 
embezzlers in his study, Zeitz (1981) interviewed only female embezzlers and fraudsters in a female 
prison in California and categorized female offenders into (1) ‘obsessive protectors’, who abused the 
position of trust to meet the responsibilities of ‘wife’ or ‘mother’, (2) ‘romantic dreamers’, who were 
impelled to protect the health or welfare of a loved person, (3) ‘greedy opportunists’, who shared the 
similar financial motivations like male offenders in Cressey’s study, and (4) ‘victims of pressure or 
persuasion’, who embezzled money or defraud due to coercive demands or fear-inspiring threats of a 
Research  Hypothesis Null Hypothesis 
Choice of 
Analysis 
1. There is a gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud.  
Ho 1: There is no gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud. 
Chi - square 
test 
2.  There is a gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the perceived 
risk of occupational fraud. 
Ho 2:  There is no gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the 
perceived risk of occupational fraud. 
Independent 
sample t–test 
3.  There is a gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of counter-occupational 
fraud. 
Ho 3:  There is no gender, position, or 
financial sector effect on the 
perceived effectiveness of counter-
occupational fraud. 
Independent 
sample t–test 
4. The employees’ perceptions of fraud 
risk and opportunity reduction are 
associated with the perceived 
occurrence of occupational fraud in 
their organization. 
Ho 4:  The employees’ perceptions of 
fraud risk, opportunity reduction are 
not associated with the perceived 
occurrence of occupational fraud.  
Logistic 
regression 
analysis 
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husband or lover (Zeitz, 1981: 80-81). Additionally, Zeitz also argued that cultural ideologies affecting 
the development of the role models such as wife, mother, and daughter should be recognized as 
possible sources for rationalization used by women (Zeitz, 1981: 77). Another interesting evidence of 
a link between female directors and the ‘reduced’ frequency and severity of corporate fraud was 
found based on the data from Chinese firms that committed securities fraud (Cumming et al. 2015).  
‘Position’ in a bank was selected as an explanatory variable because the authoritative power is 
correlated with an individual’s hierarchical status in an organization (Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). 
Internal control is sometimes regarded as ineffective to prevent management fraud, because senior 
members, like the director or CEO of a company, override internal controls to attain business 
objectives such as success and profit. (Tipgos, 2002): eg. the directors of Enron, who committed 
massive financial statement fraud, voted twice to suspend their Code of Ethics to allow them to set 
up the partnership that finally led to the demise of the company (Tipgos, 2002). A further finding 
regarding position is that senior managers in a company are likely to have a more positive perception 
of current organizational ethics than lower level employees and thus more likely to be ignorant of 
serious fraud issues in their company; whereas lower level employees are more likely to be cynical 
and critical about the organizational ethics than management (Tervino et al., 2008). Therefore, 
including position as an explanatory variable provides another aspect to understanding fraud 
management. 
Lastly, the ‘financial sector’ was selected as an explanatory variable because it is associated with the 
size and governance style of the banks. The first financial sector is composed of commercial banks 
which are mainstream, big-size corporations in Korea. However, the second financial sector comprises 
of small and medium sized banking institutions that have limited staff and anti-fraud resources and 
usually run by non-professional CEOs. It could be worthwhile for the banking industry to discover how 
vulnerability of occupational fraud varies by financial sector: eg. the Korean Savings Bank Scandal in 
2011 occurred mainly in the small and medium sized banking sector, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  Because crime is also related to the influence of offenders, larger, it is likely that more 
serious crimes are committed by larger organizations with greater resources for protecting themselves 
(Coleman, 1987). On the contrary, Wheeler and Rothman (1982) argued that smaller organizations are 
subject to more intense pressure to use illegal means in the pursuit of profits than larger, more 
established companies, in which big profits may be made through legitimate organizational activity. 
The study will explore the financial sector differences by a comparative design method.  
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The choice of statistical analysis was selected according to the sample size, type and nature of 
variables and purpose of the research questions. In the first survey to police investigators, chi-square 
test of independence was used to detect any relationship between categorical variables (male/female, 
non-high/high, first/second sector) and the type of occupational fraud committed. The principle of 
chi-square test is to determine whether two categorical variables are associated or independent. The 
test can be used when the expected count is at least five in each cell of the table (Field, 2009; Ho, 
2014). The researcher hypothesized that the corruption distribution does not change from group to 
group and attempted to find any relationship between those explanatory variables and the counts of 
corruption (loan-related fraud). 
For the analysis of data gathered from a large sample of bank employees (395 responses), a relevant 
statistical analysis was conducted to answer the respective research question. Firstly, independent 
sample t-tests were used for testing the difference between the means of perceptions measured by 
the 5-point Likert scale from two independent groups (male/female, non-high/high position, 
first/second financial sector). The test is particularly useful when the researcher conducts the 
comparison of variables obtained from two independent groups (Field, 2009; Ho, 2014). Next, 
regression was conducted in the analysis to detect any significant associations between the variables 
such as perceived ‘fraud risk’, ‘opportunity reduction’ in a bank with the occurrence of occupational 
fraud. Regression analysis is a statistical technique through which the researcher can analyse the 
relationship between a dependent variable and a set of independent (explanatory) and control 
variables. Especially, to predict the odds of occurrence of occupational fraud in a bank, logistic 
regression was mainly used. As a type of multiple regression, logistic regression is used for predicting 
a discrete outcome, which is generally the dichotomous dependent variable (Ho, 2014: 383). In this 
study, the dependent variable was a binary variable if fraud occurred (1) or did not occur (0) in the 
organization in the last five years. One of the goals of logistic regression was to identify which 
independent variable can increase or decrease the probability of outcome with statistical significance. 
Each statistical analysis met several assumptions for the test, which will be explained more thoroughly 
in each chapter.    
3.4.2 Qualitative study 
For the second phase of the study, the semi-structured interviews were arranged with managers and 
employees of each type of bank, officials of FSS, and experts on managing occupational fraud risk in 
the banking industry. In the qualitative phase of the study, the transcribed data obtained through the 
interviews was coded and analysed using Excel.  
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The coding process in the qualitative analysis entailed the following steps (Tesch, 1990: 142-149):  
 Read all the transcripts and get a sense of the whole. 
 Pick one interview and think about underlying meaning and record thoughts. 
 Make a list of topics, cluster together similar topics. 
 Abbreviate the topics as codes and write the codes next to the appropriate segments. 
 Find the most descriptive wording for the topics and turn them into categories. 
 Make a final decision on the abbreviation to use for each category and alphabetize these 
codes. 
 Assemble the data belonging to each category. 
 Recode existing data, if necessary 
 
Especially, for contextualizing the Korean banking industry in chapter 4, the differences between the 
banking institutions were mainly explored by the semi-structured interviews with bank managers and 
employees, who are currently working in the industry. Although Koreans commonly refer to 
commercial banks as the first sector and the small and medium sized banking institutions as the 
second sector, there are very few studies on the differences between the sectors in Korean literature. 
This might be because this distinction originated mainly from a practical purpose to differentiate the 
financial institutions among the public rather than academic purpose. Given the exploratory nature of 
studying the differences between the two financial sectors, a qualitative approach seems very 
appropriate for the purpose of the contextualization. In the other chapters of the study, verbatim 
quotes were used to give evidence and detailed explanation. There are several reasons for this:              
(1) as a matter of enquiry, (2) as evidence, (3) as explanation, (4) as illustration, (5) to deepen 
understanding, (6) to enable voice, and (7) to enhance readability (Corden and Sainsbury, 2006). 
Verbatim quotes were inserted in each chapter to complement statistical results and to deepen the 
understanding of the findings.   
3.5 Ethical issues 
The researcher has served as a police officer in Korean National Police Agency for almost 15 years. 
However, he obtained the leave of absence and was allowed to pursue a full time PhD by the 
government at the University of Portsmouth. For this study, the researcher successfully gained a 
favorable opinion from the University’s ethics committee with some requirements (15/16:41) and 
those requirements were fully complied with during the entire data collection process. The ethical 
measures for the study are considered here. 
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3.5.1 Ethical measures for quantitative study 
For the survey to the police officers attending classes in the academy, the researcher firstly explained 
the purpose and nature of the study to the chief of the academy. After official permission was obtained, 
an invitation letter was posted on the noticeboard of every classroom and the purpose of the study 
was fully explained in the letter. In the letter, there was a URL directing to the survey. Therefore, any 
students, who hoped to participate in the study, were freely able to access the URL and participate in 
the survey after reading the nature and purpose of the study. Participation was voluntary but the 
police officers were asked to participate in the survey only once to prevent the same case answered 
more than twice. The researcher’s official email at the University of Portsmouth was used for 
communication and the researcher was introduced as a full time PhD student, not as a police officer. 
Importantly, the sampling condition, which was the termination of investigation and prosecution of 
the cases, were notified in the letter to avoid any disclosure of information which was part of an on-
going criminal investigation. Furthermore, the questionnaire was designed to maintain anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
In the second survey, measuring employee’s perception of fraud risk and the counter-fraud 
effectiveness could be actually beneficial for the participant to awaken the importance of counter-
fraud for their organization. However, the survey included a question asking the frequency of 
occupational fraud detected in the last 5 years, which could be regarded somewhat sensitive. It is 
crucial that disclosures did not cause harm to participants or organizations (British Psychology Society, 
2010). In order to prevent occupational fraud, the FSS releases on its homepage 7  details of 
occupational fraud cases including the name of the bank branch: such data are open to the general 
public. Moreover, the organizational data reported by the bank employees was guaranteed to be 
treated confidentially and coded anonymously. Because the major aim of this research is to look at 
the differences between two financial sectors, the banks were categorized into the first or second 
sector in the analysis, which made traceability of any individual bank impossible. Therefore, no 
inappropriate disclosure or no harms occurred to participants or organizations. Also, by the same 
token as the first survey, only the researcher’s official email address of the University of Portsmouth 
was used for communication. 
3.5.2 Ethical measures for qualitative study  
Because of the inherent nature of interactive semi-structured interview, inappropriate disclosures 
such as below could be made by the interviewees. 
                                                          
7 http://www.fss.or.kr/ 
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 Breach of confidentiality through improper disclosure 
 Disclosure of career limiting criticisms 
 Disclosure of proscribed behavior of organization 
 Disclosure of information that is sub judice or part of progressing criminal investigation. 
In order to reduce the risk of inappropriate disclosures, the below control measures were taken by 
the researcher. 
 
Table 3-5: Control measures for ethical issues 
Participant  Participation is voluntary. 
Where the participants are employees of organizations, consent for their 
participation is obtained from the host organization. 
Ensure participants to maintain professional status with appropriate fiduciary 
positions and professional training in disclosure and confidentiality 
Informed 
consent 
Alert the risk in the information provided with the invitation 
Remind participants of risks before the start of interview 
Inform participants that data will be published but will be untraceable and 
anonymous 
Acquire signed consent 
Allow participants to withdraw at any time and withdraw permission to use data 
already gained until the end of data collection process 
Provide participants with the university supervisory details for making complaints 
Dialogue  
Management 
Be aware that potential breach risk in interview and adjust the focus of dialogue 
or pause interview  if it happens 
Anonymity Participant data is coded anonymously. 
Employing organization is coded anonymously. 
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All data, not in the public domain, is anonymous. 
Data in the public domain, traceable to a participant, must be anonymized or 
discarded. 
Ensure interview participants are fully aware that their participation is known to 
their employer and data gathered is visible to employer. 
If in doubt, discard data as unusable rather than breach confidentiality. 
Raw data is not shared with anyone else, including University colleagues. 
 
Most importantly, the researcher made sure that no bank employees would divulge any hidden or on-
going fraud cases within their organization during the interviews. All the participants were given 
written and verbal warning not to disclose unreported fraud cases before the interview. If the 
researcher had heard any of those ongoing or unreported fraud cases, the researcher’s offer of 
confidentiality must have been overridden by law (British Society of Criminology, 2006: 2) and the 
researcher would have had to report to the authorities. However, no such cases occurred to the 
researcher during the entire interviews.  
 
3.6 Data Management 
All data obtained from surveys and semi-structured interviews were fully and lawfully secured and 
managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998, UK and Personal Data Protection Act 2011, 
Korea. No data were uploaded or saved in other private server or medium. Plus, in the future, data 
will be retained in conditions as per the Data Protection Act 1998 and University of Portsmouth data 
retention guidelines, which is normally 30 years for consent forms and 6 years for all other forms of 
data.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Based on pragmatic research philosophy, explanatory sequential mixed method was utilized for this 
study. Explanatory sequential mixed approach is a design that incorporates a two-stage project where 
the researcher gathers quantitative data in the first place, analyses the results, and then employs the 
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outcomes to conduct the second qualitative research. For the first phase, the researcher exploited 
two different types of self-administered questionnaires: one was designed for police officers who have 
investigated occupational fraud in the banking industry (53 responses were obtained) and the other 
was devised for the current bank employees (395 responses were gained). For the second phase of 
qualitative study, the researcher conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with employees, managers 
and counter-fraud experts on how to reduce occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry. 
A comparative design method was simultaneously adopted to compare the banks (commercial banks 
and community banking institutions) in the Korean financial industry. The comparison of two different 
sector banks can provide valuable insights on managing fraud despite organizational differences. 
When building research hypotheses, the Fraud Triangle Theory (Cressey, 1953, 1971) presented a 
theoretical background and the researcher will apply the theory through the relevant statistical test 
of the data collected from convenient and proportional sampling methods. For the analysis, the choice 
of statistical test was selected according to the sample size, nature of variables and purpose of the 
research questions. Importantly, when Likert scale was used for the analysis, the study assumed the 
responses to the Likert scale were continuous variables so that parametric tests could be conducted 
(Carifio and Perla, 2007; Glass et al, 1972). Moreover, individual ‘gender’, ‘position’, and organizational 
‘sector’ were selected as the variables of major interest of the study. The reason for the selection of 
the explanatory variables, ethical measures and data management were also discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Occupational Fraud in the Korean Context 
4.1 Contextualizing occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry 
The ACFE defines ‘occupational fraud’ as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” 
(ACFE, 2012: 6-7). According to the ACFE (2012, 2014, 2016), banking and financial service industry 
ranked the first place in the number of occupational fraud occurrence out of all industries. 
Occupational fraud entails three major categories: (1) asset misappropriation, (2) corruption, (3) 
financial statement fraud (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). The definition and typology of ‘occupational fraud’ 
developed by the ACFE has provided an especially powerful way of analyzing white-collar crime at a 
workplace level and many previous studies adopted the ACFE’s definition and typology for their 
analysis of fraud (Greenlee et al., 2007; Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; 
Timofeyev, 2015). When fraud is commonly referred in this study, the author also adopts the concept 
of ‘occupational fraud’ by the ACFE.  
Figure 4-1: Fraud Tree (Source: http://www.acfe.com/fraud-tree.aspx) 
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Banking industry faces occupational fraud risk in terms of two core banking services which it supplies. 
In other words, the first risk comes from the depository service and the other comes from the loan 
service to applicants (ACFE, 2015). As a result, the first risk in the banking industry is related to the 
ACFE’s typology of ‘asset misappropriation’, while the second risk encompasses the ACFE’s typology 
of ‘corruption’, which is defined as “employees use their influence in business transaction to obtain 
unauthorized benefits contrary to their duties to employers” (ACFE, 2012). However, ‘fraudulent 
financial statement’ entails both the savings and loan related-risks because every banking institution 
should maintain important financial ratios such as the BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio (an indicator for the 
solvency of a bank) at more than a certain level (BIS, 2011). If a bank fails to maintain the ratio, the 
bank will face penalties from the central bank or financial supervisory authority (The Bank of Korea, 
2011). Therefore, an incentive to manipulate the institution’s financial ratio such as the liability/asset 
percentage can arise in order to disguise the actual soundness or stability of the bank. In a nutshell, 
the occupational fraud risk in banking industry can be summarized like the table below (ACFE, 2015).  
Table 4-1: The occupational fraud risk of banking industry 
 
Core banking services 
 
Deposit service 
 
Loan service 
 
Type of risk 
 
Internal risk 
 
External risk 
 
The ACFE categorization of 
occupational fraud 
 
Asset misappropriation 
 
Corruption 
 
Fraudulent financial statement 
 
Occupational fraud is not a legal term as it was defined by the ACFE. Therefore, contextualizing 
occupational fraud in the Korean context is very important for this study. In terms of the legal system, 
Korea has adopted the continental law style that was developed in Germany and was introduced into 
Korea by Japan in the colonial era (Yim, 2001).  In Korea, many types of occupational fraud such as 
embezzlement, breach of trust, commercial bribery (corruption), and fraudulent financial statement 
(accounting fraud) are criminal offences and defined by several laws including Criminal Act, Act on 
External Audit of Stock Companies, and Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic 
Crimes, which are summarized in Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2: The Korean laws on occupational fraud (Source: National Law Information Centre8) 
Title of the 
Korean Law 
Specific Crime 
Criminal Act Article 347 (Fraud) 
(1) A person who defrauds another, thereby taking property or obtaining 
pecuniary advantage from another, shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than ten years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won. 
Article 355 (Embezzlement and Breach of Trust) 
(1) A person who, having the custody of another's property, embezzles or 
refuses to return it, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five 
years or by a fine not exceeding 15 million won.   
(2) The preceding paragraph shall apply to a person who, administering 
another's business, obtains pecuniary advantage or causes a third person to do 
so from another in violation of one’s duty, thereby causing loss to such person. 
Article 356 (Occupational Embezzlement, Occupational Breach of Trust) 
A person who commits the crime as prescribed in Article 355 in violation of the 
duties of one’s occupation, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more 
than ten years or by a fine not exceeding 30 million won. 
Article 357 (Receiving or Giving Bribe by Breach of Trust) 
(1) A person who, administering another's business, receives property or obtains 
pecuniary advantage from a third party or aids and abets a third person to 
receive property or obtain pecuniary advantage, in response to an illegal 
solicitation concerning his/her duty, shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
more than five years or by a fine not exceeding ten million won. 
Act on 
External Audit 
of Stock 
Companies 
 
Article 20 (Penalty Provisions) 
(1) If any person provided for in Articles 401-2 and 635 (1) of the Commercial Act 
or any other person in charge of accounting affairs of a company prepares and 
publish any false financial statements or consolidated financial statements, in 
violation of the accounting standards referred to in Article 13, he/she shall be 
punished by imprisonment with labor for not more than seven years or by a fine 
not exceeding 70 million won. 
 
                                                          
8 http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engMain.do 
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Act on The 
Aggravated 
Punishment of 
Specific 
Economic 
Crimes 
 
Article 5 (Crime of Acceptance of Property, etc.) 
(1) If any executive or employee of a financial company, etc. accepts, demands 
or promises to receive any money and valuables or other benefits, in 
connection with his/her duties, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment with 
labor for not more than five years, or a suspension of qualification for not more 
than ten years. 
…… 
(4) In cases referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3), if the value of the money 
and valuables or other benefits accepted, demanded or promised to receive 
(hereafter referred to as an "accepted amount" in this Article) is 30 million won 
or more, punishment shall be aggravated as follows: 
1. When the accepted amount is 100 million won or more: Imprisonment with 
labor for an indefinite term or for a term of not less than ten years; 
2. When the accepted amount is 50 million won or more but less than 100 
million won: Imprisonment with labor for a limited term of not less than seven 
years; 
3. When the accepted amount is 30 million won or more but less than 50 million 
won: Imprisonment with labor for a limited term of not less than five years. 
(5) In cases referred to in paragraphs (1) through (4), he/she shall be 
concurrently punished by fines, which are not less than two times but not more 
than five times the accepted amount. 
 
Each type of occupational fraud categorized by the ACFE is also a crime according to the corresponding 
Korean laws above. It should be noted that the punishment for ‘occupational’ embezzlement or 
‘occupational’ breach of trust (Article 356) is more severe (maximum ten-year imprisonment) than 
that of normal embezzlement or normal breach of trust (Article 355: maximum five-year 
imprisonment). Furthermore, Korea has a law – the Act on Aggravated Punishment of Specific 
Economic Crimes (Article 5) - designed to punish financial executives or employees who receive bribes 
in connection with their duties. If the accepted amount of a bribe by an employee in a financial 
institution is 50 million won (£33,500) or more, but less than 100 million won (£67,000), the 
punishment shall be at least a seven-year imprisonment. However, if the accepted amount of bribe is 
increased to 100 million won (£67,000) or more, the punishment shall be at least a ten-year 
imprisonment and could be a life sentence. This article demonstrates a strong position and stance of 
the Korean legislation against the commercial bribery committed by executives or employees in the 
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financial institutions. The type of occupational fraud is summarized with the relevant law articles from 
the Korean legislation in Table 4-3 below. 
Table 4-3: Types of occupational fraud by the ACFE and the corresponding Korean law articles 
Types Korean Law Articles 
Asset 
misappropriation 
Criminal Act Article 356 (Occupational Embezzlement) 
Corruption 
Criminal Act Article 356 (Occupational Breach of Trust) 
Criminal Act Article 357 (Receiving or Giving Bribe by Breach of Trust) 
Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes Article 5 
(Crime of Acceptance of Property, etc.) 
Financial 
statement fraud 
Criminal Act Article 347 (Fraud) 
Act on External Audit on Stock Companies Article 20 (Penalty Provisions) 
 
 
4.2 History, regulation and structure of the Korean banking industry 
The foundations of the modern financial system in Korea were laid down during the early 1950s after 
independence. The Bank of Korea was created in 1950 with a primary purpose to maintain price 
stability. The Bank decides an inflation target in consultation with the Korean government and 
performs the typical functions of a central bank: issuing currencies, making and implementing 
monetary policy, and serving as the banker’s bank. In addition, the Bank of Korea undertakes overall 
management and surveillance of the payment and settlement systems, and manages the nation’s 
foreign exchange reserves (The Bank of Korea, 2008). 
Specialized banks were established during the 1960s to strengthen financial support for strategically 
important sectors, such as exporting industries to international markets. Most of the second financial 
sector was introduced during the 1970s to diversify financing sources, to satisfy the needs of the 
working-class people and local families, and to attract funds into the regulated market from 
underground black markets. From the early 1980s, several commercial banks and depository financial 
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institutions were added to enhance financial liberalization. Since the Korean Financial Crisis in 1997, 
substantial changes have been made into the Korean financial system in the course of a 
comprehensive financial reform programme to catch up with the global standards (The Bank of Korea, 
2008). 
The Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) are responsible 
for supervising and examining all banks, including specialized and government-owned banks, as well 
as securities and insurance companies. The FSC is the Korean government's highest financial regulator 
and it makes financial policies, and directs the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). The FSS is the 
integrated financial regulator that examines and supervises all the financial institutions under the 
oversight of the FSC (The Bank of Korea, 2008). 
As mentioned, Korean financial system consists of commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, commonly referred by Koreans respectively as ‘the first’ and ‘the second’ financial 
sector. At the end of 2017, the first financial sector (commercial banks) consisted of seven nationwide 
banks and six regional banks. Commercial banks have adopted the branch banking system with a 
nationwide or provincial network. The total number of domestic branches of commercial banks is 
around 4,900 (The Bank of Korea, 2008). Since business demarcation is still strict, commercial banks 
can engage in very limited securities business, and were not been allowed to participate in insurance 
business until 2003. However, since then, bancassurance has been introduced to permit commercial 
banks to sell insurance products. Nonetheless, major business activities of commercial banks in Korea 
still consist of deposit and loan services. The ownership of a commercial bank’s stocks by a single 
holder has been restricted since 1982 to promote public interest. This limit was set at 8 percent in 
1982, tightened to 4 percent in 1994 and raised to 10 percent in 2002 (The Bank of Korea, 2008). 
The second financial sector can be broadly classified into five categories according to their business 
activities: (1) depository financial institutions, (2) insurance institutions, (3) securities companies, (4) 
other financial institutions, and (5) financial auxiliary institutions. Out of those, only the first category, 
‘depository financial institutions’ fall within the scope of the present study, thereby excluding other 
financial institutions (i.e., insurance, securities companies) from the scope of analysis. Depository 
financial institutions consist of credit institutions, savings banks and the postal savings system. Credit 
institutions such as ‘local agricultural and fishery cooperatives’, ‘credit unions’, and ‘community credit 
cooperatives’ operate for mutual aid by taking deposits and lending monies between their members. 
‘Savings banks’ specialize in taking deposits and lending to the general public and small enterprises. 
The postal savings system, which operates through post offices nationwide, is a public financial 
institution, but excluded in the present study because they do not provide loan services. These 
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depository financial institutions, unlike the first sector banks, have no special limits on ownership, and 
some are affiliated companies, such as commercial banks and securities companies (The Bank of Korea, 
2008). The Korean depository financial institutions can be summarized as shown in Table 4-4 below. 
 
Table 4-4: Summary of the Korean depository financial institutions (Source: FSS, 2017) 
Financial 
Sector 
 
Type Sub-type Number of 
Institutions9 
Approximate 
Number of 
Branch Offices 
Approximate 
Number of 
Employees 
The First  
Sector 
Commercial 
banks 
Nationwide banks 7 4,000 90,000 
Regional banks 6 900 11,000 
The 
Second 
Sector 
Non-bank 
depository 
institutions 
Local agricultural 
and fishery 
cooperatives  
1,200 4,800 35,000 
Community credit 
cooperatives 
1,300 1800 14,000 
Credit unions 900 700 9,000 
Savings banks 70 250 8,000 
 
  
                                                          
9 Approximate number for the institutions in the second financial sector due to variability  
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4.3 Financial sector differences 
Vaughan (1983) argued that organizations can be criminogenic: they encourage loyalty and tend to 
recruit and reward similar individuals. Therefore, a unique subculture, which normalizes deviance, 
might exist in each financial sector (Coleman, 1987). Gross (1980) also asserted that all organizations 
are inherently prone to committing crime because the reliance on ‘the bottom line’, implying that 
organizations can invite fraud as a means of achieving their goals. In this regard, there are various 
factors influencing fraud risk a company is posed with: (1) the nature of its business, (2) the operating 
environment, (3) the effectiveness of its controls, and (4) the ethics and values of the company (ACFE, 
2015). Therefore, exploring the sector differences of the Korean banking institutions is a meaningful 
effort to discover the various factors influencing the fraud risk in a company. Unfortunately, no extant 
studies on the differences of the financial sectors can be found from the fraud risk management 
perspective in the Korean literature, in which lies the significance of the current study. Hence, the 
present study attempts to navigate the differences of two sectors by interviewing managers and 
employees in the industry. 
 
(A manager in nationwide commercial bank 1) 
“The first sector banks can be compared to large corporations and the second 
sector institutions can be compared to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in a 
society. The latter is more community- and local-oriented, but the first sector is 
more trust worthy, with larger asset and lower employee turnover. Although the 
Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) also supervises the second financial sector, the 
small and medium sized banking institutions in the second sector normally have a 
poor governance structure and a weak compliance system. Furthermore, the 
owners of the second-sector institutions even get involved in business 
administration, making the separation of ownership and management 
ambiguous. .…. In the second sector, anti-fraud education is not strong enough and 
tone at the top is also weak. Therefore, the second-sector employees are easily 
tempted by a small amount of money while those working for the first sector are 
usually not.”  
 
An important theme emerged in the above interview extract, in which an interviewee compares the 
banks in the first sector to large companies and the financial institutions in the second sector to small 
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and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In terms of the size of organizations, previous studies paid 
attention to a size effect on corporate crime (Coleman, 1987; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). Especially, 
Wheeler and Rothman (1982: 1425) have argued that illegal behaviour is found more often in newer, 
smaller, less profitable organizations on the margins of more central business networks.  The small 
and medium sized banking institutions in the second financial sector are generally newer, smaller, and 
less profitable organizations than larger, already well-established mainstream banks in the first 
financial sector. Therefore, there can be higher chances that the second-sector institutions might 
depend on illegal means to obtain profits on the margins of more established financial networks. For 
example, credit institutions in the second sector do business in an environment which is more 
community- and local-based, compared to the large commercial banks in a city. The interviews 
revealed that this unique environment of the second sector can provide more fraud opportunities 
than those in the first sector which are open to everyone and, thus, more transparent.  
 
(An employee in nationwide commercial bank 2) 
“The second financial sector is more vulnerable to occupational fraud because the 
chief director of the financial institutions is elected by the members ….. 
Furthermore, the local and closed environment of the second sector makes it more 
difficult for the employees to be aware of the seriousness of fraud problem. The 
people in a local area have grown up together and have known each other for a 
long time…they even know each other’s family well… Thus, sometimes they turn a 
blind eye to fraud. leading to a very low fraud awareness and poor moral standards, 
which is quite unimaginable in a commercial bank in a big city like Seoul”  
 
Another important theme appeared in the interview. The financial institutions in the second sector 
were generally thought to have a weaker corporate governance structure than those in the first sector. 
Furthermore, the second financial sector can be more vulnerable to cronyism and nepotism. In other 
words, checks and balances did not properly work in the community banks. For example, the 
professional CEOs do business administration in the commercial banks in the first sector. However, an 
elected chief director who can be a lay person is involved in bank administration in the second sector. 
In the case of savings banks, the largest shareholder can directly take part in the decision making of 
the financial institution although they know nothing about bank management. For example, the major 
shareholder might have no experience of investing in a risky business area, such as stock market 
investment. The unprofessionalism of the top management in the second-sector institutions can cause 
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an unrecoverable loss to the institution, sometimes bringing in a collapse of a financial company, of 
which the case will be discussed in the next section. 
 
(A manager in nationwide commercial bank 3)  
“The first and the second sector have a different marketing point. For example, the 
first-sector banks target salary men or business owners, but the second-sector 
institutions target local residents, who make a living by primary industry like 
agriculture or fishery. In addition, the commercial banks generally serve the public, 
but the second-sector banks mostly serve their members. Therefore, the 
relationship between the two sector banks is complementary not in rivalry…… The 
FSS supervises the second-sector institutions in an indirect way. That is…. The FSS 
gives its authority of control to the Central Federation of Credit Unions, or Central 
Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives, etc., resulting in weak monitoring 
by the FSS. However, the first-sector banks are directly supervised by the FSS and 
also under scrutiny by the mass media, because the first-sector banks can have a 
very big impact on the economy if they fail.” 
 
The nature of the supervision by the FSS is also highlighted as a factor that makes a difference in fraud 
risk management between the two sectors. The commercial banks in the first sector are directly 
regulated by the FSS. However, the banking institutions in the second sector are indirectly regulated 
by the FSS. In other words, the FSS entrusts its supervisory authority to the Credit Union Federation, 
which is a kind of self-regulatory association for the entire credit unions across the nation. In a similar 
vein, the FSS also entrusts it supervisory power of local agricultural and fishery cooperatives to 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. Community credit cooperatives are also supervised by 
the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. In summary, to give autonomy and self-regulatory power, the 
FSS takes an ad hoc role of supervisor for the banking institutions in the second sector unless 
occupational fraud happens in the institutions. This indirect method of supervision by the FSS is an 
important factor affecting fraud risk in the banking industry.  
 
(An employee in a regional commercial bank) 
“Although the credit institutions in the second sector have higher interest rates for 
deposit products than us, we have more soundness and stability than those 
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cooperatives.  We (regional banks) also belong to the first financial sector…... 
Compared to nationwide banks, we have more regional branches and serve more  
local residents, which is our strength compared to nationwide banks.”   
 
The first-sector banks are thus regarded as more stable by the public than the second-sector 
institutions. In this regard, it can be said that ‘the first’ is to ‘prime’ what ‘the second’ is to ‘sub-prime’ 
if the industry is compared to that of US by the time when the subprime mortgage crisis occurred 
(FCIC, 2011). 
   
(An employee in a local agricultural and fishery cooperative) 
“Local agricultural and fishery cooperatives were established mainly by the 
government in the 1970…. Not like other countries, which built local cooperatives 
by a bottom-up approach…...Therefore, in those days, the employees in local 
agricultural and fishery cooperatives behaved like a government worker, who were 
regarded as inefficient and not service-friendly…… In the beginning, local 
agricultural and fishery cooperatives banks were created for promoting the welfare 
of our members, but now, we provide financial services to the general residents as 
well. Depending on the location of the cooperatives, it can be said that we serve  
our members in rural areas, or we serve general residents in cities…... In my opinion, 
community credit cooperatives or credit unions are not doing as well as our 
agricultural cooperatives in terms of internal control systems. We (local 
agricultural cooperatives) now have computerized monitoring systems everywhere, 
but they (credit unions or community credit) have not implemented it in all 
branches yet…….. When the control system was not computerized, there was a 
loophole to provide a loan wrongly by forging some documents. But now, 
everything is monitored by the computer system…… thus, over-loaning has become 
impossible in our cooperatives.” 
 
The interviewee above mentioned that credit institutions were originally established to promote the 
welfare of its members. However, at the present time , credit cooperatives have begun to play a role  
similar to that of commercial banks in cities. Therefore, the current credit unions or cooperatives in 
Korea not only serve their members, but also serve the general public. However, there is a tendency 
of market discrimination among different types of credit institutions. As Table 4-4 (The summary of 
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the Korean depository institutions) demonstrated, there are three types of credit institutions in Korea. 
Local agricultural and fishery cooperatives are mostly located in a rural or coastal area and they mainly 
target farmers and fishermen in the region. Community credit cooperatives are located in the cities 
and target the community residents near to the cooperatives. Credit unions are based on the 
occupational ties. For example, Korean Air, the biggest airline in Korea, has the biggest credit union 
based on the same job affiliation in terms of asset size (The Chosun Ilbo, 2007). In a similar vein, taxi 
drivers in major cities also have their own credit unions based on the same job affiliation. This job 
affiliation results in credit unions having the smaller number of branch offices than the number of 
credit institutions in Table 4-4. In other words, some credit unions do not need to have a branch office 
because they operate within a company rather than operate based on a certain area. 
 
(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“There is no incentive for the applicants who have a good credit history to come to 
apply for a loan in the second financial sector, which has a higher interest rate for 
borrowing money than the first-sector banks. Therefore, we (the second sector) 
also have a higher default rate than the first-sector banks. Some customers are 
even rejected by us and they have no alternative but to go to savings banks or 
private lenders to apply for a loan…… Community cooperatives are normally 
medium and small sized institutions and the number of employees ranged from five 
to 30 in total. This small number of staff makes the separation of duties and system 
of checks and balances really difficult to implement. Sometimes we need to do 
everything….. There can be no distinction between the front and back office.  An 
employee receives a loan application and also evaluates the collateral by himself…... 
and….. Sometimes we are under pressure because the ownership and bank 
administration is not properly divided. The chief director has a power to dismiss 
employees or transfer them to other department or branches. ..…. It is really 
difficult to say ‘no’ to a chief director although the director asks something 
inadequate or illegitimate.” 
 
The interviewee above explained the reasons why small and medium sized banking institutions have 
a more risky nature of business and environment. First of all, the customers in the second-sector banks 
usually have lower credit rates than those in the first-sector banks. The customers who have a good 
credit rate generally have no incentive to come to the second-sector institutions which have higher 
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interest rates for borrowing money. Those who have difficulties in borrowing from the major 
commercial banks come to the second-sector institutions. In addition, the interviewee admitted that 
the small number of staff in the community institutions sometimes make it difficult to establish proper 
separation of duties and job rotation. This weak internal control system sometimes works as a 
significant risk factor in the second financial sector.  
 
 
(A manager in the central federation of credit union) 
“I think the second sector has the bigger risk and larger loss from occupational 
fraud than the first-sector banks because the job rotation cannot be properly 
operated. An employee in the first sector can change his/her position or 
department every two or three year because their organization is big. However, 
those who working in the small and medium sized institutions usually work in the 
same office or department for a long time, because our unions’ sizes are so small 
and do not have many branches. I think this led to the fraud risk in the second sector 
growing for a long period of time and increased fraud losses. If job rotation is not 
properly done, then, it can create many opportunities of fraud…. And bang! It 
occurs and big losses to a credit union and the union will disappear! ...... Plus, 
because each credit union is a separate independent organization, even the central 
federation cannot monitor all the credit unions properly, unlike the branch-
headquarter relationship in commercial banks. Some employees in the second 
sector do not even recognize what they are doing is illegal, …… because those 
employees were recruited by each credit unions without sufficient vetting 
processes or through cronyism …… and anti-fraud education is normally just for 
‘window dressing’ or perfunctory.”  
 
In addition to poor job rotation, the theme of weak pre-screening of employees has emerged during 
the interviews. Staff vetting is a very important anti-fraud control to verify the credentials of new 
employees such as an applicant’s criminal records, financial history, and academic or professional 
qualifications before hiring them (Albrecht et al., 2015). However, the interviews demonstrated that 
pre-screening is not being implemented properly in the second financial sector. This can increase fraud 
risk significantly when coupled with a weak governance structure in the second-sector institutions. It 
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was also suggested that the elected chief directors of financial institutions sometimes hire their own 
relatives or friends during their term, creating an environment of nepotism and high corruption risk.  
 
(A manager in a savings bank) 
“Savings banks were established in the 1970s to provide financial services to the 
working class who used to rely on private loans or private lenders. There are over 
70 savings banks around the nation. There are also two types of savings bank: one 
type of savings bank is affiliated with large corporations and the other is just small 
and medium sized banks, developed from private lender companies. Savings banks 
normally have 20-40 employees in total. Small and medium sized savings banks 
generally have poor internal control system and low fraud awareness…… There are 
too few staff to prevent occupational fraud in savings banks. Internal control of 
savings bank seems to work well, but in reality, it is only run perfunctorily. We 
generally do not have enough resources to match the standards of internal control 
system that the commercial banks have in the first sector.” 
 
Savings banks belong to the second financial sector. However, they are different from credit 
institutions because they were created to serve the general public, not their members. Plus, the chief 
director of a savings bank is usually the largest share-holder: This blurs the difference between the 
business management and ownership. Some CEOs of savings banks use the bank as their own personal 
account, hence, posing a high fraud risk. For example, the Savings Bank Scandal in 2011 caused a 
massive shock to the Korean economy, which will be discussed later. Many interviewees agreed that 
savings banks are more vulnerable to occupational fraud than other credit institutions in the second 
sector. 
 
(An official in the Bank of Korea)  
“In reality, the Bank of Korea regulates only the first financial sector that is under 
the General Bank Act. …. Commercial banks usually have more complicated 
financial transactions and products than the small and medium sized banking 
institutions in the second sector. For example, the first-sector banks used to have 
syndicates, consortiums, or structured products, which are more complex, thus, 
fraud and other illegalities can be hidden inside complicated transactions. But the 
second-sector institutions have usually simple transactions and products. …. 
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However, it is true that the second-sector employees have lower fraud awareness 
and fewer detection measures to discover occupational fraud in the 
institution……..but I mean….. Financial complexity also should be considered when 
it comes to the detection of fraud” 
 
The official of the Bank of Korea mentioned that the complexity of financial transaction should be 
considered when assessing fraud risk in the banking institutions. The first-sector banks have more 
complex financial transactions and products. However, the second-sector institutions usually have 
simpler transactions and products, which can be understood more easily by the public, thus reducing 
the risk of fraud. The very complicated financial transactions were attributed to one of the causes of 
the subprime mortgage crisis in the US, in which many complex financial products such as Asset-
Backed Securities were traded (FCIC, 2011). In terms of complication, the first-sector banks can pose 
a higher risk than the second-sector institutions because their transactions are more complex and 
massive. 
 
Based on the analysis of the interviews with the managers and employees in each financial sector, the 
below table summarizes the financial sector differences from the perspective of fraud risk assessment: 
the nature of business, operating environment, control effectiveness, and ethical culture (ACFE, 2015). 
The commercial banks in the first financial sector generally pose less risk of occupational fraud. On the 
contrary, the banking institutions in the second financial sector seem to have more occupational fraud 
risk. First of all, the second-sector institutions normally have weak internal control systems and a 
riskier nature of business. Secondly, having a small number of staff and budgetary issues in the second 
sector, they have limited capacity even in the basic control system such as separation of duties and 
job rotation. Furthermore, the difficulty of segregating ownership from bank management in the 
second sector has generally resulted in poor management at the top posing a more serious fraud risk. 
The closeness and localness of the second-sector institutions to their community also promotes weak 
fraud awareness and low moral standards among employees. Finally, the indirect manner of the FSS 
supervision has contributed the more fraud risk in the second-sector institutions as well.  
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Table 4-5: Financial sector differences by occupational fraud risk factors  
Financial 
Sector 
Nature of Business 
Operating 
Environment 
Control 
Effectiveness 
Ethical Culture 
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) 
Targeting salary 
men, business 
owners, and big 
companies 
 
Complicated 
financial 
transactions and 
products 
Many staff and 
large budgets 
 
Many branches 
 
Frequent job 
rotation of 
employees 
Strong internal 
control system 
 
Large number of 
fraud detection 
measures 
 
Direct supervision 
by the FSS 
High fraud 
awareness and 
moral standards 
 
Good anti-
occupational fraud 
education 
 
Separation of the 
ownership and 
management of 
bank 
 
Strong tone at the 
top 
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r 
(c
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y 
b
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ks
) 
Targeting farmers 
and fishermen 
(cooperative 
members), local 
residents, and 
small and medium 
sized companies 
 
Simple financial 
transactions and 
products 
Not enough staff 
and limited 
budgets 
 
A few branches 
 
Infrequent job 
rotation of 
employees 
 
Poor segregation 
of duties 
Weak internal 
control system 
 
Small number of 
fraud detection 
measures 
 
Indirect 
supervision by the 
FSS 
Low fraud 
awareness and 
moral standards 
 
Weak anti-
occupational fraud 
education 
 
Weak separation 
of the ownership 
and management 
of bank (e.g. 
elected directors) 
 
Poor tone at the 
top 
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4.4 The Savings Bank Scandal in Korea, 2011 
Savings banks were established in 1972 as local financial institutions designed to provide more 
convenient financial services for the working class and small and mediums sized enterprises (SMEs) in 
Korea. Savings banks offer a variety of deposit products and a range of credit services, including 
instalment loans and general loans (Korea Federation of Savings Bank, 2018). Savings banks were 
originally called just as ‘mutual savings’, because the government did not allow them to use the word 
‘bank’ in their names. However, the Korean government allowed them to call themselves a savings 
‘bank’ in 2001 to boost customer’s confidence in the industry. The government also increased deposit 
protection to the same level as that of the insurance scheme for first-sector banks. Due to this policy 
change, deposits in savings bank expanded substantially and the government also lessened lending 
regulations for the industry in 2006 (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2012). 
Contrary to commercial banks with nationwide branch networks, savings banks are supposed to focus 
on lending to regional business interests. However, with the Busan Savings Bank, the biggest savings 
bank in the industry leading the way, continued deregulation allowed its business scale and scope to 
be expanded. Other savings banks also joined the ranks of global investment banking groups such as 
Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan, and pushed for excessive business growth. They aimed to become  
commercial investment banks, combining a commercial bank and an investment bank specializing in 
capital management: eg. the Busan Savings Bank established special purpose companies (SPCs) and 
acted as an investment bank, although it was arbitrarily spending clients’ deposits without diversifying 
its investment portfolio (Yun, 2011). 
According to the results of the criminal probe into Busan Savings Bank, the bank’s chairman Mr. Park 
and his family received illegal loans worth a combined 4.59 trillion won (4.24 U.S. billion dollars) from 
five affiliate banks of Busan Savings Bank Group. They founded 120 special purpose companies (SPCs) 
to run real estate businesses, making them appear like independent entities having nothing to do with 
the majority shareholder of the bank. These companies were established for the development of 
houses and resorts, shipbuilding investment, and the construction of a new city in Cambodia, but just 
21 of the projcts were in actual development. The key to fraud and corruption in the bank was 
attributed to the fact that people with no ability to administer a financial institution ran a real estate 
development business and used illegal loans from their own savings banks (embezzlement). To avoid 
restrictions by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), they also committed accounting fraud 
(fraudulent financial statement), bribed executives at the financial watchdog, and placed them in 
auditor posts (corruption). The Busan Savings Bank Scandal clearly demonstrated how financial 
corporate executives can control and manipulate the lending, screening, and supervision of financial 
institutions (The Dong-A Ilbo, 2011). 
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In the aftermath of fraud and corruption in the Busan Savings Bank Scandal in 2012, more than 20 
savings banks around the nation were suspended by the government due to similar frauds and 
illegalities being discovered (Min, 2012). Although savings banks made up only 2 percent of the assets 
of the whole financial system, many families and pensioners have lost their life savings and the elder 
brother of the then Korean President and a leading congressman, were arrested for receiving bribes 
from a director of a savings bank for loosening regulations (KBS News, 2012). The incident has led to 
questions about the policing of regulators. About 200 people, mostly the executives of savings banks 
across the nation, have been indicted by the special investigations team at the Korean prosecutors' 
office and four savings bank executives committed suicide in the midst of investigations. The financial 
losses due to the Savings Banks Scandal were estimated to be around $ 26 billion and regarded as the 
Korean version of S&L Debacle in 1980s in the US (Oliver, 2011; The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2012). 
 
4.5 The media outlet case study of occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry 
Many occupational fraud cases in the Korean banking industry have been reported in mass media 
outlets. Particularly in the context of mass-media news reporting, the main figures in any news item 
and their characteristics are often important items to publicise (Babbie, 2007; Bryman 2016). In this 
regard, the current section will use newspaper reports of one representative occupational fraud case 
from each financial sector. One of the interviewees, who is a top officer in the compliance department 
in a commercial bank in Seoul, provided the online links of ten news reports during the interview with 
the researcher. She had been collecting the relevant news reports of financial institutions fraud cases  
to educate the employees in her bank. Among the ten mass media reports about bank frauds, two 
cases were selected for the analysis because the author believed those two cases represented the 
typical occupational fraud that can take place in the banking institutions. For analysis, the following 
contents were considered: the type of bank and financial sector, amount of loss, type of occupational 
fraud, characteristics of perpetrator, detection methods, and the weaknesses of counter-fraud 
controls allowing the fraud to occur in the organization. 
4.5.1 A case of embezzlement in a major commercial bank in Korea 
Embezzlement is defined as the wrongful taking or conversion of the property of another by a person 
to whom it has been lawfully entrusted. Misapplication of bank funds is a type of embezzlement in 
which bank employees wrongfully take or convert another party’s property for the benefit of the 
employee or someone else (ACFE, 2015). Dormant funds in banks are highly susceptible to 
embezzlement. Funds embezzled from active accounts are more likely to be noticed quickly, while 
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dormant account holders are less likely to report problems. Typically, the perpetrator first identifies 
accounts that are or are about to be inactive. Next, the perpetrator manipulates the account to make 
it appear that it is not dormant, such as creating a fictitious transaction. After that, the employee 
creates journal entries or transfer orders to move the funds into an account that the employee 
controls. This is a typical modus operandi of embezzling funds by bank employees (ACFE, 2015). 
The case of embezzling £6 million by bank employees occurred in one of the biggest commercial banks 
in November, 2013 in Seoul. The employees of Kookmin Bank, which is one of the major nationwide 
banks in Korea, secretly stole customers’ expired bonds for a period of four years. The employees took 
advantage of the loophole that expired national housing bonds10 are easily forgotten by customers. 
To raise funds for providing homes for the working-class families, the Korean government regulates 
national housing bonds to be purchased mandatorily by people who purchase a house. The bonds 
normally have a 5-year expiration date, but often customers who acquired the bonds forget about 
them and do not ask for a refund. If nobody claims after some period of the expiration date, then the 
bonds should revert to the National Treasury (The Hankyoung Sinmun, 2013).  
The employees somehow discovered the serial numbers of the bonds that were soon to expire and 
forged bonds with the same serial numbers. After making forged expired bonds, they refunded them 
into money at the other branches of their bank. The total money embezzled by this method amounted 
to £6 million for 4 years. This is a very similar to the case of moving money from customers’ dormant 
or inactive accounts to employees’ control, but they went as far as to create the falsified bonds to 
embezzle money. The problem was that the status of forged bonds was so poor that they could have 
been easily detected by the naked eye. Without the assistance of other tellers who were also 
accomplices in the bank, the bonds could not have been successfully refunded. The fraud was detected 
when the main perpetrator demanded the bonds to be repaid when the teller who used to help him 
was absent at the bank. An honest bank teller recognized the forged bonds and reported it to the 
police and the embezzlers were arrested (The Hankyoung Sinmun, 2013). 
After this incident, it was pointed out that there is a structural problem in the internal control system 
of the bank. Firstly, there was a fundamental problem in the personnel management system. The job 
rotation and mandatory vacation were not properly implemented. In the aftermath of the bank fraud 
case, Kookmin Bank's human resources department reduced the period of employment in the same 
task for employees from four years to two years in a branch or department. The bank encouraged the 
employees to develop their ability to do multiple jobs by pointing out that if employees do the same 
                                                          
10 Housing bonds are debt securities issued by state or local governments to raise money for affordable housing development. 
(Investopedia, 2018. Retrieved on Mar. 8 2018 from (https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/housingbonds.asp) 
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job for a long time, a moral hazard can arise. The main perpetrator had been working on the same 
task of dealing with the housing bonds since January 2009. It turned out that the governance structure, 
in which the CEOs of the bank were so frequently changed also worsen the problem. Frequent changes 
of top management made the employees become less professional. Instead, it made them only 
concerned about ‘line-up’ to impress a new CEO for their promotions rather than their own work. Vice 
chairman of Kookmin Bank also admitted that the internal control system was in place, but it did not 
work properly (The Hankyoung Sinmun, 2013). 
4.5.2 A case of loan fraud and corruption in a credit union  
ACFE (2015) describes loan fraud as “a multifaceted activity that includes several types of criminal 
activities and larger loan fraud schemes often involve real estate lending and collusion between 
insiders and outsiders. Although the number of occurrences might be small, loan fraud represents the 
highest risk area for financial institutions because the pecuniary loss per occurrence tends to be large.” 
Occasionally, loan applicants provide false information about their credit situation or overstate their 
assets. Of course, it is illegal to provide false documents to verify income or assets, to make 
misrepresentations in a loan application, and to knowingly process a false loan application. Common 
types of loan falsification include altered bank statements, altered or fraudulent earnings 
documentation, fraudulent letters of credit, fabricated letters of gifts, misrepresentation of 
employment, misrepresentation of loan purpose, altered credit scores, false government 
identification numbers (e.g., resident registration numbers, national insurance numbers, etc.), failure 
to fully disclose borrower’s debts or assets, and brokers using the identities of other customers to 
obtain loans for customers unable to qualify. To make matters worse, loan officers sometimes give 
loans to accomplices, who then share all, or part of the proceeds with the lending officer as a kickback. 
In some cases, loan officers also receive bribes and then influence the loan application inadequately. 
As a result, substantial losses can be caused to financial institutions when the loan is related to real 
estate fraud that usually involves a large amount of money (ACFE, 2015). 
A case of loan fraud occurred in a credit union, in Kimhae city, in 2013. The value of the illegal loan 
amounted to £68 million. According to the investigation by the District Prosecutor’s office, four 
employees, including the chairman of the bank, were arrested on violation of the Credit Union Act and 
the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes.  The case was discovered through the 
routine monitoring system of the National Credit Union Federation and was reported to the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS). The fact that the loans of the bank were rapidly increasing became the red 
flag that uncovered the fraud. In that period, the loan-to-deposit ratio, which is the balance of the 
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loan against the balance of the deposit, increased from 70 to 85 percent, exceeding the 80 percent 
limit (The Kyoungnam Domin Daily, 2015). 
Fraudulent letters of credit were used for the illegal loan. The borrower, who submitted falsified 
documents, was in a situation where he did not qualify for more loans from any bank because he 
already had a huge amount of debt. To receive loans from the bank, he exploited a loophole in the 
system. The regulation of the bank capped loans at £330,000 loan per person. To bypass this, the 
borrower founded a front company and applied for loans under the names of 19 different employees 
of the company. Furthermore, he bribed the employees of the bank not to check the authenticity of 
the forged documents. For example, the chairman of the bank received three luxury cars from the 
borrower as a bribe. Other employees received £120,000 worth of cash and expensive golf clubs. In 
return for the bribes, the employees of the credit union knowingly processed false loan applications 
leading to £68 million. Loans were used for the repayment of the borrower’s existing loans and also 
for entertainment expenses that were used for drinks and parties for the employees. They treated the 
money in the credit union like their own money.  Finally, the credit union collapsed and was merged 
with other credit union to minimize the losses to other customers (The Kyoungnam Domin Daily, 2015). 
Table 4-6 presents a summary of the two cases analysed. Case 1 represents an embezzlement case 
that occurred in a commercial bank with £6 million loss. More than 10 employees were involved in 
the fraud and the case was detected by other employee’s whistle-blowing. The cause of the fraud was 
attributed to poor job rotation that allowed the employees to work on the same task for more than 4 
years. In contrast, Case 2 demonstrated a corruption case that happened in a credit union with £68 
million loss. The chairman and three other employees received bribes from a loan applicant, who built 
a front company and used his own employees to circumvent the loan limit regulation per person. A 
continuous computerized monitoring system in the Credit Union Federation detected the fraud. The 
cause was attributed to a corrupt culture that tolerated bribes and kickbacks from loan applicants.  
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Table 4-6: The summary of two occupational fraud cases analysed from mass media news reports 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 
The type of institution Commercial bank (nationwide) Credit union  
Financial sector 1st 2nd 
Amount of loss £6 million £68 million 
The type of occupational 
fraud 
Asset misappropriation 
(Embezzlement) 
Corruption 
(Bribe and loan fraud) 
Perpetrators More than 10 employees 4 employees including the 
chairman of the bank 
Detection method Other employee’s report  
(Whistle-blowing) 
Computerized constant 
monitoring system in the Credit 
Union Federation 
Control Weakness Poor job rotation 
Collusion 
The process that should examine 
the authenticity of documents 
for loan application failed due to 
bribes (Corrupt culture that 
tolerated bribes and kickbacks) 
Collusion  
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4.6 Summary 
Banking industry faces occupational fraud risk in terms of two of its core banking services: the 
depository service (an internal risk) and loan service (an external risk) (ACFE, 2015). As a result, the 
internal risk in the banking industry is related to the ACFE’s typology of ‘asset misappropriation’, while 
the second risk encompasses the ACFE’s typology of ‘corruption’ (ACFE, 2012). However, ‘fraudulent 
financial statement’ entails both savings and loan related-risks because every banking institution 
should maintain important financial ratios for the soundness of bank. Occupational fraud in the 
banking industry can be summarized with the corresponding Korean laws as follows: (1) asset 
misappropriation (Criminal Act Article 356: Occupational Embezzlement), (2) Corruption (Criminal Act 
Article 357: Receiving or Giving Bribe by Breach of Trust; Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific 
Economic Crimes Article 5: Crime of Acceptance of Property, etc.), (3) financial statement fraud 
(Criminal Act Article 347: Fraud; Act on External Audit on Stock Companies Article 20: Penalty 
Provisions).  
The interviews with the managers and employees of the Korean banking industry revealed that the 
commercial banks in the first sector generally have less risk of occupational fraud. On the contrary, 
depository institutions in the second financial sector seem to have more fraud risk due to several 
factors identified: (1) small number of staff and low budget to fight fraud, (2) indirect supervision by 
the FSS, (3) weak internal control systems, (4) low fraud-awareness and weak anti-fraud cultures, (5) 
poor top management, etc. The Korean Savings Bank Scandal in 2011-2012 demonstrated how 
occupational fraud in SMEs can have a detrimental impact on society. Two cases were analysed from 
news media outlets that reported occupational fraud in the banking industry; one was a case of asset 
misappropriation, the other a corruption case. The cause of the former case was attributed to poor 
job rotation and collusion whereas bribery and corruptive culture were blamed in the second case. 
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Chapter 5 Characteristics of Occupational Fraud in the Korean Banking 
Industry 
5.1 Introduction 
After analysing 1,150 cases of white-collar crimes prosecuted in the US federal court in the late 1970s, 
Wheeler and Rothman (1982) concluded that knives and guns are to street crimes what occupation 
and organizations are to the world of white-collar crimes. Furthermore, they also discovered that most 
victims of white-collar crime are organizations themselves. Black (2005) also argued that the financial 
institution itself can become a ‘weapon’ or ‘vehicle’ to commit fraud when control over an 
organization is realized. This phenomenon was clearly demonstrated in the S&L Debacle in the US and 
the Savings Bank Scandal in Korea by illustrating how executives of financial institutions looted their 
organizations for private benefit (Calavita et al., 1997). 
This chapter discusses the results of the survey of the Korean police officers who have investigated 
occupational fraud in the last ten years. The details of the survey are shown in Appendix A. Its main 
purpose was to explore the characteristics of occupational fraud in the two different financial sectors 
in Korea.  
The survey data were collected from July to November, 2016 and resulted in 53 responses although 
some had missing values. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS. The analysis included 
descriptive and inferential statistics to test the hypotheses of the research questions. An exploratory 
approach was adopted to find other potential relationships within the data. The variables included 
both individual characteristics ( gender and position of the perpetrator) and organizational 
characteristics such as the type and sector of the victim bank, satisfying the need for a micro-macro 
connection in the studies of white-collar crime (Holtfreter, 2005b).   
5.2 Review of the research question 
This chapter focusses on the first research question. 
1. What are the characteristics of occupational fraud committed in the Korean banking industry? Is 
there any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the characteristics 
of occupational fraud in the banking industry? 
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5.3 Type and cost of occupational fraud  
5.3.1 Type of occupational fraud  
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of occupational fraud investigated in the last 10 years by the police 
in the sample. The ACFE reports (2012, 2014, 2016) are consistent in that asset misappropriation 
always forms around 85 percent of the sample, corruption comes next frequently (30 percent), and 
financial statement fraud occurs least frequently (less than 10 percent).11 However, the sample of this 
study displays that corruption (56 percent) in the banking industry outnumbers the percentage of 
asset misappropriation (40 percent), demonstrating the uniqueness of fraud risk in the Korean banking 
industry. Out of 50 cases in the sample, only 2 cases (4 percent) represent financial statement fraud. 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“I think it is very appropriate to divide occupational fraud risk into two core banking 
service-related ones. Taking deposit is naturally related to asset misappropriation 
and credit service is related to the risk of corruption in the institution. Both risks 
represent the unique characteristics of business activities of the banking industry.”  
 
Figure 5-1: Type of occupational fraud 
 
                                                          
11 Some cases include more than one typology of occupational fraud, resulting in a total sum of over 100 percent in the 
ACFE reports.  
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5.3.2 Cost of asset misappropriation 
As there is aggravated punishment for the increased amount of bribes received by the financial 
employees (discussed in Chapter 4.1), the Korean law also has special legislation for aggravated 
punishment for the increased amount of loss for specific property crimes. This law is detailed in Article 
3 in Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes.  
Article 3 (Aggravated Punishment for Specific Property Crime)12  
(1) Any person who commits crimes as prescribed in Article 347 (Fraud), 350 
(Extortion), 350-2 (Special Extortion), 351 (limited to habitual offenders as 
prescribed in Articles 347, 350, and 350-2), 355 (Embezzlement and Breach of Trust) 
or 356 (Occupational Embezzlement, Occupational Breach of Trust) of the Criminal 
Act shall be aggravatingly punished as follows if the value of the goods or profits 
on property which he/she gains or has another person gain (hereafter referred to 
as an "amount of profit" in this Article) is five hundred million won (£300,000) or 
more:   
1. If the amount of profit is five billion won (£3,000,000) or more: Imprisonment 
with labour for an indefinite term or not less than five years; 
2. If the amount of profit is not less than five hundred million won (£300,000) but 
less than five billion won (£3,000,000): Imprisonment with labour for a limited term 
of not less than three years. 
According to the above Article, Figure 5-2 below demonstrates the ranges of costs of asset 
misappropriation in the sample. 56 percent of the costs of asset misappropriation falls between the 
£300,000 and £3,000,000 range, which will be punished by imprisonment with labour for a limited 
term of not less than three years. Approximately six percent of the costs exceed £3 million, which will 
be punished by imprisonment with labour for an indefinite term or not less than five years.  However, 
approximately 40 percent of the costs are less than £300,000, where the punishment shall not be 
aggravated.   
 
                                                          
12 Source: National Law Information Centre (http://www.law.go.kr/eng/engMain.do) 
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Figure 5-2: Cost of asset misappropriation 
 
5.3.3 Amount of illegal loan 
The Article 3 in Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes also applies to illegal 
loans in the Korean financial industry. The illegal loans fall into the category of corruption in the ACFE’s 
fraud typology, but the Korean criminal law defines the fraud as occupational breach of trust (Criminal 
Act 356). Interestingly as Figure 5-3 indicates, far more percentage (20 %) of amount of illegal loan 
belongs to the highest range for the aggravated punishment compared to only 6 percent of the costs 
of asset misappropriation belong to the highest range in Figure 5-2. This implies that loan-related risk 
is more costly than asset misappropriation. 
 
Figure 5-3: Amount of illegal loan 
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5.3.4 Bribery for illegal loan and the amount of bribes 
Out of 25 loan-related fraud cases in the sample, approximately half of them involve bribery (Figure 
5-4). This suggests that loan service has a high bribery risk in the banking industry. 
Figure 5-4: Bribery for loan fraud or not  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4.1, Korea has a specially designed law for the aggravated punishment of 
bribery in the financial institutions. As demonstrated in Figure 5-5 below, 31 percent of the sample 
falls in the highest range of receiving £67,000 or more bribes. This is punished by imprisonment with 
labor for an indefinite term or a term of not less than ten years.  
Figure 5-5: Amount of bribes for illegal loan 
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5.4 Perpetrators 
The police officers in this study were asked to provide several pieces of demographic information 
about the occupational fraudsters they investigated (gender, position, department, age, criminal 
history, duration of crime) and the type of bank. This information was very valuable in assessing the 
relative revels of risk and in highlighting traits and characteristics consistent with occupational 
fraudsters in the banking industry. 
5.4.1 The bank and financial sector of perpetrators 
One of the questions in the survey asked the police officers, “In what type of bank did the occupational 
fraud occur when you investigated the case?”  
 
Figure 5-6: Perpetrators by bank type 
 
Nationwide banks form 32 percent of the sample and followed by community credit cooperatives 
(26%), local agricultural and fishery cooperatives (21%), credit unions (9%), savings banks (8%) and 
regional banks (4%). If analysed by financial sector, the first financial sector makes up 36% and the 
second sector 64 %. Because there is no reason to believe that the police officers targeted the second 
financial sector more than the first, this result suggests there is more occupational fraud risk in the 
second financial sector than the first.  
Figure 5-7: Perpetrators by financial sector 
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As Table 4-4 (Chapter 4.2) indicates, 61% of employees in the Korean banking industry are working for 
the first sector and 39% for the second sector. However, the investigation percentage by the police is 
reversed, with the second sector investigation at 64% and the first sector at 36%. As the third column 
in Table 5-1 demonstrates, investigation/population percentages were created showing that the 
second sector has more than a two-times higher ratio (1.63) than that of the first sector (0.59). This 
implies that second-sector banks have had more police investigation per employee capita in the last 
10 years, assuming the employee population percentages have not changed dramatically during the 
same period. Furthermore, the average loss of occupational fraud was calculated by the total amount 
of loss divided by the number of cases in each sector. The result shows that the average loss of 
occupational fraud investigated by the police was £1.4m. in the first sector and £1.5m in the second 
sector.13 These findings indicate that the second financial sector confronts more occupational fraud 
risk than the first financial sector in terms of amount of loss as well as frequency.  
 
Table 5-1: Investigation/population ratio and mean loss (n=51) 
 
 
                                                          
13 The amount of loss by fraudulent financial statement was excluded. However, if the two cases of fraudulent statement 
amount were included, the average loss of the first sector increased to £1,550,000 because all the two cases of fraudulent 
financial statement occurred in the first financial sector.  
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Financial sector Fraud 
investigation 
percentage (A) 
Employee 
population 
percentage (B) 
Investigation/population 
percentage (A/B) ratio 
Mean loss 
The first sector 
(Commercial 
banks) 
35.8% 60.5% 0.59 £1,400,000 
The second 
sector 
(Non-bank 
depository 
financial 
institutions) 
64.2% 39.5% 1.63 £1,500,000 
 
Qualitative interview below with an official in the FSS also supports this finding. 
(Official 1 in the Financial Supervisory Service) 
“The second financial sector has the higher risk of occupational fraud. They are very 
under-staffed and the internal control system is weak. Because the first-sector 
banks have a compliance and audit department, their internal control system is 
now well established. However, the internal control system of the second-sector 
banks is not well established due to lack of budget and staff.” 
5.4.2 The gender of perpetrators 
Figure 5-8: Perpetrators by gender 
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As Figure 5-8 shows, male employees account for 70 percent of occupational fraud cases in the sample. 
This is a very similar result with the other studies on the gender composition of occupational fraudster 
(ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
Figure 5-9: Average loss by gender 
 
If the loss of occupational fraud is analysed by gender, male perpetrators are associated with twice 
the cost to victim organizations than female offenders.  
 
5.4.3 The position of perpetrators 
As Figure 5-10 illustrates below, ordinary employees form almost half, 47%, middle-level managers  
38% and high-level managers/chairman 15%. Interestingly, the ACFE reports (2012, 2014, 2016) 
demonstrates the very similar percentages according to hierarchical position as the present study.  
Figure 5-10: Perpetrators by position & gender 
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If the chairman and high-lever managers are combined into a  ‘high-position’ group and the others are 
summed up as a non-high position group, Figure 5-11 below clearly demonstrates that the employees 
with a higher position cause larger average losses in organizations, which can be explained by those 
in higher managerial or executive position might commit more serious fraud than those who have a 
lower position due to more authority entrusted to them by the victim organization (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 
2016; Holtfreter, 2005b). 
 
Figure 5-11: Average loss by position 
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sample. This is one of the very significant findings that indicate poor management and low moral 
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standards at the top in the second-sector banks. Qualitative interviews also support the result of this 
finding.  
 
(An official in the Bank of Korea)  
“Very importantly, it is so common in the second financial sector that the elected 
chairman gives favourable treatments for the members who helped him win the 
election by over-loaning or giving other favourable financial treatments from 
his/her bank. They are the same as the politicians in a society and they have a 
limited term until the next election…. Usually for four years…… During the period 
when he/she is incumbent as the chairman of the banking institution, he/she wants 
to exploit every opportunity to compensate for the money he/she invested in 
succeeding in the last election” 
 
Figure 5-12: High-position perpetrators by financial sector  
 
 
5.4.4 The department of perpetrators 
Figure 5-13: Perpetrators by office  
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Figure 5-13 above displays that most of occupational fraud occurs in branch offices, not the 
headquarters of banking institutions. This is a new finding that was not discovered in other fraud 
studies. This can be attributed to the fact that the headquarters of banks are mostly composed of 
support departments such as IT and audit department. Furthermore, decentralization and weak 
internal control might explain the reason why more fraud occurred in the branch offices (Clinard and 
Yeager, 1980). 
5.4.5 The education level of perpetrators 
Figure 5-14: Perpetrators by education level  
 
In the sample, 66 percent of perpetrators had a bachelor degree or higher while 25 percent had a high 
school diploma or lower degree. This level of education is also very similar with the findings of the 
ACFE’s reports (2012, 2014, 2016). As Figure 5-15 represents below, the perpetrators with higher-
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education level have a tendency to cause more losses to victim organizations. This is consistent in 
other studies (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Holtfreter, 2005b) implying that high level of education is 
generally associated with higher position in the organization. 
Figure 5-15: Average loss by education level  
 
 
5.4.6 The age of perpetrators 
Figure 5-16 demonstrates that most of perpetrators in the sample are distributed in the age range of 
30-50. This age range conforms to the typical profile of white-collar offender: a white male, aged forty 
on average (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Button 2008). Figure 5-17 below illustrates that the average loss 
generally increases as the age of the perpetrator rises and the loss reaches its peak in the 50s, where 
perpetrators maybe have reached the highest positon in the bank.   
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Figure 5-17: Average loss by the ages of offender in the Korean banking sector 
 
 
5.4.7 The employment length of perpetrators 
In the sample, the occupational perpetrators mostly commit fraud when they have been employed 
for between 5-10 years (42%) with the 10-15 year period comprising 32 percent. This implies that the 
employees who have served more than five years generally pose more threat than the newly hired 
employees in terms of occupational fraud risk (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
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Figure 5-18: Perpetrators by length of employment 
 
Furthermore ( Figure 5-19) occupational fraud losses tend to increase based on the length of time the 
perpetrator has worked for the bank. Individuals who have worked at a bank for a longer period of 
time will often enjoy more freedom and trust from their supervisor or peers, which can mean less 
scrutiny over their actions. Their experience can also provide them with a better understanding of the 
bank’s internal controls, which enables them to more successfully commit and conceal their fraud 
schemes (ACFE, 2012). 
Figure 5-19: Average loss by length of employment 
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5.4.8 The criminal background of perpetrators 
Figure 5-20: Perpetrators by criminal background  
 
Among the 53 cases in the sample, only 3 cases involved perpetrators convicted of a criminal offence 
before. This finding is very consistent with the ACFE’s findings that most of occupational offenders do 
not have any criminal history before their first offence (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). 
5.4.9 The motive of perpetrators 
The survey asked the police officers who interrogated occupational fraudsters about the motives of 
the crime. Figure 5-21 shows that personal debt accounts for 27 percent, greed 21 percent, excessively 
close relationship with customers 19 percent, and living beyond one’s means 17 percent. These 
motives are also closely related to behavioural red flags displayed by perpetrators (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 
2016). If ‘financial motive’ category is created by combining the motives related to financial needs (i.e., 
living beyond one’s means, personal debt, greed, gambling or stock investment), ‘financial motive’ 
composes nearly 76 percent of occupational fraud cases in the sample (Figure 5-22), also supporting 
the findings from the previous studies that financial motives are the main cause of fraud (Albrecht et 
al., 1984; Albrecht et al., 2015). In a similar vein, Goldstraw-White et al (2005) found that greed was 
the primary motivation of both men and women with gambling as the second, after analysing data 
collected from 208 serious fraud offenders dealt with Australian and New Zealand higher criminal 
court. However, in another study of white-collar crime, she also discovered that work-related 
dissatisfaction with employers or retaliation against them was one of the most frequently cited 
accounts (Goldstraw-White, 2012: 193). In this regard, it is very surprising to see that no motive was 
related to work-related dissatisfaction in this sample. This might be resulted from that the present 
study gathered data indirectly by asking the police officers about the motivation of the perpetrators. 
This is the limit of the study. However, the Korean police officers always should ask offenders about 
the motives when interrogating them. Therefore, there is no reason to believe this result is biased. 
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Figure 5-21: Perpetrators by motive  
 
Figure 5-22: Perpetrators by financial motive or not 
 
 
5.4.10 The rationalization methods of perpetrators 
Rationalization methods were included in the questionnaire because rationalization is one of the 
important legs of the Fraud Triangle. Pressure and opportunity can open the gate, but rationalization 
enables the fraudster to finally walk through the gate. Therefore, rationalization is a final judgemental 
step which completes fraudulent activities and the attention and importance in the fraud literature is 
increasing (Free, 2015; Murphy and Free, 2016; Rodgers et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 5-23: Perpetrators by rationalization method 
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As shown by Figure 5-23, 47 percent of perpetrators, almost half in the sample, take the ‘temporary 
loan’ rationalization (“I am just borrowing temporarily”), which was also the most widely used method 
in Cressey’s (1953) study on embezzlers. Advantageous comparison (21%) and denial of victim (13%) 
followed in that order. However, Zeitz’s study (1981) found that women were less likely to use the 
‘temporary loan’ account than male offenders. Goldstraw-White (2012) found that female offenders 
tend to admit and accept their legal guilty more willingly than male offenders in her study by ordering 
perpetrator’s account from total refusal to confession. It might be interesting to see any gender effect 
on the neutralization techniques, however, due to the indirect method of gathering data from the 
police officers about the offender’s accounts, any gender effect on various rationalization techniques 
was not analysed in the current study. 
5.5 Victim organizations 
5.5.1 Detection methods 
Analysing the methods by which organizations detect occupational fraud can give insight into the 
effectiveness of controls and other anti-fraud measures (ACFE, 2012). In this regard, the survey asked 
the police officers to provide information about how the fraud they have investigated was initially 
uncovered. The most common detection method in the sample is ‘tip or complaint’ and ‘internal audit’, 
which accounts for 28 percent respectively. Next, the investigation by law enforcement comprises 17 
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percent, which is relatively high compared to other ACFE’s reports that are usually around 3 percent 
(ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). This relatively high percentage by law-enforcement detection can be 
explained by the unique design of the present study, in which the questionnaire was completed by 
police officers. Internal control and external audit also accounts for 11 percent respectively as 
detection method. Only 4 percent of the sample cases are uncovered by accident. 
Figure 5-24: Detection methods  
 
 
5.5.2 Duration of occupational fraud 
Detecting occupational fraud as early as possible can reduce the amount of losses (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 
2016; Albrecht et al., 2015). The duration of occupational fraud is 18 months on average in the sample. 
However, when separately analysed by the financial sector, the median duration in the second-sector 
banks is 18 months while it is 15 months in the first-sector banks in Figure 5-25. This implies that it 
takes longer for the second-sector banks to detect occupational fraud.  Moreover, as Figure 5-26 
displays, 32 percent cases last for more than two years. Figure 5-27 shows that the duration of 
occupational fraud are positively related to the amount of average loss showing a positive trend line 
in the figure. This finding strengthens the hypothesis that prevention is the best cure but early 
detection is also the second-best cure to occupational fraud. 
 
Figure 5-25: Median duration by financial sector 
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Figure 5-26: Duration of occupational fraud  
 
Figure 5-27: Average loss by duration of fraud 
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5.5.3 Opportunity factors in the organizations 
The survey asked the police officers what was the opportunity factor in the victim organization. 50 
percent of respondents answered that laxity of internal control was the opportunity factor. Excessive 
authority of the employee accounted for 31 percent and insufficient management supervision 
comprised 20 percent (Figure 5-28) 
Figure 5-28: Opportunity factors in the organization 
 
5.5.4 Contributing factors of occupational fraud in the organization 
The survey asked the police officers using 5-point Likert scale to tell the several contributing factors 
of occupational fraud adapted from the previous studies such as fraud scale, fraud diamond, and 
ethical culture studies (Albrecht et al., 1984; Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004; Murphy and Free, 2016). 
The Korean police officers were in a good position to know the circumstance of perpetrators very well 
because the police interrogated perpetrators directly and asked such questions to prepare the 
investigation documents for prosecution.  
5.5.4.1 Pressure 
Firstly, using 5-point Likert scale, the survey asked the police officers whether they agreed with the 
following statement: “The perpetrator was under pressure.” As Figure 5-29 demonstrates, 43 percent 
(‘strongly agree’ plus ‘agree’) of the respondents agreed while 30 percent (‘strongly disagree’ plus 
‘disagree’) disagreed. This implies that the police investigators generally agreed more with the role of 
‘pressure’ for promoting occupational fraud. 
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Figure 5-29: Pressure by 5-point Likert scale 
 
5.5.4.2 Internal control 
The second question was the statement for police officers to respond to: “There was weak internal 
control in the bank.” 77% agreed with the question. This indicates that weak internal control was 
attributed to as a significant contributing factor in the sample. 
Figure 5-30: Internal control by 5-point Likert scale  
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18.9%
11.3%
26.4%
30.2%
13.2%
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0%
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
"The perpetrator was under pressure." (n=53)
0.0%
3.8%
9.4%
34.0%
52.8%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly agree
"Threre was weak internal control" (n=53)
  
99 
 
Triangle elements (AICPA, 2002), the benefit of using personal integrity instead of rationalization is 
that it may be more easily observable. As Figure 5-31 demonstrates below, 74 percent of the police 
officers agreed that the perpetrator had a low personal integrity while only 8 percent of respondents 
disagreed. This implies that personal integrity of the bank employee was a significant contributing 
factor of occupational fraud. 
Figure 5-31: Personal integrity by 5-point Likert scale  
 
5.5.4.4 Capability 
Fourthly, the survey asked about the fraud diamond element, which is capability. Wolfe and 
Hermanson (2004) argued that opportunity opens the doorway to fraud, and incentive and 
rationalization can draw the person towards it. Yet the person must have the capability to recognize 
the open doorway as an opportunity and to take advantage of it. They pointed ‘position’, ‘brain’, 
‘coercion skill’, ‘confidence’, and ‘effective lying’ as the examples of capability (Wolfe and Hermanson, 
2004). The survey asked the police officers about the following question: “The perpetrator had a 
special capability to commit fraud.” Slightly more respondents disagreed (34 percent vs 32 percent), 
which indicates that the police officers in the sample did not see that a special capability was an 
important factor contributing to occupational fraud in the banking industry. 
Figure 5-32: Capability by 5-point Likert scale 
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5.5.4.5 Poor ethical culture 
Many studies emphasize organizational culture as a very significant factor in promoting occupational 
fraud (Button and Brooks, 2009; Holtfreter, 2005b; Murphy and Free, 2016). As Figure 5-33 indicates, 
more than half of the respondents (54 percent) agreed that there was a poor ethical culture in the 
bank, while only 17 percent of the police officers disagreed. This suggests that the police officers 
agreed that corporate culture played an important role in contributing occupational fraud in the 
organization. 
Figure 5-33: Poor ethical culture by 5-point Likert scale 
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5.6 Collusion and relationships 
5.6.1 Collusive fraud 
Collusive fraud is an emerging subject in the studies of fraud (Akelola, 2012; Button et al., 2018; Free 
and Murphy, 2015). Free and Murphy (2015) investigated why individuals co-offend in fraud and 
identified three bond archetypes according to two criteria (i.e., the primary beneficiary and the 
qualitative nature of tie): (1) individual-serving functional bonds; (2) organizational-serving functional 
bonds; and (3) affective bonds. For the Fraud Triangle Theory normally posits a single atomized 
individual, it is regarded as not as effective in explaining the collusive fraud (Akelola, 2012; Free and 
Murphy, 2015; Dorminey et al., 2012). In this regard, the study asked the police officers about the 
collusive fraud. 
In this sample, nearly 40 percent of occupational fraud cases were committed by collusion while 60 
percent cases were committed by a single actor. As Figure 5-35 and 36 demonstrate, when collusive 
fraud occurred, the average losses doubled from £1,050,000 to £2,190,000 and the median detection 
period took 6 months longer. Important empirical evidence was gained proving more serious nature 
of collusive fraud by this study. 
Figure 5-34: Collusive fraud 
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Figure 5-35: Average loss by collusion 
 
Figure 5-36: Median fraud duration by collusion 
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5.6.2 The relationship between the accomplices and main perpetrator 
Figure 5-37 below represents that 42 percent of accomplices are outside customers while 58 percent 
accomplices are insiders, such as subordinates (37 %), co-workers (11 %), or supervisors (11%). In 
terms of fraud loss, there was no significant difference found between outside (customers) and insider 
accomplices.  
Figure 5-37: The relationships between accomplices 
 
 
5.7 The response of the Korean criminal justice system 
The present study could have gained a valuable insight by looking into the responses of the criminal 
justice system against occupational fraud in the banking industry. Most previous studies had a limited 
access to criminal justice system and did not pay much attention to the responses from the system. 
However, the current study has strength in that the responses were directly collected from the police 
officers who are playing a vital role in the criminal justice system in Korea. 
5.7.1 Initiating method of investigation 
Firstly, the survey asked how the investigation began. The purpose of the question was to see whether 
law enforcement was pre-emptive or reactive in investigating occupational fraud in the banking 
industry. As Figure 5-38 shows, 84 percent of investigation cases started reactively. Only 16 percent 
cases started pre-emptively by the police. This finding indicates that most of occupational fraud are 
referred to the police by victim organization (49%) or tip-off from third parties (33%). 
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Figure 5-38: Initiating methods of investigation  
 
 
5.7.2 Court rulings and terms of imprisonment 
Some studies argue that court rulings against fraudsters are lenient compared to street criminals (Levi, 
2008). Because crime is also related to the size and influence of the offenders, larger, more serious 
crimes are more likely to be committed by larger organizations with greater resources for protecting 
themselves by possibly paying out the justice system (Coleman, 1987). However, Figure 5-39 shows 
that majority of court ruling was a prison sentence (66%), which is a very high percentage in the Korean 
criminal justice system. Furthermore, 70 percent of prison sentences were more than 2 years, which 
is again very high percentage compared to the sentence for other white-collar criminals in Korea (KIC, 
2018). Wheeler and Rothman (1982) also found that the average length of sentence for the white-
collar offenders who used their organization for the crime received longer sentence (24.5 months) 
than 15 months of those who did not. They concluded that the greater severity of crime, in which 
organization was used as a weapon, had an impact on court sentencing. The current study also 
discovers the similar pattern. As Figure 5-41 indicates, the prison length is positively associated with 
the average losses of occupational fraud. In terms of jail sentence, the Korean criminal court seems to 
have a strict stance to occupational fraudsters.  
 
 
 
33.3%
49.0%
15.7%
2.0%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
Tip or complaint from customer,
vendor, or the third party
Request from the bank
Pre-emptive investigation by the police
Confession of fraudster
Initiating method of investigation (n=51)
  
105 
 
Figure 5-39: Court rulings 
 
 
Figure 5-40: Length of imprisonment 
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Figure 5-41: Average losses by prison term  
 
 
5.7.3 Recovery of losses 
As Figure 5-42 displays, only 16 percent of the cases recovered more than 50 percent of the losses. 
Half of the cases recovered less than 50 percent and one third of the cases recovered nothing from 
the occupational fraudsters. This finding implies that once occupational fraud occurs, the chance to 
recover the losses is very low. 
Figure 5-42: Recovery percentages of losses 
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5.8 Hypothesis outcomes and discussion 
Three hypotheses were tested to explore the characteristics of occupational fraud for this chapter. 
The hypotheses were posed based on Research Question 1: “What are the characteristics of 
occupational fraud committed in South Korean banking industry? Is there any evidence that gender; 
position; or financial sector had an effect on the characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking 
industry?” 
The hypotheses that underpinned this chapter are listed in Table 5-2. Each null hypothesis (Ho) 
proposed that the result was not statistically significant. If a null hypothesis was rejected (p-value is 
less than 0.05), the corresponding research hypothesis can be accepted because the data were not 
caused by random chance. Chi-square test was used for the analysis, where observations are grouped 
into discrete nominal categories and observed frequencies were compared with expected frequencies. 
The primary function of chi-square independence test is to determine whether two categorical 
variables are independent or associated (Ho, 2014). The study attempted to shed light in determining 
whether there are any associations between gender, position, financial sector and occupational fraud 
characteristics. However, the sample size of fraudulent financial statement was too small to have its 
own separate category. Instead, corruption was selected as the main interest of the study. Out of 53 
cases in the sample, corruption cases (28) versus non-corruption cases (25) were grouped for the chi-
square independence test. 
Table 5-2: Research and null hypothesis for Chapter 5 
Research hypothesis Null hypothesis 
1a: There is a gender effect on the characteristics 
of occupational fraud. 
Ho 1a: There is no gender effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud.  
1b: There is a position effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud. 
Ho 1b: There is no position effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud.  
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1c: There is a financial-sector effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud. 
Ho 1: There is no financial-sector effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud.  
 
5.8.1 Hypothesis 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D 
Hypothesis 1A: Corruption will vary according to the perpetrator’s gender. 
Ho 1A: Corruption is not significantly associated with the perpetrator’s gender. 
As Table 5-3 demonstrates below, 23 male perpetrators (62%) committed corruption while only 5 
female perpetrators (31%) committed corruption. The p-value (0.038) was smaller than 0.05 rejecting 
the null hypothesis 1A. Therefore, there is a statistically significant association between the 
perpetrator’s gender and corruption. In other words, male perpetrators were associated with 
corruption, while the female perpetrators were not. 
 
Table 5-3: Cross-tabulation of gender x corruption 
 Corruption Non-corruption Total χ2 test 
statistic 
 
p-value 
Male 23 
(62%) 
14 
(38%) 
37 
(100%) 
4.283 0.038 
Female 5 
(31%) 
11 
(69%) 
16 
(100%) 
  
Total 28 
(53%) 
25 
(47%) 
53 
(100%) 
  
0 cells have expected count less than 5. 
 
Hypothesis 1B: Corruption will vary according to the perpetrator’s position. 
Ho 1B: Corruption is not significantly associated with the perpetrator’s position. 
As Table 5-4 shows below, 8 high-position perpetrators (100%) committed corruption while 20 non-
high position perpetrators (44%) committed corruption. Fisher’s Exact test should be selected if any 
of the expected counts are less than 5 in the chi-square test (Brace et al., 2016: 174). Two cells had 
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the expected count less than 5, hence Fisher’s Exact Test was used instead of Pearson’s Chi-Square. 
The Exact p-value (0.005) was far smaller than 0.05 rejecting the null hypothesis 1B. Very interestingly, 
there was not a single high-position perpetrator who committed asset misappropriation. The very 
small p-value indicates that there is a statistically significant association between the perpetrator’s 
position and corruption. In other words, high-position perpetrators were associated with corruption, 
while non-high position perpetrators were not. 
Table 5-4: Cross-tabulation of high-position x corruption 
 Corruption Non-
corruption 
Total χ2 test 
statistic  
 
p-value 
(Fisher’s Exact 
Test) 
High-position 8 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(100%) 
8.413 0.005 
Non-high position 20 
(44%) 
25 
(56%) 
45 
(100%) 
  
Total 28 
(53%) 
25 
(47%) 
53 
(100%) 
  
2 cells have expected count less than 5. Hence, Fisher’s Exact Test was used for p-value. 
 
Hypothesis 1C: Corruption will vary according to the financial sector. 
Ho 1C: Corruption is not significantly associated with the financial sector. 
As Table 5-5 displays below, 8 first-sector perpetrators (42%) committed corruption while 20 second-
sector perpetrators (59%) committed corruption. The p-value (0.242) was larger than 0.05 not 
rejecting the null hypothesis 1C, which means that there is no statistically significant association 
between the financial sector and corruption. In other words, the second sector was not associated 
with corruption. 
Table 5-5: Cross-tabulation of financial sector x corruption 
 Corruption Non-
corruption 
Total χ2 test 
statistic  
 
p-value 
The first sector 8 
(42%) 
11 
(58%) 
19 
(100%) 
1.367 0.242 
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The second sector 20 
(59%) 
14 
(41%) 
34 
(100%) 
  
Total 28 
(53%) 
25 
(47%) 
53 
(100%) 
  
0 cells have expected count less than 5. 
 
Although this hypothesis was not included in the null hypotheses of Table 5-2, the below test was 
conducted additionally for an exploratory purpose to find any possible relationships.   
 
Hypothesis 1D: High-position perpetrator will vary according to the financial sector. 
Ho 1D: High-position perpetrator is not significantly associated with the financial sector. 
As Table 5-6 demonstrates, there was no first-sector perpetrator (0%) who was in high position while 
there were 8 second-sector perpetrators (24%) who were in high position. Again, 1 cell had the 
expected count smaller than 5, hence, Fisher’s Exact test was used instead of Pearson’s Chi-Square. 
The Exact p-value (0.04) was smaller than 0.05 rejecting the null hypothesis 1D. Therefore, there is a 
statistically significant association between the high position and the financial sector. In other words, 
the high-position perpetrators were associated with the second financial sector. 
 
Table 5-6: Cross-tabulation of financial sector x high position 
 High position Non-high 
position 
Total χ2 test 
statistic  
 
p-value 
(Fisher’s 
Exact Test) 
The first sector 0 
(0%) 
19 
(100%) 
19 
(100%) 
5.265 0.040 
The second sector 8 
(24%) 
26 
(76%) 
34 
(100%) 
  
Total 8 
(15%) 
45 
(85%) 
53 
(100%) 
  
1 cell has the expected count less than 5. Hence, Fisher’s Exact Test was used for p-value. 
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5.8.2 Discussion 
The very small number of fraudulent financial statement cases (n=2) in the sample has limited the 
analysis of the study. Instead, the current study focused on ‘corruption’ and discovered significant 
associations between corruption and the perpetrator’s ‘gender’ and ‘position’. Based on the outcomes 
of the hypothesis tests above, important findings can be summarized: (1) male perpetrators are more 
likely to be associated with corruption, (2) high-position perpetrators are more likely to be associated 
with corruption, and (3) high-position perpetrators more likely to be associated with the second 
financial sector. However, it should be noted that the second sector was not associated with 
corruption. Out of 34 cases in the second sector, there were 20 corruption and 14 asset 
misappropriation cases. In other words, corruption was committed independently from financial 
sector. 
With respect to gender, Daly (1989) found that women were more likely to have lower status 
occupations (e.g., clerical), while men were more likely to be employed as managers or executives. 
Wheeler and Rothman (1982) also discovered that gender was a significant predictor of offense 
magnitude. In their study, large number of female defendants were relatively lowly placed bank tellers 
convicted of embezzlement.  In a similar vein, the female employees in the Korean banking institutions 
usually have a lower status in the organizational hierarchy than their male counterparts. Furthermore, 
the male employees are more likely to work for loan-related activities that are vulnerable to 
corruption such as bribery, while the females are more likely to work as a teller that can be exposed 
to embezzlement risk. The gender effect of the study also seems to be related to the offender’s 
position in the bank. 
Regarding position, Holtfreter (2005b) found that the individuals who committed ‘fraudulent 
statements’ were more likely to be older, educated males with managerial positions conforming to 
the high status image of white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1961), whereas those perpetrated ‘asset 
misappropriation’ or ‘corruption’ more closely resembled ‘middle-class’ offenders (Weisburd et al., 
1991). This was attributed to the fact that an individual’s position in an organization can impact on his 
or her opportunities, resulting in different types of fraud committed by employees at diverse 
organizational hierarchy. The current study also supports that the employees who have higher 
position in a bank are more likely commit corruption which is associated with more losses than asset 
misappropriation. 
Lastly, with respect to organizational characteristics, Holtfreter (2005b) also found that asset 
misappropriation was committed significantly more often in smaller organizations, whereas 
corruption occurred in larger organizations more frequently. However, the present study could not 
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detect any association of the fraud typology and financial sector (first-sector banks vs second-sector 
banks). Corruption (56%) and asset misappropriation (40%) were committed independently regardless 
of the sector. 
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 5.9 Summary and conclusion 
Table 5-7 below recapitulates the type and cost of occupational fraud in the sample. Corruption was 
committed most often (56%), asset misappropriation comes second (40%), and fraudulent financial 
statement formed the least of the sample (4%). The mean cost of occupational fraud in the banking 
industry was £1,520,000 and fraudulent statement fraud was the most costly. Among 25 loan-related 
fraud in the sample, 52 percent involved bribery and the mean amount of bribes was £40,000. The 
mean length of occupational fraud was 18 months, which is consistent with the finding of the ACFE’s 
biennial reports (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016).  
 
Table 5-7: Summary of occupational fraud characteristics 
 % (n) Mean amount 
All types of occupational fraud  £1,520,000 
  Asset misappropriation 40 (20) £1,330,000 
  Corruption 56 (28) £1,550,000 
  Fraudulent financial statement 4 (2) £2,680,000 
Bribery for loan   
  Yes 52 (13) £40,000 
  No 48 (12)  
Duration of occupational fraud  18 months 
 
Table 5-8 below summarizes the profiles of occupational fraudsters in the Korean banking industry 
who were investigated by the police in the last 10 years. 64 percent perpetrators came from the 
second financial sector; 70 percent of the perpetrators were male; 47 percent were ordinary 
employees; 83 percent were working for bank branches, the ages of 30s and 40s accounted for 79 
percent; 42 percent of perpetrators had worked for 5-10 years in the bank before committing crime; 
94 percent did not have any criminal history before; 76 percent committed occupational fraud for a 
financial motive; and ‘temporary loan’ comprised 47 percent of the rationalization methods in the 
sample.  
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Table 5-8: The profile of occupational fraudster in the Korean banking sector 
Profile of perpetrator % (n) 
 Financial sector 
 
   The first sector (commercial bank) 36 (19) 
   The second sector (community bank) 64 (34) 
Gender 
 
  Male 70 (37) 
  Female 30 (16) 
Position 
 
  Ordinary employee  47 (25) 
  Middle level 38 (20) 
  High level 15 (8) 
Department 
 
  Headquarters 17 (9) 
  Branch office 83 (44) 
Age 
 
  20s 2 (1) 
  30s  41 (22) 
  40s 38 (20) 
  50s 13 (7) 
  60s 6 (3) 
Length of Employment 
 
  less than 5 years 11 (6) 
  5 -10 years 42 (22) 
  10 -15 years 32 (17) 
  15 years or more 15 (8) 
Pre-criminal history 
 
  Yes 6 (3) 
  No 94 (50) 
Motivation 
 
  Financial motives 76 (40) 
  Non-financial motives 24 (13) 
Rationalization method  
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  Temporary loan 47 (25) 
  Advantageous comparison 21 (11) 
  Denial of victim  13 (7) 
  Diffusing responsibility 8 (4) 
  Others 11 (6) 
Table 5-9 below reviews the responses of the Korean criminal justice system against occupational 
fraudsters in the sample. Most of the police (84 %) had started the investigation reactively such as by 
request from banks. 66 percent perpetrators received prison sentence and the 2-3 year term of 
imprisonment was the most common (30%). Unfortunately, the vast majority of cases (84 %) failed to 
recover more than half of the loss.  
Table 5-9: The summary of criminal justice responses  
Criminal justice response % (n) 
 Method of initiating investigation 
 
   Pre-emptive  16 (8) 
   Reactive   84 (43) 
Court ruling 
 
  Prison sentence 66 (31) 
  Probation  15 (7) 
  Fines 15 (7) 
  Acquittal 4 (2) 
Term of imprisonment 
 
  less than a year 3 (1) 
  1 - 2 years 27 (8) 
  2 - 3 years 30 (9) 
  3 - 4 years 17 (5) 
  4 years or more 23 (7) 
Recovery of loss 
 
  Zero 33 (17) 
  0 - 50 percent 51 (26) 
  50 - 100 percent 12 (6) 
  100 percent 4 (2) 
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To summarize this study gives a novel lens to view the profiles and characteristics of bank fraudsters 
which has been under-researched. The analysis of investigation/population ratio (Table 5-1) shows 
that the second financial sector has more occupational fraud risk than the first financial sector. The 
hypothesis tests of the study discovered that male or high-position perpetrators are more likely to be 
associated with corruption and high-position perpetrators are more likely to be associated with the 
second financial sector. This indicates that poor management and low moral standards at the top in 
the small and medium sized banking institutions in Korea, which was also argued by the qualitative 
interviews in the previous chapter. However, despite the many valuable insights above, the present 
study also has some limitations. For example, the sample of the present study included only the 
detected cases by the police. However, it should be noted that the Korean police deal with almost all 
the criminal cases in Korea (KIC, 2018). Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency to report fraud 
cases more willingly to the police in the banking industry. This trend was found by the in-depth 
interviews with the bank employees, whose perceptions of fraud risk and its controls will be 
thoroughly discussed in the following chapters.   
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Chapter 6 Perceptions of Occupational Fraud Risk and Controls 
6.1 Introduction 
Sun Tzu outlined in his book of The Art of War that if a warrior knows his enemy and knows himself as 
well, he shall surely have one hundred victories out of one hundred battles (知被知己 百戰百勝). In 
the previous chapter, the secret details of the enemy, the profiles of occupational fraudsters, have 
been revealed. Sequentially, this chapter attempts to assess the aegis and defence system of the 
Korean banking industry because inadequate controls or compliance programmes heighten the risk of 
occupational fraud in organizations (KPMG, 2009). In order to do that, the study firstly asked the bank 
employees about the risk of occupational fraud and then enquired about the controls in their 
organization. Fraud risk is an uncertainty of outcome or threat that can damage the organization and 
its reputation due to occurrence of fraud (Giles, 2012: 94). Organizations can proactively eliminate 
fraud opportunities by (1) accurately identifying sources and measuring risks and (2) implementing 
effective preventive and detective controls to mitigate those risks (Albrecht et al., 2015). While the 
presence of internal controls of an organization does not entirely provide guaranteed protection 
against fraud, it can help to both abate losses and deter some potential fraudsters by swelling the 
perception of detection. Consequently, enacting the anti-fraud controls, which are specifically 
designed internal controls to prevent and detect fraud, is a crucial part of fraud risk management 
programmes (ACFE, 2016).  
This chapter considers the results of the survey of the banking employees in Korea. The main purpose 
of the survey was threefold: (1) to quantify and rank the perceived threat of occupational fraud, (2) to 
assess the level of implementation of 14 specific anti-fraud controls in the banking institutions, (3) to 
measure the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls through the experience of the participants and to 
compare it. Tunley et al (2018) argued that the survey instruments which do not include both presence 
and effectiveness dimensions can overestimate or underestimate the value of anti-fraud techniques. 
To overcome this, the present survey incorporated not only the presence but also the effectiveness 
dimension of the anti-fraud controls.  
The chapter is composed of 7 sections; the first section is introduction, the second section is the review 
of Research Questions, the third is about respondents’ profiles, the fourth is about the bank 
employees’ perceptions of fraud risk, the fifth is about the employees’ perceptions of anti-fraud 
controls and investment, and the sixth is about hypothesis outcomes and discussion, and the last 
section is about summary and conclusion. Like Chapter 5, statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS 
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and the analysis included descriptive and inferential statistics to test hypotheses of the research 
questions.  
 
6.2 Review of the research questions 
This chapter deals with the following research questions: 
2. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk? Is there any evidence that 
gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived risk of occupational fraud? 
3. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls? Is there 
any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived effectiveness 
of anti-fraud controls? 
4. Is there any statistically significant association among the perceived risk, counter-fraud 
effectiveness, and frequency (occurrence) of occupational fraud? 
 
6.3 Descriptive statistics 
6.3.1 Respondent profile 
This study sampled 395 participants selected proportionally from the employee population as 
described in the methodology chapter 3.3. The first-sector respondents made up 52 percent and the 
second-sector respondents accounted for 48 percent of the total sample. The 395 respondents came 
from 6 different types of banking institutions in Korea as demonstrated in Table 6-1 below: nationwide 
banks (44.8%), regional banks (7.1%), local agricultural and fishery cooperatives (20.5%), community 
credit cooperatives (8.1%), credit unions (14.7%), and savings banks (4.8%), which entail almost all 
types of depository financial institutions in Korea except postal service. The national postal service 
was excluded in this study because it only deals with savings. 
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Table 6-1: Sample size by the type of depository financial institutions in Korea  
Financial sector Type Subtype Sample size 
The first sector Commercial banks 
Nationwide banks 177(44.8%) 
Regional banks 28(7.1%) 
The second 
sector 
Credit unions 
Local agricultural and fishery 
cooperatives 
81(20.5%) 
Community credit 
cooperatives 
32(8.1%) 
Credit unions 58(14.7%) 
Savings institutions Savings banks 19(4.8%) 
Total 395(100%) 
 
6.3.2 Individual characteristics 
Table 6-2 provides a summary of individual characteristics including gender, ages, length of 
employment, education, position in bank, type of office, and the perceived occurrence of occupational 
fraud in the last five years. As already discussed in the methodology chapter, the comparison of two 
financial sectors (commercial banks vs community banking institutions) can provide valuable insights 
on managing occupational fraud in the banking industry, in which lies the originality of the study. Male 
respondents comprised 62% and female employees 38%. The second sector was slightly more male-
dominated compared to the first (66% vs 58%). When it comes to the ages, most of the respondents 
came from the ages of 40s (41%) and 30s (35%). The second sector was composed of more older 
employees than the first sector. In terms of length of employment, the majority of respondents (35%) 
had worked more than 20 years for their bank. With regard to position, high-level managers or top 
officers accounted for 15% and middle-level managers 45% in the sample. Plus, almost half of the 
respondents (45%) were working in a branch of their bank. Unfortunately, no statistics exist to confirm 
that the characteristics of the sample correspond with the actual distribution in the industry. However, 
the researcher believes that the method of proportional quota sampling in this study certainly eased 
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the concern regarding the congruency of the sample characteristics with the actual distribution of the 
employee population.  
Interestingly, 41 percent of the respondents had experienced an occurrence of occupational fraud in 
the last five years. However, respondents in the second sector had perceived far fewer occurrences 
of occupation fraud than those in the first (22% vs 60%). This implies that community banks in the 
second sector have a smaller number of anti-fraud controls to detect fraud in their organizations 
(Bussman and Werle, 2006).  
Table 6-2: Individual characteristics of the respondents 
Individual characteristics 1st Financial sector 
% (n) 
2nd financial sector 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Gender 
Female 42.4 (87) 33.7 (64) 38.2 (151) 
Male 57.6 (118) 66.3 (126) 61.8 (244) 
Ages 
20s 9.8 (20) 5.8 (11) 7.8 (31) 
30s 42.0 (86) 27.9 (53) 35.2 (139) 
40s 35.1 (72) 46.3 (88) 40.5 (160) 
50s or older 13.2 (27) 20.0 (38) 16.5 (65) 
Length 
of 
employment 
0 – 5 17.1 (35) 11.6 (22) 14.4 (57) 
6 – 10 26.8 (55) 15.3 (29) 21.3 (84) 
11 – 15 17.6 (36) 16.8 (32) 17.2 (68) 
16 – 20 7.8 (16) 16.3 (31) 11.9 (47) 
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20 or longer 30.7 (63) 40.0 (76) 35.2 (139) 
Education 
High school 7.3 (15) 13.2 (25) 10.1 (40) 
2-year college 5.9 (12) 14.2 (27) 9.9 (39) 
4-year 
university 
74.1 (152) 66.3 (126) 70.4 (278) 
Master or 
more 
12.7 (26) 6.3 (12) 9.6 (38) 
Position 
Contract 
worker 
3.4 (7) 4.2 (8) 3.8 (15) 
Ordinary 
employee 
35.6 (73) 35.8 (68) 35.7 (141) 
Middle-level 
manager 
49.8 (102) 40.5 (77) 45.3 (179) 
High-level 
manager 
10.2 (21) 18.9 (36) 14.4 (57) 
Executives or 
chairman 
1.0 (2) 0.5 (1) 0.8 (3) 
Type of 
office 
Branch office 48.8 (100) 42.6 (81) 45.8 (181) 
Business 
department 
14.6 (30) 14.2 (27) 14.4 (57) 
Support 
department 
19.0 (39) 31.1 (59) 24.8 (98) 
Internal 
control 
department 
17.6 (36) 12.1 (23) 14.9 (59) 
Perceived 
fraud 
No 41.0 (84) 77.9 (148) 58.7 (232) 
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occurrence 
in the last 
5 years 
Yes 59.0 (121) 22.1 (42) 41.3 (163) 
 
6.3.3 Organizational characteristics 
Table 6-3 and 4 show a summary of institutional characteristics of respondents including the presence 
of anti-fraud department, bank size, number of anti-occupational fraud controls, number of colleagues 
in the office, total number of employees, perceived frequency of occupational fraud in the last five 
years, and the loss of the most recent case in the bank. The majority of the respondents (82%) said 
that their bank had an anti-occupational fraud department. 67% of the respondents were working for 
the bank that had fewer than 5,000 employees. The mean number of employees was 5,128 and the 
mean number of colleagues in an office was 19. In addition, the mean frequency of perceived 
occupational fraud in the last five years was 3 and the mean loss of the most recent case was £717,635 
(Table 6-4). 
The number of anti-occupational fraud controls was measured by asking the respondent whether the 
specific anti-fraud control existed in their bank and adding the positive answers to make a total sum. 
As described in Table 2-3 in Chapter 2.6., the 14 specific anti-occupational fraud controls were adopted 
from Giles’ study (2012);  
(1) the segregation of duties (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.90),  
(2) the authorization limits (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.94),  
(3) criminal history pre-screening (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.59),  
(4) credit pre-screening (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.61),  
(5) certification pre-screening (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.56),  
(6) mandatory vacation (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.70),  
(7) anti-occupational fraud statement (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.75),  
(8) internal control assessment (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.93),  
(9) anti-occupational fraud training (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.94),  
(10) employee support programme (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.77),  
(11) surprise audit (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.88),  
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(12) fraud hot-line (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.83),  
(13) computerized constant monitoring (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.92),  
(14) reward programme for whistle-blowers (1 = exist, 0 = non-exist; mean = 0.52).  The mean number 
of measured anti-fraud controls was 10.84 in the total sample.   
Table 6-3: Categorical organizational characteristics of the respondents 
Organizational characteristics 1st Financial 
sector 
% (n) 
2nd financial 
sector 
% (n) 
Total 
% (n) 
Existence of 
anti-fraud 
department 
No 8 (17) 28 (53) 18 (70) 
Yes 92 (188) 72 (137) 82 (325) 
Bank size 
(total number 
of employees) 
Small and 
medium bank 
(less than 5,000) 
37 (75) 100 (190) 67 (265) 
Large bank 
(5,000 or more) 
63 (130) 0 (0) 33 (130) 
In addition, an independent sample t-test was conducted to see the difference between the two 
financial sectors. An independent sample t-test compares the means (Likert scale points) of the 
participants in group A with the means of those  in group B. These two groups should be independent 
such as male/female, non-high/high position, or the first/second- sector employees. A non-directional 
two-tailed hypothesis test was performed because there can be a relationship between the variables 
in either direction such as higher or lower between the two groups. Hereafter, if independent sample 
t-test is conducted in this study, the two-tailed hypothesis test is used because no previous literature 
exists regarding the study’s research questions that can predict possible directions (Brace et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the assumptions for independent sample t-test were all ensured to be met: (1) 
independency, (2) normality, (3) homogeneity of variance (Ho, 2014). Especially, homogeneity of 
variance means that the distribution of the dependent variable for one of the group being compared 
has the same variance as the distribution for the other group being compared. If Levene’s p-value is 
0.05 or less, then there is not equality of variance, thus the bottom row of values for t-stat was used 
from the result output of SPSS (Brace et al, 2016).  
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Table 6-4 below summarizes the difference by financial sector. There were statistically significant 
differences at 1 percent level (p<0.01) among all the non-categorical organizational characteristics. 
This finding indicates that the banks in the first sector are larger with statistical significance in terms 
of the number of employees, perceived frequency of occupational fraud, number of anti-fraud 
controls and the loss of the recent case. 
Table 6-4: Non-categorical organizational characteristics of the respondents and the result of t-test 
 
The first sector 
mean 
The second 
sector mean 
T-statistics 
Total sample 
mean 
Number of 
employees in the 
office 
25.5 12.2 4.37** 19.1 
Number of total 
employees in the 
bank 
9,660 240 20.16** 5,128 
Number of perceived 
occupational fraud 
occurrence in the last 
5 years 
4 2 3.97** 3 
Loss of the most 
recent occupational 
fraud 
£952,812 £81,275 3.06** £717,635 
Number of anti-fraud 
controls 
(out of 14 measured) 
11.63 9.98 6.29** 10.84 
**p < 0.01 
 
6.4 Perceptions of occupational fraud risk 
6.4.1 Occupational fraud risk 
This section deals with Research Question 2 which seeks to understand the respondents’ perceptions 
of the risk of occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry. The survey asked employees whether 
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they view occupational fraud to be a significant risk within their bank today, using 5-point Likert scale. 
Figure 6-1 shows that 41 percent (‘strongly agree’ plus ‘agree’) of the respondents perceived 
occupational fraud is a significant risk while 39 percent (‘strongly disagree’ plus ‘disagree’) did not. 
 
Figure 6-1: Perceived risk of occupational fraud (n=395) 
 
 
When analysed by the subtype of occupational fraud with 5-point Likert scale, the respondents 
perceived that asset misappropriation posed the most serious risk, followed by corruption. Fraudulent 
financial statement was perceived to be the least serious risk among the three subtypes of 
occupational fraud. 
Figure 6-2: Perceived risk by the subtype of occupational fraud (5-point Likert scale) 
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Table 6-5 gives a summary of the independent sample t-test by financial sector. There were 
statistically significant differences between the respondents in the two financial sectors with regard 
to perceived fraud risks. Overall, the respondents in the first sector perceived occupational risk higher 
than those in the second sector. However, a caution should be made that this does not necessarily 
demonstrate the evidence that the banks in the second sector are safer from fraud risk than the first 
sector. Differently from the employees’ perceptions of fraud risk, the analysis of 
investigation/population ratio investigated by the police in Chapter 5 showed that the second financial 
sector had more fraud-investigation ratio per employee than that of the first financial sector. This 
mismatch between the employees’ perception and fraud investigation ratio represents that there is a 
discrepancy between the fraud investigation ratio and the perceived fraud risk due to different 
awareness of occupational fraud depending on the financial sector. Therefore, an  explanation is that 
raised awareness of the employees though the increased anti-fraud investments might have caused 
higher perceived fraud risks in the first financial sector. 
Table 6-5: Perceived risks differences by financial sector and t-test 
Perceived risk 
Financial 
sector 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Occupational fraud is a 
serious risk in my bank 
today 
1st sector 205 3.24 1.465 
2.762** 0.006 
2nd sector 190 2.84 1.462 
Asset Misappropriation 
is a serious risk in my 
bank today. 
1st sector 205 2.99 1.460 
3.671*** 0.0003 
2nd sector 190 2.45 1.420 
Corruption is a serious 
risk in my bank today. 
1st sector 205 2.75 1.373 
2.491** 0.013 
2nd sector 190 2.39 1.432 
Fraudulent financial 
statement is a serious 
risk in my bank today 
1st sector 205 2.47 1.395 
2.043* 0.042 
2nd sector 190 2.18 1.366 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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6.4.2 Potential impacts of occupational fraud  
To gauge the potential impacts of occupational fraud other than direct pecuniary loss, the study asked 
the employees what their bank would be most concerned about when occupational fraud occurs. 
These questions also employed 5-point Likert scale. 
 
Figure 6-3: Potential impacts of occupational fraud (5-point Likert scale) 
 
As Figure 6-3 demonstrates, the respondents were most worried about the loss of customers (4.07), 
followed by the loss of public trust (4.00) if occupational fraud occurred in their bank. This finding is 
consistent with Clinard and Yeager (1980), who discovered that adverse publicity about law violations 
represented the most feared consequence of sanctions imposed on a corporation. Fisse and 
Braithwaite (1983) also concluded that non-financial impact on the loss of reputation was found to be 
the most significant deterrent of corporate crime. Legal fines and sanctions came third (3.81), and the 
loss of ability to attract good employees follows fourth (3.39). Finally, the respondents in the sample 
were least worried about the damage to the bank’s share price (3.10). 
6.4.3 Enablers of occupational fraud 
The survey asked employees what factors may allow occupational fraud to occur in their organization 
using 5-point Likert scale. As Figure 6-4 exhibits, the most agreed factor was management override of 
internal controls (3.12). The second most agreed factor was inadequate oversight by management 
(3.11). The third most consented enabler was the collusion between management and third party 
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(2.83). The collusion between employee and third party followed the next (2.72) and collusion 
between management and employee came fifth (2.70). The respondents gave the least consent to the 
statements that inadequate internal control or compliance programmes were the contributing factor 
of occupational fraud (2.68).  
 
Figure 6-4: Perceptions of the enablers of occupational fraud (5-point Likert scale) 
 
 
This finding implies that management override of internal control is the most severe risk to counter-
fraud effort, known as the Achilles heel of fraud prevention (Dorminey et al, 2010, 2012; AICPA, 2016). 
Management override refers to “the ability of management or those charged with governance to 
manipulate accounting records and prepare fraudulent financial statements by overriding these 
controls, even where the controls might otherwise appear to be operating effectively” (FRC, 2009). 
Internal control is sometimes regarded as ineffective to stop ‘management fraud’ because senior 
members like the director or CEO in a company just consider internal control as a way of attaining 
business objectives such as success or profit. In other words, management controls ‘internal control’ 
and manipulates it. Another Achilles heel of fraud prevention, ‘collusion’ was found to be a less critical 
element than management override in the sample. However, collusion between ‘management and a 
third party’ turned out to pose the most serious risk out of three possible collusive relationships (i.e., 
management - third party, employee - third party, management - employee). Interestingly, 
inadequate internal control or compliance programmes came as the least agreed enabler of 
occupational fraud. This suggests that other factors than internal control or compliance programmes 
are viewed as more serious risk factors by the employees. 
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6.4.4 Future occupational fraud risk 
The survey asked the employees about the direction in which they expected occupational fraud risk 
to be headed. As Figure 6-5, 6, and 7 demonstrate, most respondents generally believed that the risk 
of occupational fraud would remain the same over the next twelve months.  
Figure 6-5: Future risk of asset misappropriation 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Future risk of corruption 
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Figure 6-7: Future risk of fraudulent financial statement 
 
 
6.5 Perceptions of anti-fraud control and investment 
Fraud prevention requires a system of policy and procedures which together minimise the likelihood 
of fraud occurring, whilst maximizing the possibility of detecting any fraudulent activity that might be 
concealed quickly (ACFE, 2015). Therefore, proactive fraud prevention and detection controls play a 
vital part in managing the risk of fraud, but the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls might be viewed 
differently by the employees in the banking industry. Furthermore, organizations might rely on 
different controls depending on the type of institutions. In this regard, the study asked the participants 
to identify which of the 14 anti-fraud controls (Giles, 2012) was present at their organization and to 
assess the perceived effectiveness of those controls. 
6.5.1 Implementation rates of anti-fraud controls 
Table 6-6 provides a summary of the implementation rates of the 14 anti-fraud controls in the total 
sample. Authorization limits and anti-fraud education (both 94.2%) were the most frequently adopted 
methods in the respondents’ organizations. Internal control assessment by management (92.9%), 
constant computerized monitoring (92.2%), and segregations of duties (90.4%) followed in that order. 
Those five anti-fraud controls were the methods that more than 90 percent of the respondents 
identified to be present in their bank. Surprise audit (87.6%), hotline (82.5%), employee support 
programme (77.5%), anti-fraud policy (75.2%) followed in this order. The least frequently employed 
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controls were mandatory vacation (69.9%), pre-credit check (60.5%), pre-criminal check (59.2%), pre-
certification check (56.2%), and last come the reward programmes for whistle-blower (51.6%). 
Table 6-6: Rank and implementation rate of anti-fraud controls 
Rank Type of anti-fraud control 
Implementation rate 
(n=395) 
1 Authorization limits 94.2% 
1 Anti-fraud education 94.2% 
3 
Internal control assessment by 
management 
92.9% 
4 Constant computerized monitoring 92.2% 
5 Segregation of duties 90.4% 
6 Surprise audit 87.6% 
7 Hotline 82.5% 
8 Employee support program 77.5% 
9 Anti-fraud policy 75.2% 
10 Mandatory vacation 69.9% 
11 Pre-credit check 60.5% 
12 Pre-criminal check 59.2% 
13 Pre-certification check 56.2% 
14 Reward programme for whistle-blower 51.6% 
Authorization limits are one of the essential controls that the maximum authority for each level of the 
organization’s hierarchy should be clearly specified and checked. Jerome Kerviel from the French bank  
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Societe Generale demonstrated that the breach of authorization limits can bring about devastating 
losses (Giles, 2012). Authorization limits co-ranked in first place with anti-fraud education (94.2%) in 
implementation rate. Anti-fraud education helps to prevent fraud and ensure that frauds that occur 
are detected at early stages, thus limiting losses to banks and minimizing the negative impact on the 
work environment. Every employee within an organization should be required to attend anti-fraud 
education and methods of training can vary from memoranda, organization-wide emails, formal 
training programmes, to other intercompany communication methods (ACFE, 2015; Albrecht et al, 
2015). One recent study revealed that face to face comprehensive ethics training can decrease 
unethical behaviours by raising moral awareness and providing information on rules and regulations 
in organizations (Warren et al., 2014). 
Internal control assessment by management was placed at third in the implementation rate. 
Management review of internal control is a central part of the modern governance and risk 
management. The review of internal control should extend to line manager and team leader. Without 
visible and proactive monitoring by management, organizations will remain at risk of suffering 
occupational fraud (Giles, 2012). Plus, employees should know that supervisors are assessing the 
effectiveness of controls and watching for suspicious anomalies to further increase the probability of 
detection. 
It is surprising that three pre-screening checks were located at the lower half of the implementation 
rate in the table. Recruiting honest employees is necessary as a first step to create a positive work 
environment (Albrecht et al., 2015). Button and Brooks (2009) also pointed that staff vetting, such as 
background checks, is one of the vital factors to foster anti-fraud culture in organizations.  However, 
the interviews with bank employees revealed that the strengthened legislations for protecting private 
information in Korea have made it very difficult for the banks to verify applicants’ background directly. 
In the below verbatim quote, one of the interviewees expressed his opinion how difficult to obtain 
personal data and why pre-screening is thought to be unpractical now. In this sense, the result of low 
implementation rates of the three pre-screening checks can be explained. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Criminal background checks, credit history checks, and certificate verification 
before the recruitment are not feasible practically. To inquire about the 
information, we need to ask for inquiries to respective institutions such as police or 
credit agencies. Currently, there is no organization doing such things without the 
consent of individuals because of the Personal Information Protection Act. All of 
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these institutions require special authority by laws for doing pre-screenings, which 
made it difficult for banks to obtain this personal information. Thus, it is undertaken 
and provided by applicants themselves, but there is a problem of how to verify the 
authenticity of the documents submitted by the applicants. A problem of forgery 
occurs. How reliable an individual’s own document can be? Instead, banks are just 
receiving signed letters from the applicants that his/her employment will be 
canceled if something untruthful is later revealed. Most companies are doing like 
this. Pre-screening checks are not actually practical now.” 
 
The reward programme for whistle-blowers was placed in the lowest half in the implementation rate 
(51.6%) and it was much lower in the second financial sector (38.4%). The reward programme was 
invented to encourage whistle-blowing by rewarding internal informants, but it sometimes raised 
controversial issues because it can bring distrust and unnecessary tension among employees (Giles, 
2012). In the absence of social structures supporting peer reporting, Trevino and Victor (1992) found 
that work group members operate under severe pressures that prohibit whistle-blowing. If whistle-
blowers are negatively evaluated as ‘snitches’, work group members have little inclination to report 
peers' misconduct. By the same token, the low implementation rate of the reward programme in 
Korea can be attributed to the culture of seeing whistle blowers as trouble makers in organizations as 
highlighted by the interview with a bank manager below. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“Monetary compensation can undermine the organization's ambience and lead to 
bullying. Especially in our society, internal whistle-blowers are often buried in the 
organization. It is better to use a system that is socially institutionalized. In 
commercial banks, the reward system is only effective to alleviate the punishment 
in case the whistle-blower was also involved in the fraud.” 
 
Next, chi-square (χ2) tests of independence were conducted to see the association of the 
implementation rate between the sectors. The test was mainly used to detect any relationship 
between the presence of specific controls and financial sector (sector effect). The conditions for the 
test were all satisfied: every variable was a categorical variable composed of counts (Ho, 2014). The 
respondents were asked whether specific anti-fraud controls existed in their bank. There were some 
respondents who did not know whether a specific anti-fraud control was present in their bank. For 
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analysis, those responses were grouped together into the non-presence group as two by two table 
represents below. None cell in the test had less than 5 expected counts, hence, normal chi-square test 
(Pearson’s Chi-Square) was utilized. Fisher’s Exact test is only used when there are one or more cells 
with an expected frequency of less than 5 in a table (Brace et al., 2016). 
 
Table 6-7: Implementation by financial sector and chi-square test 
Type Presence The 1st sector 
(N,               %) 
The 2nd sector 
(N,               %) 
χ2  statistic 
p-value 
Segregation of 
duties 
Not present 18 8.8% 20 10.5% 0.346 
Yes, exist 187 91.2% 170 89.5% 0.557 
Authorization 
limits 
Not present 10 4.9% 13 6.8% 0.694 
Yes, exist 195 95.1% 177 93.2% 0.405 
Pre-criminal check Not present 79 38.5% 82 43.2% 0.872 
Yes, exist 126 61.5% 108 56.8% 0.350 
Pre-credit check Not present 82 40.0% 74 38.9% 0.046 
Yes, exist 123 60.0% 116 61.1% 0.831 
Pre-certification 
check 
Not present 76 37.1% 97 51.1% 7.829** 
Yes, exist 129 62.9% 93 48.9% 0.005 
Mandatory vacation Not present 34 16.6% 85 44.7% 37.124*** 
Yes, exist 171 83.4% 105 55.3% 0.000 
Anti-fraud policy Not present 39 19.0% 59 31.1% 7.648** 
Yes, exist 166 81.0% 131 68.9% 0.006 
Management review 
of IC 
Not present 10 4.9% 18 9.5% 3.162† 
Yes, exist 195 95.1% 172 90.5% 0.075 
Anti-fraud education Not present 10 4.9% 13 6.8% 0.694 
Yes, exist 195 95.1% 177 93.2% 0.405 
Employee support 
programme 
Not present 10 4.9% 79 41.6% 76.093*** 
Yes, exist 195 95.1% 111 58.4% 0.000 
Surprise audit Not present 15 7.3% 34 17.9% 10.153** 
Yes, exist 190 92.7% 156 82.1% 0.001 
Hotline Not present 17 8.3% 52 27.4% 24.889*** 
Yes, exist 188 91.7% 138 72.6% 0.000 
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Constant 
computerized 
monitoring 
Not present 11 5.4% 20 10.5% 3.631† 
Yes, exist 194 94.6% 170 89.5% 0.057 
Reward for whistle-
blower 
Not present 74 36.1% 117 61.6% 25.638*** 
Yes, exist 131 63.9% 73 38.4% 0.000 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, † p<0.1 
Table 6-7 above provides a summary of implementation rates by the financial sector. The first sector 
generally had the more respondents who identified the presence of anti-fraud controls in their bank. 
If the test result has less than 5 percent p-value (0.05), it means that the association was not a  random 
one and we can conclude there is a statistically significant association between the specific control 
and the financial sector (sector effect). Employee support programme (χ2 test statistic=76.093, 
p<0.001) was the most significantly associated anti-fraud control with the first sector (95% vs 58%). 
Mandatory vacation comes second (χ2 test statistic=37.124, p<0.001; 83% vs 55%) and reward 
programme for whistle-blower follows third (χ2 test statistic=25.638, p<0.001; 64% vs 38%). Fraud 
hotline was also significantly associated with the first sector (χ2 test statistic=24.889, p<0.001; 92% vs 
73%). Surprise audit (χ2 test statistic=10.153, p<0.05; 93% vs 82%), pre-certification check (χ2 test 
statistic=7.829, p<0.05; 63% vs 49%) and anti-fraud policy (χ2 test statistic=7.648, p<0.05; 81% vs 69%) 
followed in that order. However, segregation of duties, authorization limits, pre-criminal check, pre-
credit check, and anti-fraud education were not associated with the financial sector (independent with 
sector). Constant computerized monitoring and management review of internal control were 
marginally associated with the first sector at 10 percent level. 
The results of the study show that the second-sector banks tend to rely on traditional basic controls 
such as segregation of duties, authorization limits, and anti-fraud education, as the first-sector banks 
also implement (Those programmes were independent with the financial sector; no sector effect). 
However, the first-sector banks tend to exploit more various anti-fraud controls such as employee 
support programme, mandatory vacation, and reward programme for whistle-blowers (Those 
programmes were associated with the first financial sector). This result again supports the findings of 
the previous studies that small and medium sized organizations have limited resources and budgets 
to invest in anti-fraud measures compared to large corporations (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Bussman 
and Werle, 2006).    
Employee support programmes turned out to be the most significantly associated with the first 
financial sector (χ2 test statistic=76.093).  While 95 percent of the first-sector respondents said they 
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had an employee support programme, only 58 percent of the second-sector respondents said they 
had such a programme.  Employee support programmes aim to help employees by means of 
confidential counselling in areas such as addiction, family problems, mental health issues, stress, and 
financial difficulties, which can lessen pressure or motivation to commit fraud (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
However, in-depth interviews with one of the managers in the second sector bank revealed that why 
it is not so frequently implemented as expected in the second sector. The qualitative interview 
suggests that the conditions for effective employee support programmes are not yet satisfied in the 
second financial sector.   
 (An employee in an agricultural-fishery cooperative) 
“An Employee support programme exists in my bank, but it is not so popular, thus, 
few employees are using it. The reason is that employees are reluctant to expose 
their privacy and personal life…… I think… they are embarrassed to talk to someone 
else other than their family members about their private life. I don’t think it's really 
helping. Furthermore, there are few experts who can actually provide a 
professional counseling in the bank, it is of no use because everybody thinks that 
only his/her secret is exposed to others.” 
 
Mandatory vacation is a form of short-term job rotation based on the assumption that while the 
employee is on vacation, it is more likely that any illegal activity, if it is taking place, will be detected 
(ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Giles, 2012). However, an interview with a bank manager has shown that 
mandatory vacation does not always work well in reality in Korea. Mandatory vacation ranked the 10th 
out of 14 controls in the implementation rate (Table 6-6). Limited staff and budgetary issues in the 
banks made it especially more difficult for them to actually implement this control. 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Mandatory vacation is actually ineffective. I cannot order an employee to take a 
vacation from tomorrow because there are few employees in our branch office. We 
don’t have enough staff to work with.....Furthermore, these days, computers and 
everything have a security passcode. If you do not ask the password to the 
employee, you will not be able to see their personal PC the next day. And even if 
you see the employee's PC, there are several tasks that the employee is in charge 
of, so there is a problem of what to look for. As a result, there are not so many 
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cases that we can detect fraud through mandatory vacation. It is difficult to say 
that mandatory vacation is settled well, and I think it is only a formal, perfunctory 
control.” 
 
6.5.2 Perceived effectiveness of anti-fraud controls 
To prevent fraud, increasing the perception of detection is regarded as one of the most effective fraud 
prevention methods (ACFE, 2015; Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012). Controls do little good in preventing 
occupational fraud if those at risk do not know of the presence of possible detection. In this regard, 
the current study asked the employees about the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls in detecting and 
preventing fraud. As Table 6-8 demonstrates, the respondents in the sample rated continuous 
computerized monitoring as the most effective (4.10). Surprise audit came second (3.95) and both 
segregation of duties and internal control assessment by management ranked third (3.82). 
Respondents evaluated anti-fraud policy as least effective (3.26). Reward programmes for whistle-
blower ranked second least effective, and employee support programmes was third least effective 
control (3.50) among the 14 anti-fraud controls. 
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Table 6-8: Perceived effectiveness of anti-fraud controls 
Rank Perceived effectiveness 
5-point Likert scale 
(n=395) 
1 Constant computerized monitoring 4.10 
2 Surprise audit 3.95 
3 Segregation of duties 3.82 
3 Internal control assessment by management 3.82 
5 Pre-criminal check 3.81 
6 Authorization limits 3.73 
7 Education 3.72 
8 Pre-credit check 3.69 
9 Mandatory vacation 3.55 
10 Pre-certification check 3.53 
11 Hotline 3.51 
12 Employee support programme 3.50 
13 Reward programme for whistle-blower 3.32 
14 Anti-fraud policy 3.26 
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ACFE (2016) discovered that pro-active data monitoring and analysis (computerized constant 
monitoring) reduced the median loss by 54 percent. In a similar vein, many employees agreed that 
computerized constant monitoring system is the most effective out of many controls. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“Continuous computerized monitoring system works well and is very cost-effective. 
It costs money to instal it, but does not cost later. And computerized programmes 
have no room for subjective human prejudice. Auditors in the audit department can 
have a bias and prejudice according to their human relationships, and take 
employee’s reputation into account when examining employee fraud…... so 
sometimes fail to discover fraud. However, computerized monitoring programmes 
have the advantage of preventing a human bias and prejudice.” 
McCabe et al (1996) found that self-reported unethical behavior was lower for those working in an 
organization with a code of conduct than for those working without such as code. Furthermore, the 
self-reported unethical behavior was inversely associated with the implementation strength and 
embeddedness of the code of conduct in the company. It implies that in order for a corporate code of 
conduct to be effective in preventing unethical behavior, it must be more than just ‘window dressing’ 
(Trevino, 1990). However, anti-fraud policy was ranked least effective (3.26) in the current study. This 
implies that anti-fraud policy in the banking sector is still regarded just for cosmetic by the banking 
employees. This was clearly revealed in an interview with a bank manager below.  
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Declaration of anti-fraud policy, code of conduct, these are pledges and 
resolutions ...... In fact, this is a matter of ethics and integrity for employees, but 
running this system does not guarantee anything in the bank. ... . Declaration and 
real practice are separate. ..... The implementation of a code of ethics will make 
employees sign the pledge, but there are not so much employees who really 
understand the true meaning of the signature. They just sign a memorandum once 
a year ….... And that's it! They forget about it….. Employees should have high 
integrity from the recruitment other than just signing a code of ethics. I think this 
is much more important.” 
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Table 6-9 gives a summary of perceived effectiveness differences by the financial sector. Generally, 
the respondents in the second financial sector evaluated anti-fraud controls lower than those in the 
first sector.  Reward programmes for whistle-blowers (p=0.000), mandatory vacation (p=0.000), and 
surprise audit (p=0.006) were perceived significantly differently at 1 percent level between the two 
sectors. Anti-fraud policy (p=0.023), hot-line (p=0.038), employee support programme (p=0.039), and 
pre-certification check (p= 0.045) were statistically different at 5 percent level.  In contrast, other 
controls were rated not statistically differently between the two sectors. For example, constant 
computerized monitoring (ranked 1st in effectiveness), segregation of duties (ranked 3rd in 
effectiveness), and internal control assessment (ranked 4th in effectiveness) were perceived similarly 
between the two sector. The lower evaluation by the second sector of reward programmes and 
mandatory vacation might have been caused by their low implementation rates of the programmes 
(52%, 70% respectively) in the second sector.   
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Table 6-9: Perceived effectiveness differences by sector and t-test 
Anti-fraud controls Sector N Mean Std. Dev. t-stat p value 
Segregation of 
duties 
First 205 3.85 0.930 0.628 0.531 
Second 190 3.79 0.947 
Authorization 
limits 
First 205 3.82 0.996 1.876† 0.061 
Second 190 3.63 1.050 
Pre-criminal check First 205 3.88 1.005 1.382 0.168 
Second 190 3.74 1.026 
Pre-credit check First 205 3.74 1.014 0.975 0.330 
Second 190 3.64 1.018 
Pre-certification 
check 
First 205 3.63 1.004 2.014* 0.045 
Second 190 3.42 1.050 
Mandatory vacation First 205 3.75 1.113 3.544*** 0.000 
Second 190 3.34 1.183 
Anti-fraud policy First 205 3.38 1.085 2.284* 0.023 
Second 190 3.14 1.035 
Internal control 
assessment 
First 205 3.82 1.030 -0.016 0.987 
Second 190 3.82 0.860 
Anti-fraud 
education 
First 205 3.70 1.073 -0.396 0.692 
Second 190 3.74 0.915 
Employee support 
programme 
First 205 3.60 1.022 2.066* 0.039 
Second 190 3.38 1.101 
Surprise audit First 205 4.09 0.951 2.758** 0.006 
Second 190 3.81 1.047 
Hotline First 205 3.61 1.011 2.086* 0.038 
Second 190 3.40 1.033 
Constant computer 
monitoring 
First 205 4.15 0.940 1.168 0.243 
Second 190 4.04 0.913 
Reward programme 
for whistle-blower 
First 205 3.51 0.988 3.776*** 0.000 
Second 190 3.12 1.045 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p<0.1 
  
142 
 
Lastly, Figure 6-8 reveals the gaps between the respondents’ views of the effectiveness and the 
organization’s usage rates of the controls. In their study of utilizing situational crime prevention 
techniques to prevent occupational corruption, Tunley et al (2018) analysed their utilization and 
effectiveness of a variety of controls and concluded that counter-corruption managers require the 
delegated power and support of the executive leadership to achieve meaningful implementation of 
the techniques. The controls with the highest usage level included authorization limits and anti-fraud 
education, which, however, ranked in the middle of the perceived effectiveness (6th and 7th 
respectively).  
Figure 6-8: Correlating implementation and effectiveness 
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Moreover, it should be pointed out that some of the controls with low implementation rates had a 
relatively high perceived effectiveness; those controls are pre-criminal checks (5th) and pre-credit 
checks (8th) in the perceived effectiveness order. Despite the relatively highly perceived effectiveness, 
the weak implementation rate of pre-screening checks might be due to the difficulty in obtaining 
private personal data such as credit, criminal, certification backgrounds as discussed in the interview 
previously.  CIFAS has a fraud data-base that member organisations use to share data on thousands 
of confirmed fraud cases, preventing over £1 billion in fraud losses every year (CIFAS, 2018). However, 
Korea has not yet established a fraud intelligence sharing system, which one of the managers during 
the interview strongly argued that Korea should have.  
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Because of the Privacy Act, it has become extremely difficult for us to obtain 
information about an individual. Prosecution must be done to prevent criminals 
from being recruited again. However, we do not have the authority to acquire such 
information, and banks are required to get information by themselves, so we 
cannot do effective background checks. Data sharing systems in the financial 
industry are needed to share information on occupational fraudsters for effective 
management.” 
 
6.5.3 Perceptions of anti-occupational fraud investments 
The survey asked the respondents about the perceived organizational investments to fight 
occupational fraud. One focused on responses to the levels of budgetary investment through the 
statement: “I perceive that the amount of funding dedicated in my organization to fight against 
occupational fraud is appropriate.” The second item collected responses on human resource 
investment through the statement “I perceive that the amount of human resources dedicated in my 
organization to fight against occupational fraud is appropriate.” An independent sample t-test was 
conducted resulting in statistically significant differences (p<0.001) between the two sectors’ 
perception means. The respondents working in the first sector viewed that budgetary and human 
resource investments are more appropriate than those working for the community banks. This finding 
reinforces the point that the fraud risks faced by small organizations differ from those faced by larger 
organizations (sector effect). Due to their limited resources, small businesses can be especially 
affected by a loss of funds to occupational fraud. Unfortunately, however, resource restrictions in 
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most small organizations often mean less investment in anti-fraud controls, which makes those 
organizations more vulnerable to fraud (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). The result of the present study also 
supports the ACFE’s arguments.   
 
Table 6-10: Perceived investment difference by financial sector 
Perceived investment 
Financial 
sector 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Proper budget for 
anti-occupational 
fraud. 
1st sector 205 3.26 0.953 
4.247*** 0.00003 
2nd sector 190 2.84 0.995 
Proper human 
resources for anti-
occupational fraud. 
1st sector 205 3.20 1.005 
3.512*** 0.0005 
2nd sector 190 2.84 0.990 
***p < 0.001 
 
6.5.4 Perceptions of opportunity reduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.5, the Fraud Triangle Theory is based on the ‘opportunity reduction’ 
approach to prevent crime. Opportunity in the Fraud Triangle is commonly defined as (1) a control 
weakness is present, and (2) the likelihood of being caught is remote (Dorminey et al., 2012: 558). 
Enhancing deterrence can reduce fraud opportunities by increasing the perceived probability of 
detection and punishment (ACFE, 2015; Albrecht et al., 2015). The employee must perceive a chance 
to commit the fraud without being detected. This opportunity can arise from several sources including 
poor internal controls, weak supervision, lack of prosecution of perpetrators, and ineffective anti-
fraud controls. In this regard, Dorminey et al (2010) provided the items to reduce perceptions of fraud 
opportunity as summarized in Table 6-11 below. 
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Table 6-11: Checklist to reduce perceptions of opportunity (Source: Dorminey et al., 2010) 
Checklist 
to reduce perceptions of fraud 
opportunity 
 
Good design of internal control 
Internal control operational as designed 
Continuous monitoring 
Effective auditing software tools 
Effective punishment protocol 
Open communication with employees, vendors, and 
customers 
Proper employee activity monitoring 
Effective tip hotlines 
Whistle-blower protections 
Monitoring of contractual parties 
 
The survey asked the respondents in the banking industry about the perceptions of opportunity 
reduction. The reliability of the scale was very high with a Cronbach’s α of = 0.951. (Ho, 2014). The 
variable of ‘perceived opportunity reduction’ was created by averaging ten items as exhibited in Table 
6-12 below. The respondents in the total sample generally rated anti-fraud communication (3.36), 
monitoring third party (3.34), whistle-blowing system (3.20), and protection of whistle-blower (2.98) 
below the average (3.50), which hints further efforts in this area are required. It should be 
remembered that protection of the whistle-blower ranked bottom out of ten opportunity reduction 
items as discussed in in-depth interview that sociocultural aspects play a significant role for the 
successful whistleblowing system in organizations. 
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Table 6-12: Descriptive statistics of perceived opportunity reduction by descending order 
Opportunity reduction checklist N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Constant monitoring is well 
conducted 
395 1 5 3.787 0.987 
Internal control system is well 
designed 
395 1 5 3.714 0.949 
Punishment is well enough if get 
caught 
395 1 5 3.696 1.082 
Audit programme is effective 395 1 5 3.696 1.007 
Internal control system is well 
operated 
395 1 5 3.658 0.962 
Employees are well monitored in the 
bank 
395 1 5 3.544 0.969 
Anti-fraud communication is 
effective  between co-workers, 
customers, and vendors 
395 1 5 3.359 1.051 
Third party is well monitored 395 1 5 3.344 1.024 
Whistle-blowing system is well 
operated 
395 1 5 3.200 1.072 
Protecting whistle-blower is well 
conducted 
395 1 5 2.980 1.177 
Mean of 10 items 
(Perceived opportunity reduction) 
395 1 5 3.498 0.858 
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Sequentially, an independent sample t-test was conducted to see the difference of perceived 
opportunity reduction between the sectors. The results are summarized in Table 6-13. As expected, 
the respondents in the first sector had significantly higher perceptions of opportunity reduction in 
their organization. All ten items for opportunity reduction were statistically significantly different 
between the two sectors at 0.1 percent level (p<0.001). This finding indicates that the commercial 
banks and regional banks in the first sector have far superior processes and measures to reduce 
employee’s perceptions of fraud opportunity. In contrast, the small and medium sized community 
banks in the second sector appeared to have greatly more scope to improve the quality of anti-fraud 
controls to decrease the perceived fraud opportunity than the commercial banks in the first sector.  
 
 
 
Table 6-13: Perceived opportunity reduction by financial sector and t-test 
Opportunity reduction 
checklist 
Financial 
sector 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat 
Well-designed internal 
control 
1st sector 205 3.98 0.894 5.936*** 
2nd sector 190 3.43 0.928 
Well-operating internal 
control 
1st sector 205 3.89 0.879 5.17*** 
2nd sector 190 3.41 0.986 
Constant monitoring is 
well conducted 
1st sector 205 4.03 0.907 5.204*** 
2nd sector 190 3.53 1.006 
Audit program is 
effective 
1st sector 205 4.00 0.910 6.643*** 
2nd sector 190 3.36 1.002 
Punishment is well 
enough if get caught 
1st sector 205 4.02 0.955 6.444*** 
2nd sector 190 3.35 1.106 
Anti-fraud 
communication is 
effective 
1st sector 205 3.57 0.924 4.239*** 
2nd sector 190 3.13 1.131 
Employees are well 
monitored in the bank 
1st sector 205 3.83 0.831 6.321*** 
2nd sector 190 3.24 1.014 
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Whistle-blowing 
system is in good 
operation 
1st sector 205 3.58 0.950 7.753*** 
2nd sector 190 2.79 1.052 
Protecting whistle-
blower system is well 
conducted 
1st sector 205 3.33 1.118 6.388*** 
2nd sector 190 2.61 1.125 
Third party is well 
monitored 
1st sector 205 3.65 0.966 6.557*** 
2nd sector 190 3.01 0.981 
 Mean of 10 items 
(Opportunity 
reduction) 
1st sector 205 3.7878 0.75049 7.443*** 
2nd sector 190 3.1853 0.85789 
***p < 0.001 
6.5.5 Perception of anti-fraud culture 
Ethical culture has been conceptualized as ‘the multidimensional interplay between an organization’s 
formal and informal systems that promote ethical or unethical behaviour’ (Trevino et al., 1998). 
Moreover, Trevino (1986) argues that a strong culture has a correspondingly strong normative 
structure that leads to more agreement among organizational members about what is and is not 
appropriate behaviour. Therefore, anti-fraud efforts should focus on creating work environments 
where ethical sensitivity leads an individual contemplating a fraud to reconsider and pause. By 
cultivating ethical culture, potential fraudsters have a greater degree of cognitive dissonance to 
overcome. In this regard, Dorminey et al (2010) also have provided 5 items to deflate rationalization 
and pressure in organizations by creating anti-fraud culture.  
Table 6-14: Checklist to deflate possible rationalization and pressure (anti-fraud culture) 
Anti-fraud environment 
to deflate possible rationalization 
and pressure 
Setting proper tone at the top 
Strong ethical corporate culture 
Workplace of integrity 
Meaningful code of conduct 
Anti-fraud training programs 
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The participants in the survey were asked about the perceptions of anti-fraud culture. The reliability 
of the Likert Scale was very high with a Cronbach’s α of = 0.917. The variable of ‘perceived anti-fraud 
culture’ was created by averaging five items as exhibited in Table 6-15 below. The respondents in the 
total sample generally rated the integrity of workplace (3.87), effectiveness of code of conduct (3.77) 
and anti-fraud education (3.73) higher than average (3.65). On the other hand, ethical corporate 
culture (3.58) and tone at the top (3.28) were rated below the average (3.65), which hints that these 
two areas require more improvement. It should be stressed that ‘the tone at the top’ was placed at 
the bottom in the result. Tone at the top, which is the ethical leadership in organizations is a critical 
component to create anti-fraud culture because especially those in positions of authority can 
eventually influence the entire organizational members in either a good or bad way. 
 
Table 6-15: Descriptive statistics of perceived anti-fraud culture by descending order 
Anti-fraud culture 
checklist 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
The integrity in my 
workplace is high. 
395 1 5 3.87 0.997 
Code of conduct is real 
and effective. 
395 1 5 3.77 1.033 
Anti-fraud education and 
training is well operated. 
395 1 5 3.73 0.961 
Strong ethical corporate 
culture exists. 
395 1 5 3.58 1.115 
Tone at the top for anti- 
fraud is good 
395 1 5 3.28 1.128 
Mean of 5 items 
(Anti-fraud culture) 
395 1 5 3.65 0.909 
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Next, an independent t-test was performed to compare the sector differences. (Table 6-16) Similarly 
to the results of perceived opportunity reduction, the second sector respondents had far lower 
perceptions of anti-fraud culture in their bank. All the five items were statistically different at 0.1 
percent level (P<0.001). This indicates that the second-sector banking institutions have a weaker anti-
fraud culture compared to the commercial banks in the first financial sector. 
Table 6-16: Perceived anti-fraud culture by financial sector 
Anti-fraud culture 
checklist 
Financial 
sector 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat 
Tone at the top for anti-
fraud is good 
1st sector 205 3.54 1.036 4.857*** 
2nd sector 190 3.00 1.159 
Strong ethical corporate 
culture exists 
1st sector 205 3.93 1.010 6.780*** 
2nd sector 190 3.21 1.106 
The integrity of my 
workplace is high 
1st sector 205 4.07 0.902 4.199*** 
2nd sector 190 3.66 1.051 
Code of conduct is real 
and effective 
1st sector 205 4.05 0.933 5.835*** 
2nd sector 190 3.46 1.052 
Anti-fraud education and 
training is well operated 
1st sector 205 3.96 0.901 5.138*** 
2nd sector 190 3.48 0.963 
Perceived anti-fraud 
culture 
(mean of 5 items) 
1st sector 205 3.9093 0.82329 6.276*** 
2nd sector 190 3.3611 0.91267 
***p < 0.001 
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6.6 Hypothesis outcomes and discussion 
The Research Questions dealt with in this chapter are:  
2. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk? Is there any evidence 
that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived risk of occupational 
fraud? 
3. What are the bank employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls? Is there 
any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect on the perceived 
effectiveness of anti-fraud controls? 
4. Is there any statistically significant association among the perceived risk, counter-fraud 
effectiveness, and frequency (occurrence) of occupational fraud? 
 
Organizational-level differences (sector effect) have already been tested resulting in statistically 
significant outcomes all round. To summarize the results of organizational differences so far, the 
respondents in the first-sector banks perceived the higher risks of occupational fraud than the 
participants from the second-sector banks. At the same time, the respondents in the first-sector banks 
recognized their banks had higher anti-fraud investments, better opportunity reduction and more 
elevated anti-fraud culture than the employees in the second-sector banks perceived. Therefore, in 
this section, only the t-test of gender and position differences (gender & position effect) will be 
additionally conducted regarding Research Question 2 and 3. Finally, for Research Question 4, more 
advanced analysis will be performed utilizing logistic regression analysis. Logistic regression is used for 
predicting a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e., fraud occurrence vs non-occurrence). Logistic 
regression is regarded more flexible because it does not need to meet the requirement of the 
predictor variable conditions, which are the normal distributions, linear relation, and equal variance 
assumptions (Ho, 2014: 383). 
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Table 6-17: Research and null hypothesis for Chapter 6 
 
 
6.6.1 Hypothesis 2A, 2B 
Hypothesis 2A: There is a gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk. 
Ho 2A: There is no gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk.  
Table 6-18 presents the results of an independent sample t-test of the means of the perceived risks 
by gender. There are no significant differences found regarding the means of the perceived risks of 
occupational fraud between the male and female employees. In other words, there was no gender 
effect found on the perceived risks of occupational fraud with statistical significance. 
  
Research  Hypothesis Null Hypothesis 
2. There is a gender or position or sector effect 
on the employees’ perceptions of occupational 
fraud risks. 
Ho 2:  There is no gender or position or sector 
effect on the employees’ perceptions of 
occupational fraud risks.  
3.  There is a gender or position or sector effect 
on the employees’ perceptions of opportunity 
reduction or anti-fraud culture. 
Ho 3:  There is no gender or position or sector 
effect on the employees’ perceptions of 
opportunity reduction or anti-fraud culture. 
 
4. The employees’ perceptions of fraud risks and 
opportunity reduction in the bank are associated 
with the perceived occurrence of occupational 
fraud in their organization. 
Ho 4:  The employees’ perceptions of fraud risks, 
opportunity reduction in the bank are not 
associated with the employee’s perceived 
occurrence of occupational fraud. 
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Table 6-18: Perceived risks by gender and t-test 
Perceived risk Gender N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Occupational fraud is 
a serious risk in my 
bank today 
Female 151 2.93 1.427 -1.212 0.226 
Male 244 3.12 1.504 
Asset 
Misappropriation is a 
serious risk in my 
bank today 
Female 151 2.74 1.430 0.135 0.893 
Male 244 2.72 1.487 
Corruption is a serious 
risk in my bank today 
Female 151 2.60 1.400 0.281 0.778 
Male 244 2.56 1.420 
Fraudulent financial 
statement is a serious 
risk in my bank today 
Female 151 2.39 1.351 0.666 0.506 
Male 244 2.30 1.409 
 
Hypothesis 2B: There is a position effect on the employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk.  
Ho 2B: There is no position effect on the employees’ perceptions of occupational fraud risk. 
Table 6-19 gives a summary of an independent t-test between the means of perceptions between the 
high/non-high employees. There were statistically significant differences of the means of perceptions 
of occupational fraud risk with regard to corruption and fraudulent financial statement. The 
employees in a high position of the bank viewed the risk of corruption lower than those in non-high 
position (p=0.024). Plus, high-ranking employees perceived the risk of fraudulent financial statement 
the smaller than non-high ranking employees (p=0.009). However, there were no statistically 
significant differences found regarding the risk of general occupational fraud and asset 
misappropriation. 
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Table 6-19: Perceived fraud risks by position and t-test 
Perceived risk Position N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Occupational fraud is 
a serious risk in my 
bank today 
Not high 335 3.10 1.436 1.362 0.177 
High 60 2.78 1.668 
Asset 
Misappropriation is a 
serious risk in my 
bank today 
Not high 335 2.76 1.433 0.853 0.396 
High 60 2.57 1.630 
Corruption is a 
serious risk in my 
bank today 
Not high 335 2.64 1.400 2.260* 0.024 
High 60 2.20 1.424 
Fraudulent financial 
statement is a serious 
risk in my bank today 
Not high 335 2.41 1.385 2.638** 0.009 
High 60 1.90 1.324 
 **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
6.6.2 Hypothesis 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D 
Hypothesis 3A: There is a gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of opportunity reduction. 
Ho 3A: There is no gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of opportunity reduction. 
Table 6-20 represents the results of an independent sample t-test on the means of perceived 
opportunity reduction in the bank between male and female employees. There are no significant 
differences between the male and female employees with regard to their means of perceptions of 
opportunity reduction at the 5 percent level. Only the perception of ‘enough punishment’ was 
marginally significantly associated with the male employees (p=0.062). In other words, the male 
employees agreed more that punishment is enough when fraudsters get caught. Other than this, no 
gender effect was found on the perceived opportunity reduction. 
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Table 6-20: Perceived opportunity reduction by gender and t-test 
 
Opportunity 
reduction checklist 
Gender N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Well-designed 
internal control 
Female 151 3.67 1.031 -0.718 0.473 
Male 244 3.74 0.895 
  
Well-operating 
internal control 
Female 151 3.70 0.993 0.603 0.547 
Male 244 3.64 0.944 
  
Constant monitoring 
is well conducted 
Female 151 3.79 1.028 0.116 0.907 
Male 244 3.78 0.963 
  
Audit programme is 
effective 
Female 151 3.76 1.056 1.015 0.311 
Male 244 3.66 0.975 
  
Punishment is well 
enough if get caught 
Female 151 3.56 1.169 -1.870† 0.062 
Male 244 3.78 1.018 
  
Anti-fraud 
communication is 
effective 
Female 151 3.34 1.108 -0.225 0.822 
Male 244 3.37 1.016 
  
Employees are well 
monitored in the 
bank 
Female 151 3.60 0.967 0.834 0.405 
Male 244 3.51 0.971 
  
Whistle-blowing 
system is in good 
operation 
Female 151 3.17 1.146 -0.502 0.616 
Male 244 3.22 1.026 
  
Protecting whistle-
blowers is well 
conducted 
Female 151 2.91 1.213 -0.962 0.336 
Male 244 3.02 1.154 
  
Third party is well 
monitored 
Female 151 3.33 1.037 -0.201 0.841 
Male 244 3.35 1.018 
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Perceived 
opportunity 
reduction 
(mean of 10 items) 
Female 151 3.4828 0.90919 -0.277 0.782 
Male 244 3.5074 0.82588 
  
 †p<0.1 
 
Hypothesis 3B: There is a position effect on the employees’ perceptions of opportunity reduction. 
Ho 3B: There is no position effect on the employees’ perceptions of opportunity reduction. 
Table 6-21 below offers the results of hypothesis test of 3B. Generally, the employees in a high position 
agreed more with the larger opportunity reduction than the non-high employees. To be specific, the 
high-ranking employees rated more highly  good control design (p=0.025), internal control operation 
(p=0.049), a continuous monitoring system (p=0.017), audit programme effectiveness (p=0.011), 
enough punishment when get caught (p=0.001), and protection of whistle-blowers (p=0.004) than the 
ordinary employees in the bank. In contrast, there were no statistically significant differences of 
perceptions found regarding employee monitoring system (p=0.531), whistle-blowing system 
(p=0.117), and third-party monitoring (p=0.841). Anti-fraud communication was only marginally 
significant at a 10 percent level (p=0.073). Furthermore, the created variable of perceived opportunity 
reduction (the mean of ten items) was significantly different depending on the employee’s position 
(p=0.018) in the bank. To put differently, high ranking employees agreed more with a large level of 
opportunity reduction in the bank than ordinary employees. 
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Table 6-21: Perceived opportunity reduction by position and t-test 
 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p<0.1 
Opportunity reduction 
checklist 
Position N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Well-designed internal 
control 
Not high 335 3.67 0.942 -2.252* 0.025 
High 60 3.97 0.956 
Well-operating internal 
control 
Not high 335 3.62 0.962 -1.975* 0.049 
High 60 3.88 0.940 
Constant monitoring is 
well conducted 
Not high 335 3.74 0.995 -2.394* 0.017 
High 60 4.07 0.899 
Audit programme is 
effective 
Not high 335 3.64 1.013 -2.555* 0.011 
High 60 4.00 0.921 
Punishment is well 
enough if get caught 
Not high 335 3.63 1.098 -3.468** 0.001 
High 60 4.08 0.907 
Anti-fraud 
communication is 
effective 
Not high 335 3.32 1.054 -1.797† 0.073 
High 60 3.58 1.013 
Employees are well 
monitored in the bank 
Not high 335 3.53 0.975 -0.628 0.531 
High 60 3.62 0.940 
Whistle-blowing system 
is in good operation 
Not high 335 3.16 1.089 -1.571 0.117 
High 60 3.40 0.960 
Protecting whistle-
blowers is well 
conducted 
Not high 335 2.91 1.184 -2.911** 0.004 
High 60 3.38 1.059 
Third party is well 
monitored 
Not high 335 3.33 1.013 -0.457 0.648 
High 60 3.40 1.092 
Perceived opportunity 
reduction 
(mean of 10 items) 
Not high 335 3.4549 0.86421 -2.371* 0.018 
High 60 3.7383 0.78397 
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Hypothesis 3C: There is a gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of anti-fraud culture. 
Ho 3C: There is no gender effect on the employees’ perceptions of anti-fraud culture.  
Table 6-22 below provides a summary of an independent t-test regarding the perceptions of anti-fraud 
culture between the male and female employees. No statistical differences were found except only 
the marginally significant difference of the perceived workplace integrity (p=0.063). Other than that, 
the male and female employees generally perceived anti-fraud culture in their bank not significantly 
differently. Therefore, there was no gender effect on the perception of anti-fraud culture. 
 
Table 6-22: Perceived anti-fraud culture by gender and t-test 
Anti-fraud culture 
checklist 
Gender N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Tone at the top for 
anti-fraud is good 
Female 151 3.19 1.191 -1.291 0.198 
Male 244 3.34 1.086 
  
Strong ethical 
corporate culture 
exists. 
Female 151 3.56 1.214 -0.228 0.820 
Male 244 3.59 1.052 
  
The integrity of my 
workplace is high. 
Female 151 3.75 1.064 -1.863† 0.063 
Male 244 3.95 0.948 
  
Code of conduct is 
real and effective. 
Female 151 3.74 1.086 -0.383 0.702 
Male 244 3.78 1.001 
  
Anti-fraud education 
and training is well 
operated. 
Female 151 3.78 1.006 0.851 0.395 
Male 244 3.70 0.933 
  
Perceived anti-fraud 
culture 
(mean of 5 items) 
Female 151 3.6053 0.98196 -0.692 0.489 
Male 244 3.6705 0.86140 
  
 †p<0.1 
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Hypothesis 3D: There is a position effect on the employees’ perceptions of anti-fraud culture.  
Ho 3D: There is no position effect on the employee’s perceptions of anti-fraud culture. 
Again, an independent sample t-test was conducted to test the hypothesis 3D. As Table 6-23 
demonstrates, all the p-values were smaller than 0.05, rejecting null hypothesis 3D. Simply put, the 
employees’ perceptions of anti-fraud culture were statistically significantly different depending on the 
employees’ position in the bank. The high ranking employees agreed more with the enhanced level of 
anti-fraud culture than ordinary employees. To be specific, tone at the top (p=0.016), strong ethical 
corporate culture (p=0.008), workplace integrity (p=0.0001), effective code of conduct (p=0.042), and 
anti-fraud education effectiveness (p=0.013) were significantly different depending on the employees’ 
position in the bank. Furthermore, the created variable of perceived anti-fraud culture (mean of 5 
items) was also statistically significantly different depending on the position of employees (p=0.002).  
Table 6-23: Perceived anti-fraud culture by position and t-test 
Anti-fraud culture 
checklist 
Position N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
t-stat p-value 
Tone at the top for 
anti-fraud is good 
Not high 335 3.22 1.102 -2.412* 0.016 
High 60 3.60 1.224 
Strong ethical 
corporate culture 
exists. 
Not high 335 3.52 1.116 -2.687** 0.008 
High 60 3.93 1.056 
The integrity of my 
workplace is high. 
Not high 335 3.79 0.989 -3.803*** 0.0001 
High 60 4.32 0.930 
Code of conduct is 
real and effective. 
Not high 335 3.72 1.011 -2.04* 0.042 
High 60 4.02 1.127 
Anti-fraud education 
and training is well 
operated. 
Not high 335 3.68 0.968 -2.542** 0.013 
High 60 4.00 0.883 
Perceived anti-fraud 
culture 
(mean of 5 items) 
Not high 335 3.5869 0.89379 -3.066** 0.002 
High 60 3.9733 0.92898 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p<0.1 
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6.6.3 Hypothesis 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E 
Hypothesis 4A: If the employees agree more that occupational fraud is a significant risk to their 
organization today, then the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank 
are larger.  
Ho 4A: The employees’ perceived risk of occupational fraud is not associated with the odds of 
reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank. 
 
Hypothesis 4B: If the number of anti-fraud control exists more in the organization (quantitative 
aspect of controls), then the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in the bank are 
smaller.  
Ho 4B: The number of anti-fraud controls is not associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence 
of occupational fraud in the bank. 
 
Hypothesis 4C: If the employees agree more that opportunity is reduced effectively in the 
organization (qualitative aspect of controls), then the odds of reporting the occurrence of 
occupational fraud in their bank are smaller. 
Ho 4C: The employees’ perceived opportunity reduction is not associated with the odds of reporting 
the occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank. 
 
Hypothesis 4D: If the employees agree more that management override is a major contributing 
factor of occupational fraud in their organization today, then the odds of reporting the occurrence 
of occupational fraud in the bank are larger. 
Ho 4D: The employees’ perceived risk of management override is not associated with the odds of 
reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank. 
 
Hypothesis 4E: If the employees agree more that collusion is a major contributing factor of 
occupational fraud in their organization today, then the odds of reporting the occurrence of 
occupational fraud in the bank are smaller.  
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Ho 4E: The employees' perceived risk of collusion is not associated with the odds of reporting the 
occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank. 
 
To predict the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in a bank, logistic regression 
was utilized. In this study, the dependent variable is a binary variable if the employee perceives that 
occupational fraud occurred (1) or did not occur (0) in a bank within the last five years. One of the 
goals of logistic regression is to identify which independent variable can increase or decrease the 
probability of outcome with statistical significance and the study wants to discover which independent 
variables are statistically significant predictors in the model. Sample size was calculated based on the 
work of Peduzzi et al. (1996) and the minimum sample size was 269 for the logistic regression. The 
sample size of this study was 395, which meets the minimum sample size. 
Table 6-24: Descriptive statistics for logistic regression 
Variables N Mean Std. deviation Min Max 
Perceived fraud occurrence 395 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Female 395 0.38 0.49 0 1 
High position 395 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Working for support/internal 
control department 
395 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Organizational size (5,000 or 
more employees= large bank) 
395 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Working in the second sector 395 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Perceived fraud risk 395 2.67 1.28 1 5 
Number of anti-fraud controls 395 10.84 2.73 0 14 
Perceived opportunity 
reduction 
395 3.50 0.86 1 5 
Perceived management 
override 
395 3.12 1.14 1 5 
Perceived collusion 395 2.75 1.01 1 5 
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Table 6-25: Correlation matrix for logistic regression 
 
Perceived 
fraud risk 
Number of 
anti-fraud 
controls 
Perceived 
opportunity 
reduction 
Perceived 
management 
override 
Perceived 
collusion 
Perceived 
fraud risk 
1     
Number of 
anti-fraud 
controls 
0.047 1    
Perceived 
opportunity 
reduction 
0.069 0.467** 1   
Perceived 
management 
override 
0.352** 0.023 0.025 1  
Perceived 
collusion 
0.371** 0.020 0.064 0.550** 1 
N 395 395 395 395 395 
**p < 0.01 
To test the hypotheses of 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E, a series of logistic regression was conducted and 
Table 6-26 presents the results. To interpret logistic regression coefficients, it is more valuable to 
understand the odds ratio (𝑒β) than the coefficient (β). The logistic regression coefficient (β) simply 
shows the changes in the predicted logged odds of experiencing an event for a one-unit change in the 
independent variables. The second interpretation comes from transforming the logistic regression 
coefficients (β) so that independent variables affect the odds rather than the logged odds of the 
dependent variable. To find the effect on odds, simply taking the exponent (𝑒β) is necessary. For the 
exponentiated coefficient which is called the odds ratio, an exponentiated coefficient of 1 leaves the 
odds unchanged, an exponentiated coefficient greater than 1 increases the odds, and an 
exponentiated coefficient smaller than 1 decreases the odds. In terms of a formula, the exponentiated 
coefficient (odds ratio) minus 1 and times 100 gives the percentage increase or decrease due to a one-
unit change in the independent variable (Pampel, 2000: 23). 
% change = (𝑒β(odds ratio) – 1)*100 
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Table 6-26: Logistic regression results  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
β 
(Odds ratio) 
β 
(Odds ratio) 
β 
(Odds ratio) 
β 
(Odds ratio) 
β 
(Odds ratio) 
 Constant -0.564 
(0.569) 
-1.174* 
(0.309) 
-1.692* 
(0.184) 
-0.866 
(0.421) 
-1.068 
(0.344) 
C. 
V. 
Female -0.349 
(0.706) 
-0.343 
(0.710) 
-0.357 
(0.700) 
-0.370 
(0.691) 
-0.412 
(0.663) 
High position -0.250 
(0.779) 
-0.185 
(0.831) 
-0.238 
(0.788) 
-0.144 
(0.866) 
-0.179 
(0.836) 
Support / IC 
department 
1.222*** 
(3.394) 
1.256*** 
(3.512) 
1.225*** 
(3.404) 
1.325*** 
(3.763) 
1.312*** 
(3.714) 
Organizational 
size (Large bank) 
1.146** 
(3.146) 
1.115** 
(3.049) 
1.076** 
(2.932) 
1.235** 
(3.438) 
1.323** 
(3.755) 
The second 
financial sector 
-0.351 
(0.704) 
-0.299 
(0.741) 
-0.255 
(0.775) 
-0.354 
(0.702) 
-0.424 
(0.654) 
Bank type 
     
Regional banks -0.144 
(0.866) 
-0.142 
(0.868) 
-0.101 
(0.904) 
-0.041 
(0.960) 
0.024 
(1.025) 
Local agri-fishery 
cooperatives 
-0.207 
(0.813) 
-0.247 
(0.781) 
-0.242 
(0.785) 
-0.248 
(0.780) 
-0.188 
(0.829) 
Community credit 
cooperatives 
-2.121* 
(0.120) 
-2.134* 
(0.118) 
-2.101* 
(0.122) 
-2.155* 
(0.116) 
-2.087* 
(0.081) 
Credit unions -1.627* 
(0.197) 
-1.594* 
(0.203) 
-1.570* 
(0.208) 
-1.513* 
(0.220) 
-1.311* 
(0.270) 
Savings banks -0.351 
(0.704) 
-0.299 
(0.741) 
-0.255 
(0.775) 
-0.354 
(0.702) 
-0.424 
(0.654) 
I. 
V. 
Perceived fraud 
risk 
 
0.216* 
(1.241) 
0.216* 
(1.242) 
0.225* 
(1.252) 
0.211* 
(1.235) 
Number of anti-
fraud controls 
  
0.048 
(1.049) 
0.091† 
(1.096) 
0.094+ 
(1.098) 
Opportunity 
reduction 
   
-0.395* 
(0.673) 
-0.386* 
(0.680) 
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Management 
override 
    
0.300* 
(1.350) 
Collusion 
    
-0.285+ 
(0.752) 
Model significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R square 
(Nagelkerke) 
0.317 0.330 0.333 0.347 0.362 
Classification 
Accuracy 
0.724 0.727 0.724 0.732 0.749 
D.V: the occurrence of occupational fraud in the last five years 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p <0.1 
 
When only control variables were included in model 1, three variables were statistically significant 
predictors of the odds of the employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud;  
(1) working in a support or internal control department (p = 0.000),  
(2) large organizational size (p = 0.002), and  
(3) bank type (p = 0.000).  
To be specific, the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud of the employee who is 
working in a support or internal control department (odds ratio=3.39) we3.39 times as large or 239 
percent larger for the odds of one who is not working for either department. The variable of 
organizational size predicted that the odds of the employee working in a bank with more than 5,000 
employees (odds ratio =3.15) were 3.15 times as large or 215 percent larger than for those who are 
working for a bank which has less than 5,000 employees. In terms of bank type, compared to 
nationwide banks (reference group), the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud of 
the employee working in community credit cooperatives (odds ratio=0.12) were 0.12 times as small 
or 88% smaller ((0.12-1)*100) than those who are working for nationwide banks. In a similar vein, the 
odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud of the employee working in credit unions (odds 
ratio = 0.20) were 0.20 times as small or 80% smaller ((0.20-1)*100) than for those who are working 
for nationwide banks. Throughout all models, these control variables remained statistically significant 
at the alpha level of 1 percent (p<0.01). 
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In model 2, the study tested ‘the perceived risk of occupational fraud’ (odds ratio=1.24) and found a 
statistically significant effect of the independent variable (p = 0.024). In other words, the odds of the 
employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud are 1.24 times as large or 24 percent larger 
for additional one-unit increase of the perceived fraud risk. This result supports Hypothesis 4A and the 
effect also remains throughout all the models at the alpha level of 5 percent (p<0.05). 
In model 3, the study tested the quantitative aspect of internal control, which is the number of anti-
fraud controls in the bank, but could not find any significant effect (p = 0.321). Throughout the entire 
models, no significant effect was found rejecting Hypothesis 4B. 
In model 4, the study inserted the independent variable of ‘the perceived opportunity reduction’ (odds 
ratio = 0.67) and found a statistical significant effect (p = 0.020). In other words, the odds of employee 
reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in the bank were 33 percent smaller ((0.67-1)*100) for 
an additional one-unit increase of the perceived opportunity reduction. This result supports 
Hypothesis 4C at the alpha level of 5 percent (p<0.05). 
Finally, in model 5, the study tested ‘perceived contribution of management override’ and ‘collusion’ 
to fraud occurrence. In the results, only the variable of ‘perceived management override’ (odds ratio 
= 1.35) showed a statistically significant effect supporting hypothesis 4D (p = .022). To put it differently, 
the odds of employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in the bank were 1.35 times as 
large or 35 percent bigger for an additional one-unit increase of the perceived management override. 
However, collusion is not significant at the conventional 5 percent level (p = 0.058).  
  
6.6.4 Discussion 
Firstly, the results of independent sample t-tests showed the ‘position’, rather than ‘gender’ of 
employees has the effects on that perceived risks of occupational fraud, opportunity reduction, and 
anti-fraud culture. That is, the employees in a high position in the banks viewed the risk of corruption 
(p=0.024) and financial statement fraud (p=0.009) lower than those in non-high position in the banks. 
Plus, the high-ranking employees agreed more with the larger level of opportunity reduction (p=0.018) 
and with the higher level of anti-fraud culture (p=0.002) in their banks than the non-high ranking 
employees. This is an interesting finding which concurs with that of other study (Trevino et al., 2008). 
Trevino et al. (2008) found that perceptions of ethics in the organization differed across levels, with 
senior managers’ perceptions being significantly more positive and lower level employees’ 
perceptions being more negative or cynical. This implies that organizational ethics could not be 
perceived to be much of a problem to senior managers, hence providing too little ethical leadership 
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or too few financial resources to support effective anti-fraud controls. Therefore, senior managers and 
directors at the top should seek out the perceptions of lower-level employees so that they can better 
understand how lower-level employees perceive organizational ethical problems. By the same token, 
the present study indicates that the task of addressing occupational fraud should involve attention to 
organizational structures and the ways to foster interaction among various groups of employees 
especially across multiple hierarchical levels (Trevino, 2008).  
Next, logistic regression analysis revealed several significant findings; firstly, the employee’s perceived 
risk of fraud is positively associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud 
in the organization. Simply put, the employees’ fraud risk assessment is positively related to the 
perceived occurrence of occupational fraud in their organization. Therefore, the study provides 
important empirical evidence that risk assessment can be utilized as an indirect method of measuring 
the historic occurrence of occupational fraud in the banking institutions. Secondly, the qualitative 
aspect of anti-fraud control (i.e. perceived opportunity reduction) is negatively associated with the 
odds of employees reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud, whilst the quantitative aspect of 
anti-fraud controls (the number of anti-fraud controls) is not. This is one of the most significant 
findings of the study that how to operate control mechanisms is more important than mere presence 
of anti-fraud controls supporting the conventional saying of ‘substance over form’ empirically. Thirdly, 
the employee’s perceived management override is positively associated with the odds of reporting 
the occurrence of occupational fraud, whilst perceived collusion is not. This result suggests that the 
employees in the banking industry perceived that management override is the more serious risk factor 
than collusion.  
Interestingly, the control variable of employee working in a support or internal control department is 
positively associated with the odds of employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud with 
high statistical significance (p < 0.001). Information asymmetry can explain the reason because the 
support or internal control department is located in the headquarters of the bank with much 
information reported from many branches. This concentrated information enables the employees 
who are working for either department to know much about the information on occupational fraud 
occurrence, which is regarded as sensitive and secretive due to the possible reputational damages to 
the bank. Plus, large organizational size was also positively associated with the odds of reporting the 
occurrence of occupational fraud (p < 0.01). This can be explained in terms of Routine Activity Theory 
(Felson, 2002). If there are more suitable targets (assets) and likely offenders (employees) in a large 
bank, the organization is more likely to suffer from occupational fraud. Another possible hypothesis is 
that a smaller number of controls (capable guardian) in the second-sector banks has led to a lower 
level of detection than the larger banks in the first sector. This also implies that more occupational 
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fraud might be hidden in the second sector because of their staffing and budget limitations on 
counter-fraud activities (Bussman and Werle, 2006; Johansson and Carey, 2016).  
6.7 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the results of analyses of the employees’ perceptions in the Korean banking 
industry. The main purposes of the survey were: 
(1) to quantify and rank the perceived risk of occupational fraud,  
(2) to assess the usage of the 14 specific anti-fraud controls in the banking institutions, and  
(3) to measure the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls through the experience of the participants and 
to compare it.  
There are several important findings of this chapter: 
Firstly, the respondents perceived that asset misappropriation posed the most serious risk, followed 
by corruption, and fraudulent financial statement was the least seriously perceived risk. Moreover, 
the respondents were worried most about the loss of customers and public trust as the most serious 
potential impacts of occupational fraud. This result concurs with the finding of Clinard and Yeager 
(1980), which discovered that adverse publicity about law violations represented the most feared 
consequence of sanctions imposed on a corporation. The current survey also asked the employees 
what factors may allow occupational fraud to occur in their organization. Most agreed a contributing 
factor was management override of internal control. This is significant empirical evidence that support 
that management override is a very serious threat to fraud prevention (Tipgos, 2002).  
Secondly, the study discovered that authorization limits (94.2%), anti-fraud education (94.2%), 
management review of internal control (92.9%), constant computerized monitoring (92.2%), and 
segregations of duties (90.4%) are the top five most frequently adopted anti-fraud controls in the 
Korean banking industry. In contrast, the least frequently employed controls were mandatory vacation 
(69.9%), pre-credit check (60.5%), pre-criminal check (59.2%), pre-certification check (56.2%), and last 
came reward programmes for whistle-blowers (51.6%). The results of chi-square tests showed that 
the small and medium sized banks in the second sector were associated with basic control methods, 
such as segregation of duties, authorization limits, and anti-fraud education, which do not require 
expensive investment. However, the commercial banks in the first sector tend to exploit more various 
anti-fraud controls such as employee support programme, mandatory vacation, and reward 
programmes for whistle-blowers possibly due to more abundant organizational investments.  
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Regarding anti-fraud controls, the respondents in the sample rated continuous computerized 
monitoring systems as the most effective (4.10). Surprise audit came second (3.95) and both 
segregation of duties and internal control assessment by management ranked third (3.82). However, 
the respondents evaluated anti-fraud policy as the least effective (3.26). Reward programmes for 
whistle-blowers ranked second least effective, and employee support programme the third least 
effective. Independent sample t-tests showed that the respondents in the second sector generally 
evaluated anti-fraud controls lower than those in the first sector. Furthermore, in-depth interviews 
with bank employees and managers revealed that the low implementation rates of pre-screening 
checks, despite their relatively highly perceived effectiveness, are due to the difficulty in obtaining 
private personal data because of the strong information protection law in Korea. One important policy 
recommendation drawn from the interviews was that Korea should establish a fraud intelligence 
sharing system to provide financial institutions with perpetrators’ data to prevent fraud.  
Thirdly, Table 6-27 summarizes differences of employees’ perceptions by financial sector. The 
respondents in the first sector had higher perceptions of almost every items measured in this study 
such as fraud risk, anti-fraud investment, opportunity reduction, anti-fraud culture, and perceived 
frequency of occupational fraud in their organization. On the flip side, this provides an insight that the 
institutions in the second sector had to adopt strategically different approach because of this sectoral 
differences compared to the commercial banks in the first sector, which will be discussed in following 
chapters. 
 
Table 6-27: Summary of perceptions by financial sector and t-test 
 
1st financial sector 
(n=205) 
2nd financial sector 
(n=190) 
t-stat 
Perceived 
occupational risk 
3.24 2.84 2.762** 
Perceived anti-fraud 
investments 
3.23 2.84 4.102*** 
Perceived opportunity 
reduction 
3.79 3.19 7.443*** 
Perceived anti-fraud 
culture 
3.91 3.36 6.276*** 
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Perceived frequency 
of occupational fraud 
3.95 2.32 3.973*** 
***p < 0.001 
 
Fourthly, the results of hypothesis tests showed that the employees’ ‘positon’, rather than ‘gender’, 
had statistically significant effects on the perceived risks of occupational fraud, opportunity reduction, 
and anti-fraud culture. Very interestingly, high-ranking managers’ perceptions were significantly more 
positive than non-high ranking employees. Therefore, the result of the study indicated that the task 
of fighting occupational fraud needs to pay attention to organizational hierarchical structures and 
foster interaction among varied groups of employees in the organization (Trevino et al., 2008). 
Lastly, the results of logistic regression showed that the employees’ perceived fraud risk was positively 
associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in their organization. 
Therefore, the study demonstrates that employees’ risk assessment can be used as an indirect method 
of measuring the occurrence of occupational fraud in the banking institutions. Furthermore, this study 
discovered that the qualitative aspect of control effectiveness (perceived opportunity reduction) is 
negatively associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud with statistical 
significance, whilst the quantitative aspect of anti-fraud control (the number of anti-fraud controls) is 
not. These findings are very crucial because the study empirically supported the conventional wisdom 
of ‘substance over form’ by showing that how to operate control mechanisms is much more important 
than stale or mere presence of anti-fraud controls in organizations.  
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Chapter 7 The Impact of Organizational Investment on Occupational 
Fraud: Mediating Effects of Ethical Culture and Monitoring Control14 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Despite the very serious and significant impacts on society, empirical studies on occupational fraud in 
the financial sector have been very limited. To bridge the paucity of information, this study surveyed 
395 Korean banking sector employees with respect to their perception and experience of occupational 
fraud in their organization. Although previous studies attempted to discover what control mechanisms 
(e.g., background checks, hotline, risk assessment, audit, etc.) are effective in preventing and 
detecting fraud (Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; Kummer et al., 2015; 
Tunley et al., 2018), few studies have tried to investigate the impact of ‘organizational investment’ on 
occupational fraud. Furthermore, Murphy and Free (2016) called for more research on the 
relationship between ‘ethical culture/climate’ and ‘fraud.’ They argued that the current framework, 
the Fraud Triangle, has a limited scope of analysis by just diagnosing fraud as the problem committed 
by immoral individuals who should be ‘monitored’ through control mechanisms; this has led to a 
narrow approach to assessing fraud risk  focusing only on monitoring aspects. Therefore, the current 
study attempted to fill the gap of research on ‘organizational investment,’ and  to contribute to anti-
fraud community by simultaneously exploring the effects of ‘ethical culture’ and ‘monitoring 
effectiveness’ on occupational fraud, in which lies the novelty and significance of the study.  
For the analysis, structural equation modelling (SEM) was utilized.  SEM is a methodology that takes a 
confirmatory approach to the analysis of structural theory bearing on some phenomenon. The 
modelling conveys two important aspects of the procedure:  
(1) that the causal processes under study are represented by a series of structural (i.e., regression) 
equations, and  
(2) that these structural relations can be modeled pictorially to enable a clearer conceptualization of 
the theory under study.  
The hypothesized model can then be tested statistically in a simultaneous analysis of the entire system 
of variables to determine the extent to which it is consistent with the data. If the goodness of fit is 
                                                          
14 This chapter was mainly written by the author but enhanced by Dr. Shim and Professor Button (Co-authors). This chapter 
is published in International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice (Issue 53, 2018, pp. 46-55). (Retrieved on 13th April, 2018 from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1756061617302690) 
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adequate, the model argues for the plausibility of postulated relations among variables (Byrne, 2001). 
Following an explanation of the background, method and findings of the study, its implications and 
limitations are considered.  
7.2 Theoretical background 
7.2.1 Occupational fraud and the Fraud Triangle  
Occupational fraud is sometimes called ‘internal,’ ‘insider,’ or ‘employee’ fraud (Bonny et al., 2015; 
Edge, 2016; Gunduz and Onder, 2013; Rossi, 2012) or just referred to as fraud (Holtfreter, 2005a, 
2005b, 2008; Murphy and Free, 2016). The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), defines 
‘occupational fraud’ as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate 
misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or assets” (ACFE, 2012: 6-7). 
Therefore, ‘occupational fraud’ is fraud against an organization committed by members of an 
organization, which range from ordinary employees through to managers to executives. It entails 
three categories: 
(1) asset misappropriation, which includes the theft or misuse of an organization’s asset;  
(2) corruption, where employees use their influence in business transaction to obtain unauthorized 
benefits contrary to their duties to employers;  
(3) fraudulent financial statements, which normally involve making reported financial statements look 
better than they really are (ACFE, 2012; Albrecht et al., 2015; Holtfreter, 2005b; Wells, 1997). 
Holtfreter (2005b) found that the individuals who committed ‘fraudulent statements’ were more likely 
to be older, educated males with managerial positions conforming to the high status image of ‘white-
collar crime’ (Sutherland, 1961), whereas those perpetrated ‘asset misappropriation’ or ‘corruption’ 
more closely resembled ‘middle-class’ offenders (Weisburd et al., 1991); in terms of organizational 
characteristics, ‘asset misappropriation’ was committed significantly more often in smaller 
organizations, whereas ‘corruption’ occurred in larger organizations more frequently. The definition 
and typology of ‘occupational fraud’ developed by the ACFE has provided an especially powerful way 
of analyzing white-collar crime at a workplace level and many previous studies adopted the ACFE’s 
definition and typology for their analysis of fraud (Greenlee et al., 2007; Holtfreter, 2005a, 2005b, 
2008; Johansson and Carey, 2015; Timofeyev, 2015). When fraud is commonly referred in this paper, 
the authors also adopt the concept of ‘occupational fraud’ by the ACFE.  
According to the ACFE’s biennial reports, almost every organization is a victim of occupational fraud 
and the typical organization loses approximately 5 percent of its annual revenue with the median loss 
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of one case estimated at around $150,000 (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Therefore, studying what works 
for countering it is very important. Cressey’s Fraud Triangle Theory depicts that there is a high 
probability of fraud when pressure (incentive), opportunity, and rationalization (attitude) interact 
(Cressey, 1953; Wells, 1997). However, some imply that all three elements only apply to ‘first time’ or 
‘accidental’ offenders and not to repeat offenders, who are known as ‘predators.’ In the case of the 
latter, only one condition is necessary to commit fraud, which is opportunity (Dorminey et al., 2010, 
2012). Although challenges and caveats have been made to the Fraud Triangle (Lokanan, 2015; 
Schuchter and Levi, 2016), the theory is established as a useful framework not only for assessing the 
risk of fraud but also for presenting ways of countering fraud (AICPA, 2002). For example, ‘opportunity’ 
can be reduced by strengthening control mechanisms to increase the probability of detection and 
punishment in organizations (ACFE, 2015; Albrecht et al., 2015; Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012).  
Furthermore, having an ethical culture/climate is suggested as a solution to eliminate the other 
elements of the Triangle, ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ (Murphy and Free, 2016; Dorminey et al., 
2010; Rodgers et al., 2015). The individual level ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ have been hard to 
observe because both are happening in a subjective human mind. Moreover, only occupational 
offenders actually experience the concurrence of the three elements by actually committing fraud, 
whilst normal employees do not often encounter them simultaneously. This hence made empirical 
studies of all three elements very complicated (Schuchter and Levi, 2016). However, if the unit of 
analysis is converted to the organizational level, ‘ethical corporate culture’ can be a proxy measure 
which is negatively associated with the strength of ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ in a company 
(Dorminey et al., 2010; Murphy and Free, 2016). Despite the suggested link between the ethical 
culture and the two elements, empirical analysis for this expanded solution cannot be found in the 
extant literature. In this regard, the present study endeavours to enlarge Fraud Triangle Theory by 
measuring ‘monitoring effectiveness’ and ‘ethical culture’ in organizations rather than directly 
assessing individual offender’s perceived ‘pressure,’ ‘opportunity,’ and ‘rationalization.’  
7.2.2 Deterrence and monitoring control 
Traditionally, deterrence was stressed as a way of combatting crime. The more certain, severe, and 
swifter the punishment as perceived by individuals, the more effective would be the deterrence. 
(Erickson et al., 1977; Paternoster, 1989). Especially, between the certainty and severity of 
punishment, many now agree that perceived certainty is more effective in deterring crime (Apel and 
Nagin, 2011; Hollinger and Clark, 1983). Interestingly, a deterrence/rational choice theory would be 
more suitable in understanding occupational fraud because corporations are normally composed of 
rational individuals who want to maximize profits (Simpson et al., 2013). This approach, therefore, 
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mainly utilized methods to swell the perceived certainty of detection by focusing on monitoring and 
surveillance in organizations. To monitor and discover insider fraud, traditional methods such as 
internal/external auditing have been used in many companies although those measures sometimes 
necessitated time-consuming investigations and adequate organizational investments (Button and 
Gee, 2013). 
However, with the rapid growth of IT technology, computerized fraud monitoring systems have 
emerged using advanced information techniques to detect fraud and track fraudsters in a real time 
basis (Giles, 2012). For example, a continuous monitoring programme (also called as fraud pattern 
analysis) was implemented to identify anomalies, triggering points, and risk indicators using large data 
sets in many financial institutions. This programme searches for red flags that require further 
investigation and enables management or auditors to identify fraudulent activity much quicker, 
thereby reducing the cost of fraud (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Plus, auditing software and programmes 
have significantly advanced to find evidence of fraud more precisely using state of the art technology 
(Singleton and Singleton, 2010). The Korean banking industry has also adopted this technological 
innovation to strengthen its capacity of detection of occupational fraud (Datanet, 2015).  
7.2.3 Ethical culture  
The COSO internal control system that most organizations currently implement was established in 
response to the S&L Debacle, in reflection of the limited capability of traditional control mechanisms 
and to further integrate ‘ethical culture’ into the control system (Alleyne and Amaria, 2015; Singleton 
and Singleton, 2010). Trevino defines ethical culture as “a subset of organizational culture, 
representing a multidimensional interplay among various formal and informal systems of behavioral 
control that are capable of promoting ethical behavior” (Trevino et al., 1998: 451). Schwartz (2013) 
argued that three essential elements must be present if illegal or unethical activities are to be 
minimized through maintaining an ethical corporate culture. The three elements entail (1) the 
existence of core ethical values embedded throughout the corporation in its policies, process, and 
practices; (2) the establishment of a formal ethics programme such as ethics training; (3) the 
continuous presence of ethical leadership, which is an appropriate ‘tone at the top’ as reflected by 
the board of directors and senior managers. By the same token, Button and Brooks (2009) maintained 
that there are three main factors that affect anti-fraud culture in organizations: (1) a clear statement 
of ethical behaviour; (2) staff vetting such as background checks to create an honest work-
environment; (3) maintaining a positive working morale by such as good salary, all of which require 
adequate investments in the organizations.  
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7.2.4 Anti-occupational fraud investment  
Findings from a Global Survey of Economic Crime showed that the number of controls and detection 
measures in organizations was one of the most significant explanatory variables for the detection of 
crimes in an organization (Bussman and Werle, 2006). For example, companies that reported no 
victimization had significantly fewer controls while companies assigning more employees to control 
related tasks were more likely to detect possible fraud (Choi et al., 2013). Lee (2013) also found that 
the percentage of personnel responsible for monitoring financial statement fraud is positively 
associated with a good earnings ‘quality’: where company earnings are comprised of real cash flows 
rather than account receivables. Other studies have also implicated a high probability of occupational 
fraud when employees feel underpaid by a company or insecure about their job stability (Gill and 
Goldstraw-White, 2010; Greenberg, 1990; Lawrence and Kacmar, 2017).  
However, the hidden and secretive nature of occupational fraud makes it difficult for executives or 
directors of companies to realize the necessity of investments in countering occupational fraud. If one 
inventory item was misappropriated by an employee and the profit margin is 20 percent in the 
company, the losses can be recovered only after selling 5 additional items at a regular price (ACFE, 
2015). In a fiercely contested market situation, a competitive advantage can therefore be achieved by 
investing in anti-occupational fraud to reduce this hidden cost associated with fraud (Button and Gee, 
2013). 
Nonetheless, the impact of organizational investment for countering occupational fraud has not been 
well explained in the previous literature. In this regard, we attempted to discover the impact of 
organizational investment in financial institutions, where occupational fraud reported most frequently 
out of all industries (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). Some studies suggested that organizational investment 
might depend on several factors such as the strategy, size, and leadership of organizations (Bentley et 
al., 2013; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982; Tunley et al., 2018) implying a multidimensional interplay 
among various factors in corporate culture. However, given the exploratory nature of the study, we 
have assumed anti-occupational fraud investment as an exogenous variable and attempt to see its 
influences on mediating and endogenous variables sequentially. 
 
From the literature review so far, the author has developed the following hypotheses for the present 
study. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the perceived investment in anti-
occupational fraud and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
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Hypothesis 2A: If the employees agree more that proper budget and human resources are 
invested in anti-occupational fraud, then they feel that ethical culture is stronger in their 
organization. 
Hypothesis 2B: If the employees agree more that proper budget and human resources are 
invested in anti-occupational fraud, then they feel that the effectiveness of monitoring 
control is higher in their organization. 
Hypothesis 3A: There is a negative relationship between the perceived ethical corporate 
culture and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
Hypothesis 3B: There is a negative relationship between the perceived effectiveness of 
monitoring control and the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. 
 
In figure 7-1, the analysis model is presented based on these hypotheses. The relationships between 
variables are depicted by a solid line (positive effect) or a dotted line (negative effect). In order to 
maximize the visibility of the model, control variables are not described.  
 
Figure 7-1 Respective path hypotheses. 
 
Notes: latent variable = circle, observed variable = square; solid line (—) = positive effect, dashed line 
(---) = negative effect 
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7.3 Research method 
7.3.1 Sampling and data 
For data collection, a quota sampling method was administered to the employees in the Korean 
banking industry from June to September 2016. The survey questionnaire utilized a web-based 
platform easily accessed via social network and email services through mobile phone or any 
computers. An informed consent form was posted on the opening webpage notifying their 
participation was voluntary and confidential. A total of 444 responses were collected but only 395 
were usable for the analysis because of missing values in some returns. The full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method was utilized for the missing values, which is evaluated as the best technique 
to minimize a bias regardless of their distribution (Enders, 2006; Schafer and Graham, 2002). Six 
different types of banking institutions were included in the sample: (1) nationwide banks (45%), (2) 
regional banks (7%), (3) local agricultural and fishery cooperative banks (21%), (4) community credit 
banks (8%), (5) credit union banks (15%), and (6) savings banks (5%); these percentages represent a 
similar proportion of the bank employee population in Korea. In addition, the organizational 
characteristics of the respondents include the followings: (1) 68 percent had less than 5,000 
employees; (2) 82 percent had an anti-occupational fraud department in the bank; (3) 48 percent 
respondents were working for the second financial sector (community banks), whilst the others were 
working for the first financial sector (commercial banks).  
Table 7-1: Sample size by the type of depository financial institutions in Korea  
Financial sector Type Subtype Sample size 
The first sector Commercial banks 
Nationwide banks 177(44.8%) 
Regional banks 28(7.1%) 
The second 
sector 
Credit unions 
Local agricultural and fishery 
cooperatives 
81(20.5%) 
Community credit 
cooperatives 
32(8.1%) 
Credit unions 58(14.7%) 
Savings institutions Savings banks 19(4.8%) 
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7.3.2 Measurement of variables 
7.3.2.1 Endogenous variable 
To capture the endogenous variable, ‘the perceived frequency of occupational fraud,’ the author 
developed a single item by directly asking respondents how many occupational frauds had occurred 
in their bank within the last five years. The responses ranged from 0 to 10 and the mean was 3.45 with 
a standard deviation of 2.589. Following West et al. (1996), the normal distribution assumption was 
satisfied. The frequency responses were directly utilized for the analysis without any change. 
7.3.2.2 Exogenous variable 
The exogenous variable, ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ was measured with two items using 5- 
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). One item focused on responses to the 
levels of budgetary investment through the statement: “I perceive that the amount of funding 
dedicated in my organization to fight against occupational fraud is appropriate.” This produced a mean 
of 3.06, and a standard deviation of 0.994. The second item collected responses on human resource 
investment through the statement: “I perceive that the amount of human resources dedicated in my 
organization to fight against occupational fraud is appropriate.” This produced a mean of 3.03 and a 
standard deviation of 1.01. All items satisfied the normal distribution and were loaded on a single 
component. 
7.3.2.3 Mediating variables 
One of the mediating variables, ‘ethical corporate culture’ was measured by 3 items with 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) adapted from the Schwartz’s study (2013). The 
reliability of the scale was high with a Cronbach’s α of 0.870. One item was about the presence of 
ethical leadership using the following statement: “Proper tone at the top such as management’s 
honesty and integrity is well established.” This produced a mean of 3.28 and a standard deviation of 
1.13. The respondents were then asked about their ethical culture: “A strong ethical corporate culture 
exists in the bank,” which produced a mean of 3.58 and a standard deviation of 1.12. Finally, the 
respondents were asked about the core ethical values such as workplace integrity: “The integrity of 
my workplace is high” produced a mean of 3.87 and a standard deviation of 1.00. All three items were 
normally distributed and were loaded on a single component. 
The other mediating variable, ‘effectiveness of monitoring control’ was specified by 4 items with 5-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) adapted from the study of Dorminey et al 
(2010, 2012). The reliability of the scale was very high with a Cronbach’s α of 0.938. The four items 
are (1) “Internal control system is well designed (mean = 3.71, standard deviation = 0.95).”; (2) 
“Internal control system is in good operation as designed (mean = 3.66, standard deviation = 0.96).”; 
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(3) “Continuous monitoring system is in good operation (mean = 3.79, standard deviation = 0.99).”; (4) 
“Auditing tools and programmes in our bank are effective (mean = 3.70, standard deviation = 1.01).” 
All items were normally distributed and confirmed as one component. 
7.3.2.4 Control variables 
For our study, the unit of analysis was set at the organizational level. Therefore, only the organizational 
characteristics of the respondents were included. Three organizational characteristics and five 
different bank types were coded as a dummy variable. The three organizational variables included: (1) 
the size of organization15 (1 = small and medium sized, 0 = large; mean = 0.68), (2) the existence of 
anti-occupational fraud department in the bank (1 = yes, 0 = no; mean = 0.82), and (3) working for the 
second financial sector (1 = yes, 0 = no; mean = 0.48). The size of organization was selected as a control 
variable because previous studies indicated that crime is related to the size and influence of 
organizations (Coleman, 1987; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). The existence of anti-occupational fraud 
department was chosen because the authors believed that it is related to anti-fraud strategy of 
organizations (Bentley et al. 2013). Lastly, the unique characteristics of the financial sector were 
controlled to prevent any confounding effects on the endogenous variable. In the model, the savings 
bank was designated as reference group and 5 types of different banks were all dummy coded: (1) 
nationwide banks (=1, non-nationwide banks = 0; mean = 0.45), (2) regional banks (= 1, non-regional 
banks = 0; mean = 0.07), (3) local agricultural and fishery cooperatives (= 1, non-local agricultural and 
fishery cooperatives = 0; mean = 0.20), (4) community credit cooperatives (= 1, non-community credit 
cooperatives = 0; mean = 0.08), (5) credit unions (= 1, non-credit unions= 0; mean = 0.15). 
7.4 Findings 
7.4.1 Analytic strategy 
The general two-stage approach of structural equation modelling (SEM) was adopted. Firstly, a 
preliminary test was conducted through a measurement model to check the acceptability of whether 
to proceed to the next stage. For that, the author examined all the values of standardized factor 
coefficient, R-Square, and bivariate correlation. Secondly, a structural model estimated not only the 
direct pathway linking ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ to ‘the perceived frequency,’ but also the 
mediating effects of two respective variables (‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘effectiveness of 
monitoring control’). Bias-corrected (BC) bootstrapping methods, which are used for deriving robust 
estimates of standard errors and confidence intervals for estimates such as the correlation coefficient 
or regression coefficient, were utilized to minimize the concern about the normal distribution 
                                                          
15 If the total number of employees is less than 5,000 (mean in the sample) in the banking institution, it was categorized as 
a small and medium sized organization.   
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assumption and the probability of type I error. In addition, the fixed coefficient models were estimated 
to reduce the concern regarding the independence assumption by six different bank types being 
dummy coded. The Mplus 7.0 programme was utilized for the analysis (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-
2002). 
7.4.2 Measurement model 
A total of three latent constructs were included in the measurement model, showing the acceptable 
model fit indices: root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.051, comparative fit index 
(CFI) = 0.991, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = 0.987, and standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) = 
0.015. Moreover, the values of standardized factor coefficients ranged from 0.805 to 0.916 and all 
were statistically significant (p < 0.001). The respective values of R-Square ranged from 0.648 to 0.875 
indicating an acceptable explanatory power. 
Table 7-2 demonstrates the values of bivariate correlations among the latent variables. Given that all 
correlation values were below 0.80, no collinearity issue was found (Byrne, 2012). As predicted by the 
theoretical model, the relationships were all positively correlated among the latent variables. 
Table 7-2: Bivariate correlation matrix for the latent variables. 
 AFI ECC MCE 
Anti-occupational 
Fraud Investment 
(AFI) 
1.000   
Ethical Corporate 
Culture (ECC) 
0.421*** 1.000  
Monitoring Control 
Effectiveness (MCE) 
0.357*** 0.624*** 1.000 
 
 ***p < 0.001 
Although Table 7-2 does not indicate any issues of collinearity, ‘ethical corporate culture’ (3 items) 
and ‘effectiveness of monitoring control’ (4 items) appeared to be relatively highly correlated (0.624). 
To ease the concern, an additional exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to compare the 
integrated one-factor solution (7 items) with the original two-factor solution. A series of EFA models 
showed that the original two-factor design (‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘monitoring control 
effectiveness’) was far superior in the model fit indices. 
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7.4.3 Structural model 
The structural part (shaded in Figure 7-2) was composed of three latent variables and one observed 
variable. A two parallel mediator model was estimated using ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ as 
the exogenous variable; ‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘monitoring control effectiveness’ as two 
mediating variables; the ‘the perceived frequency’ as the endogenous variable. The eight dummy 
variables outside the shaded box were designed to control for the theoretical variables inside the 
shaded area. All the parameters were drawn from 2,000 bootstrap samples. 
Figure 7-2: Structural equation modelling analysis. 
 
Notes: solid line (—) = significant effect, dashed line (---) = insignificant effect, dashed-dotted line (-
‧-‧) = positive effect, dotted line (‧‧‧‧) = negative effect; Unstandardized path coefficient, standard 
error (parentheses), BC (bias-corrected) 95% CI (confidence interval) (brackets), and R-square values 
are reported.  
 
The structural model demonstrated ideal model fit indices and confirmed a high explanatory power 
(RMSEA = 0.036, CFI = 0.986, TLI = 0.978, SRMR = 0.022). Furthermore, significant variances in the 
theoretical variables were explained by the analytic model: 7.4% in ‘anti-occupational fraud 
investment,’ 37.0% in ‘ethical corporate culture,’ 31.2% in ‘monitoring control effectiveness,’ and 20.1% 
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in ‘the perceived frequency.’ Among three pathways (one direct and two indirect pathways) in the 
relationship between the exogenous variable and the endogenous variable, only one indirect pathway 
was found to be statistically significant. As expected, ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ statistically 
significantly increased both the ‘ethical corporate culture’ (BC 95% CI = [0.336, 0.575]) and ‘monitoring 
control effectiveness’ (BC 95% CI = [0.281, 0.481]) supporting the hypotheses 2A and 2B. However, 
only the enhanced perception of ‘ethical corporate culture’ sequentially decreased ‘the perceived 
frequency of occupational fraud’ in a statistically significant way (BC 95% CI = [-2.663, -0.067]) 
supporting our hypothesis 3A. 
Interestingly, three control variables negatively affected the endogenous variable; those dummy 
variables were ‘the second financial sector’ (BC 95% CI = [-9.121, -4.414]), ‘nationwide bank’ (BC 95% 
CI = [-7.135, -3.315]), and ‘regional bank’ (BC 95% CI = [-9.118, -4.035]). In other words, the 
respondents working for the second financial sector appeared to perceive the smaller frequency of 
occupational fraud than those working for the first financial sector. In a similar vein, the employees 
working for nationwide and regional banks reported the lower perceived frequency compared to 
those working for savings banks (the reference group). 
In sum, the SEM model demonstrated a full mediation relationship with respect to the indirect 
pathway linking ‘anti-occupational fraud investment’ to ‘the perceived frequency’ with ‘ethical 
corporate culture.’ An additional test was conducted to confirm the statistical significance of the 
mediation pathway. As reported in table 7-3, the linkage of 'anti-occupational fraud investment   ̶ 
ethical corporate culture   ̶ the perceived frequency of occupational fraud' was found to be statistically 
significant (BC 95% CI = [-1.316, -0.036]), whereas no significant relationship was found in other 
pathways.  
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Table 7-3: Significance test of direct and indirect pathways. 
Parameter B SE BC 95% CI 
Direct effect 
   
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→ Perceived frequency of 
occupational fraud 
0.258 0.328 [-0.369, 0.901] 
Indirect effect 
   
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→ Ethical corporate culture 
→ Perceived frequency of 
occupational fraud 
-0.647 a 0.324 [-1.316, -0.036] 
Anti-occupational fraud investment 
→ Monitoring control effectiveness 
→ Perceived frequency of 
occupational fraud 
0.417 0.270 [-0.057, 0.977] 
Notes: a = significantly different from zero 
 
7.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The S&L Debacle in the US, the Barings Bank fiasco in the UK, the savings bank collapse in Korea, and 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in many countries have demonstrated how significant the 
consequences of problems in the financial sector can be. However, like other white-collar crimes, the 
invisible and secretive nature of fraud inside the banking institutions has limited the empirical analysis 
so far undertaken in this field. Because of this lack of research, there has been no clear evidence about 
whether organizational investment works for countering occupational fraud, and where to focus the 
investment if it works. In this regard, the present study explored the impact of anti-occupational fraud 
investment and discovered the more effective pathway in preventing occupational fraud between two 
methods expanded from Fraud Triangle Theory.  
The result of the analysis showed that the perception of increased investment has statistically 
significantly enhanced two mediating variables, the ‘ethical corporate culture’ and ‘effectiveness of 
monitoring control.’ However, only the perception of an improved ethical culture was negatively 
related to the perceived frequency of occupational fraud with statistical significance. This finding 
implies that developing an ethical culture is more effective than monitoring controls for the banking 
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institutions to prevent occupational fraud. In a similar vein, the COSO’s integrated internal control also 
emphasizes the ‘tone at the top,’ ‘integrity,’ and ‘ethical values’ of organizations as its first component 
of the framework, namely ‘control environment’ (COSO, 2013). However, it should be noted that the 
two mediating variables in our sample were positively correlated (0.624), which hints that the two 
constructs interact for the same end (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Other studies also found evidence 
of the importance of control effectiveness (Johansson and Carey, 2016; Rae and Subramaniam, 2008).  
With regard to the reason for ‘monitoring control’ not playing a mediating role in the study, it can be 
explained by several possible hypotheses. Firstly, because the banking sector has traditionally been 
severely regulated compared to other industries, this might have brought fatigue among the 
employees about ‘monitoring control.’ Also, in terms of cultural context, Korea has been historically 
influenced by Confucian ideas stressing a hierarchical group culture (Batzeveg et al., 2017; Jang and 
Hwang, 2014). In such culture, it might be more difficult to prevent management override and 
collusive fraud (AICPA, 2016; Tipgos, 2002). This might have resulted in the employees’ imperfect 
perception of the effectiveness of ‘monitoring control.’ Secondly, because most occupational fraud is 
committed by ‘first time’ offenders who are amenable to appeals to morality, not by ‘predators’ who 
are immune to those appeals (Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012; Paternoster and Simpson, 1992), the 
present study indicates that setting ethics as the first line of defence is effective in decreasing normal 
employees’ malpractices in organizations (ERC, 2010; Giles, 2015). We believe that these alternative 
explanations are an important area for future research. 
Interestingly, the control variable such as working in the second financial sector (community banks) 
has lowered the perceived frequency of occupational fraud. However, a caution should be made that 
this does not necessarily demonstrate evidence that these banking institutions are safer from 
occupational fraud than the first financial sector. Instead, the finding can be explained by Routine 
Activity Theory, because the first sector is composed of commercial banks with more assets and 
employees (Felson, 2002); if there are more ‘suitable targets’ (assets) and ‘likely offenders’ 
(employees), the organization is more likely to suffer from more crime. Furthermore, a smaller 
number of controls (‘capable guardian’) in the community banking institutions might have led to a 
lower level of detection than in the first sector (Bussman and Werle, 2006; Johansson and Carey, 2016).  
Moreover, the investment-culture relationship should be understood in a more nuanced way. In this 
study, the author focused on ‘organizational’ investment and culture. The level of investment decided 
by management is the first step to set ‘the strong tone at the top’ in a company. Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory implies that crime is a risk-seeking activity by facing the risk of 
punishment. Furthermore, individual perception of risk is affected by psychological framing (Fung, 
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2015; Huerta et al., 2012). If developing a strong culture by increasing anti-fraud investment can 
change employees’ perceptions into a low crime and risk-averse pattern, this framing can spread out 
reinforcing virtuous cycles in a company, which would require less investment in return (Kleiman, 
2009). Therefore, our study gives an important message to CEOs or directors about the investment - 
culture interaction to reduce employee’s malpractice in organizations. 
The present study has several limitations. First, we directly asked the banking employees about the 
observed frequency of occupational fraud in the last five years. Of course, there might be gaps 
between actual and perceived fraud levels in companies. However, occupational fraud is regarded as 
so sensitive that it is very difficult to obtain real crime data in the banking industry (Button, 2008). 
Also, such information about illegal activities cannot be traced without potentially compromising the 
anonymity of the respondents. Instead, this study paid attention to the facts that occupational fraud 
could be detected most frequently by employees in a company (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016) and 
respondents are more likely to report that they observed others’ unethical behaviour, rather than 
their own (Trevino et al., 1998). 
Admittedly, the use of a micro-level endogenous variable (i.e., respondents' perceived level of fraud) 
raises concerns about the generalizability of our findings to macro-level set (i.e., fraud at the 
organisational level). Moreover, the mediating variable of ethical corporate culture (as a macro-level 
variable) was designed to predict the lower-level perception variable. Although this mismatched 
analytic framework is not confined to this study (Hechanova et al., 2014), it is still possible for the 
findings to be faced with a type I error. However, to use both bank type and organization size as 
controls in the analytical models would certainly ease the concerns pertaining to the mismatch issue 
to some extent. In other words, due to data limits, the current model specification was the least-worst 
option. 
Despite the limitations above, the findings are significant because the study discovered an important 
pathway for fighting occupational fraud in organizations. Reducing employee fraud can be best 
achieved only through enhancing the ethical corporate culture, which indicates that the 
internalization of values mediates the relationship between the increased organizational investments 
and desired behavioral outcomes of the employees (Warren et al, 2014). According to Bandura’s (1977) 
social learning theory, increased anti-occupational fraud investment will raise the moral awareness of 
employees, which is a critical component of ethical decision-making, and in sequence will decrease 
employees’ fraud in organizations. The current study’s findings also concur with the renowned 
corporate crime control strategy (i.e., family model regulation), that strongly enhanced organizational 
culture can buttress individuals’ attitudes not to tolerate peer misconduct in the workplace 
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(Braithwaite, 1989) or to use Fisse and Braithwaite’s (1983: 246) own words, “If we are serious about 
controlling corporate crime, the first priority should be to create a culture in which corporate crime is 
not tolerated.”    
Furthermore, the current study has important policy implications, which are not confined to the 
Korean banking industry. Recently, Wells Fargo bank in the US, one of the biggest banks in the world, 
was fined by the US regulating authority because millions of fraudulent accounts were created without 
customer’s agreement by some of their employees. The cause was not attributed to the lack of 
sufficient monitoring, but to inadequate organizational ‘practice’ and ‘pressure’ from the top, which 
measured success by the average number of products held by a customer (The New York Times, 2016). 
Therefore, this study can resonate not only through the Korean banking sector but also in other 
countries, like the US. Without cultivating corporate culture, through investing in ethical leadership, 
values, and ethics programmes (Button and Brooks, 2009; Schwartz, 2013), monitoring controls will 
do nothing other than generate a “don’t get caught” motivation for employees (Weaver and Trevino, 
1999). Furthermore, the present study also contributes to broadening the current fraud risk 
framework, the Fraud Triangle, by showing that ethical culture should be considered more importantly 
when assessing fraud risks in organizations. 
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Chapter 8 Qualitative Study Findings 
Chapter 8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents qualitative study findings using data collected from semi-structured interviews 
with bank managers and employees in South Korean banking industry. Sixteen interviews were carried 
out using a snowball sampling method. The sample represented a cross-section of depository financial 
institutions. It encompassed managers and employees from each type of bank: nationwide, regional, 
local agricultural and fishery cooperative, community credit cooperative, credit union and savings 
banks. It also included the officials from the Financial Supervisory Service and the Bank of Korea, who 
undertook fraud risk management duties in the financial industry. The composition of interviewees is 
summarized in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1: Interview list by sector and type of the bank 
Financial sector Type of bank Number of 
Interviewees 
The first financial 
sector 
Nationwide bank 5 
Regional bank 1 
Specialized bank16 1 
The second financial 
sector 
Local agricultural and fishery cooperative 1 
Community credit cooperative 1 
Credit union 1 
Savings bank 2 
Others 
(Specialists on fraud risk 
management)  
Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 2 
The Bank of Korea 1 
University professor (Security expert) 1 
 Total 16 
                                                          
16 Specialized bank is beyond the scope of the present study. However, the interview with a manager in a specialized bank 
was conducted for the researcher to have an overview of the Korean banking industry. 
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The interview data were transcribed and significant parts of texts and themes that relate to the 
conceptual framework extracted from the transcribed texts. The findings of the qualitative study were 
aligned with the Fraud, Resilience and Cultural Model (Button and Gee, 2013) that posits a three-level 
analysis for a counter-fraud framework: The perpetrator (micro-), organizational (meso-) and societal 
and national (macro-) levels. The conceptual framework for qualitative findings is depicted in Figure 
8-1. 
Figure 8-1: The conceptual framework for the analysis of qualitative data (Source: Button and Gee, 
2013: 65) 
 
The first level of analysis focuses on perpetrators, collusion and the Fraud Triangle components that 
are associated with individual factors (Section 8.3); the second level of analysis is based on 
organizational aspects such as tone at the top, management override and some constraints on 
organizational capacities. In addition, whistle-blowing systems and corporate governance structures 
are included in the organizational-level analysis (Section 8.4). Lastly, the study analyzes societal and 
national-level factors such as the criminal justice system, national culture and counter-fraud 
legislation (Section 8.5.). The summary and implications of the findings are considered in the 
discussion and conclusion section of 8.6. 
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Chapter 8.2 Review of the research question 
A qualitative research method is used when researchers are interested in understanding how people 
interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their 
experiences (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). Throughout chapters 5 to 7, quantitative research methods 
were adopted, which was appropriate because the study aimed to compare data in a systematic way, 
make generalizations to the whole population or test theories with a hypothesis and compare 
information between different groups. However, a qualitative approach is suitable when the study is 
exploring a subject about which was not well investigated before. In this regard, the final research 
question, “What and how can systems be improved to reduce occupational fraud in South Korean 
banking industry?” was explored by semi-structured interviews with the employees of banks and 
officials whose tasks were related to fraud risk management in the financial industry.  
Chapter 8.3 Perpetrators  
8.3.1 Perceived pressure or incentive 
The study asked the interviewees to answer questions from their observation and experience about 
the factors that caused the bank employees to commit occupational fraud. According to Cressey’s 
Fraud Triangle (1953), perceived pressure from non-sharable financial problems creates the motive 
for the crime. Albrecht et al., (1984) conducted an analysis of 212 frauds in the early 1980s that were 
collected from internal auditors of companies and identified ten most highly-rated individual factors 
of fraud. Those individual factors were: (1) living beyond their means, (2) an overwhelming desire for 
personal gain, (3) high personal debt, (4) a close association with customers, (5) feeling pay was not 
commensurate with responsibility, (6) a wheeler-dealer attitude, (7) strong challenge to beat the 
system, (8) excessive gambling habits, (9) undue family or peer pressure, (10) no recognition for job 
performance. Some of these motives were very similar to Cressey’s (1953) non-shareable financial 
problems.  
Although the current study has different backgrounds in time and location from the previous two 
studies, the results of the current interviews were also surprisingly akin to those two studies. The only 
variation from the previous studies lies in the fact that the pressure or incentive of fraud stems mostly 
from financial motives such as failures of investing in stock market or future trade. The Korean 
derivatives market (future trade) is regarded as so immense compared to its GDP and it once had the 
world's largest trading volume, exceeding one quarter of the entire global future-trading volume (The 
Chosun Ilbo, 2011).  Derivatives in the financial markets are very speculative products that can yield 
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dozens or even hundreds of times of profit, but at the same time, they can cause enormous losses if 
they go wrong as happened to Leeson in the Barings bank’s case. It is like a zero-sum game in which 
one side makes a profit and the other necessarily has to bear a loss. Hence, the market has a great risk 
for an individual investor to jump in. Nevertheless, there are so many Koreans who are looking for a 
quick profit by investing in the derivatives market, which has become like a gambling zone (The Chosun 
Ilbo, 2011). An official in the FSS, who has worked for 25 years supervising the banking industry 
mentioned his opinion on the cause of banking employees’ fraud. 
(Official 1 in the FSS) 
“Most of the time, money is pinched by stock investment or business failure, and 
bank employees commit fraud to recover it. They firstly invest in stock markets with 
their own money, but lose lots of money, then they begin to tap into customer’s 
money. As time passes by, the amount of embezzlement continues to increase. In 
my opinion, men tend to commit fraud due to stock investment failures, but women 
are more likely to commit fraud due to family or romantic matters.” 
(Official 2 in the FSS) 
“There was a female banker who embezzled up to several million dollars in the past. 
She was embezzling to make money for her boyfriend. Women often try to help 
their lovers….. However, I did not see occupational fraud occurred as a result of 
organizational performance pressures. If you commit crime, you will be fired 
immediately.  It is not often the case that a fraud is committed because of 
employee’s promotion prospects or the pressure for organizational performance.” 
 
It is interesting to note that similar reasons were highlighted by Goldstraw-White (2012) for gender 
differences relating to cause of fraud. Zeitz (1981) found that some female embezzlers committed 
fraud to solve an urgent financial need involving their lover’s or family’s desperation. Cumming et al. 
(2015) pointed out that men and women learn different gender roles, related values, and concerns, 
which form their masculine and feminine personalities from childhood. Consequently, men and 
women display psychological and cognitive differences in moral principles. Carlson (1972) suggested 
that men are guided by agentic goals, focusing more on the pursuit of individual achievement, 
whereas women are guided by communal goals, which put more emphasis on the development of 
interpersonal relationships. Radtke (2000) also implied that women are more nurturing, less 
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aggressive, and less likely to be physically harmful to others. These gender differences can explain why  
motives for occupational fraud differed between male and female offenders.  
(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“Having worked for almost 30 years in the banking industry and analyzed the 
causes of fraud, I have found that the people in economically difficult situations 
committed fraud most of time. It was not poverty from the beginning, but a loss by 
gambling, stock investments, and such things that cannot be shared with others, 
have caused fraud. They are not bad people from the beginning, but when they get 
a lot of debts due to stock investment, horse racing, gambling and so on, they are 
likely to embezzle customer’s money.” 
Albrecht et al. (2015) discovered that either financial or vice-related pressures represent majority of 
fraud motives; work-related pressure such as job dissatisfaction or a desire to beat the system 
comprises a relatively small proportion of motives. The interviewees of the current study also revealed 
that occupational frauds are mostly committed through financial pressures, not through job-related 
pressures. They argued that the pressure from job performance is usually not so serious to cause 
employees to commit fraud, because they are afraid of losing their job if they get caught. On the other 
hand, some interviewees stated that there is a high probability of occupational fraud when employees 
feel insecure about their job stability. 
(Official 1 in the FSS) 
“If employees think that their job is as stable and lifelong as before, they will not 
commit a crime. But when employees think that employment is unstable and when 
they do not know when they will be fired by their employer, they begin to invest in 
stock or derivative markets to make more money. It is the job insecurity that acts 
as a pressure from the organization. In other cases, every cause is related to a 
personal motive, in my opinion.” 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“Occupational frauds occurred most frequently when banks are going to be merged. 
The executives run away first. There are a lot of frauds when lower-level employees 
feel uneasy and believe that they have a high probability of losing their job.” 
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In a similar vein, Lawrence and Kacmar (2017) found that threat of losing one’s job will translate into 
feelings of emotional exhaustion that may lead employees to unethical behaviours such as fraud. 
Therefore, they emphasized that organizations should seek to provide an environment that supports 
employees who are experiencing job insecurity and become open in communications with employees 
when considering dismissal. By the same token, Greenberg (1990) also found that the employee theft 
rate was reduced and feelings of inequality were lessened when the basis for pay cuts was thoroughly 
and sensitively explained to the employees. Therefore, running a good employee support programme 
is highlighted to prevent fraud because the programme can demonstrate to employees that they are 
valued by their employers. According to ACFE’s report (2012), an employee support programme was 
one of the top anti-fraud controls that are correlated with the greatest decrease in losses through 
fraud. However, many interviewees showed scepticism on the usefulness of employee support 
programme because many believe that the environment for successful implementation of the 
programmes is still not mature enough in the banking industry.  
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“An employee support programme is very difficult to carry out, especially as the 
FSS forbids economic support, arguing that it is unfair to provide support such as a 
low loan rate to employees. Furthermore, Koreans do not easily  talk about their 
personal affairs.” 
On the contrary, one interviewee argued that employee support programmes play a role as a method 
of fraud detection rather than a preventive measure. The reason is that while employees receive a 
counselling programme, they are more likely to report personal difficulties stemming from the 
pressures or malpractices of their supervisors.  
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“The company can detect illegal activities in the process of employee counselling 
programmes. Bribery, asset misappropriation, sexual harassment and so on, can 
be detected. It is more effective for detection than prevention of fraud. …........ 
There are some managers who push subordinates too hard without any guilty 
feelings, and those who receive the counselling are likely to reveal it during the 
programme. In many cases, weaker people in organizations use the counselling 
programme to report superiors’ unethical behaviours.” 
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The analysis of interviews has revealed that the perpetrators in the banking industry commit fraud 
mostly by financial motives rather than work-related pressures. Especially, unrecoverable losses from 
the failure of investing in stock or derivatives market were pointed by many interviewees as one of 
the main promoters of employee fraud. Unfortunately, the personal motives resulting from vices such 
as gambling or stock investments, are not easy to control since those employees do not normally share 
their private distress and problems with others in the company (Cressey, 1953). Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of employee support programmes, which were developed to cope with those pressures, 
are usually rated very lowly with suspicions by the interviewees, because the environment that can 
provide its successful implementation is not yet ripen in the industry. 
In order for banks to prevent employees from investing excessively in volatile financial markets, such 
as a future trading, proper education programmes are necessary about the severe consequences of 
very risky investments in those markets. Furthermore, employees in the banking sector should be 
better trained to recognise the fraud ‘red flags’ (Albrecht et al., 1984). For example, banking 
institutions can assign them to the back office, in which cash is not dealt with by the employees under  
economic pressures. Some interviewees pointed out that occupational fraud occurred most 
frequently when employees felt insecure about their job stability. This has a more significant 
implication for the employees in the second sector because those working in the sector are more likely 
to feel unstable about their job stability due to the instable business nature.  Therefore, the banking 
industry should provide ways to lessen the employees’ feelings of emotional exhaustion and instability 
by thoroughly and sensitively communicating relevant information with employees (Greenberg, 1990; 
Lawrence and Kacmar, 2017).   
8.3.2 Perceived opportunities 
According to the fraud triangle model, the non-shareable financial problem creates motives for the 
fraud to be committed, but employees should also perceive that he/she has an opportunity to commit 
fraud without being caught. Therefore, perceived opportunity is the perception (1) that a control 
weakness is present, and importantly, (2) the likelihood of being caught is remote (Dorminey et al., 
2012). Having an effective control is one of the most important steps an organization can take to 
prevent and detect occupational fraud. While there are many control-procedures that are followed 
by organizations, they are all variations of each of the five basic control procedures: (1) segregation of 
duties, (2) system of authorizations, (3) independent checks, (4) physical safeguards, (5) documents 
and records (Albrecht et al., 2015).  
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Segregation of duties involves dividing a task into more than two parts so that one individual does not 
have complete control of the task. The second control procedure is a proper system of authorizations. 
When employees are not authorized to perform an activity, the opportunity to commit fraud is 
reduced. The theory behind independent checks is that if employees know that their work will be 
monitored by others, the opportunity to commit and conceal a fraud will be reduced. Mandatory 
vacation, periodic job rotations, supervisor reviews, and the use of auditors are the examples of 
independent checks. Physical safeguards, such as vaults, safes, and locks eliminate opportunities to 
commit fraud by making it difficult for employees to access assets. The fifth control procedure includes 
using documents and records to create a record of transactions and an audit trail because the 
documents can provide excellent detective controls once fraud occurs (Albrecht et al., 2015).   
Poor segregation of duties and infrequent job rotations were pointed out as one of the main 
contributing factors for fraud opportunities by some interviewees. In addition, the small size and 
limited-staff issue in the second-sector banks were very frequently stressed by the interviewees as a 
reason for not adequately implementing segregations of duties and job rotations, which hence 
jeopardize anti-fraud controls in the banking institutions.  
(Official 1 in the FSS) 
“The second financial sector is poorly controlled. For example, credit union banks 
usually have only five employees in an office. Since the employee can do everything 
by himself, the fraud amount is large if it turns out later.” 
 (A manager in the credit union federation) 
“At banks in the first sector, employees are rotated regularly. However, the 
employees in credit unions used to work in the same institution until their 
retirement after they joined the company. If you work in one place for a long time, 
you can hide fraud. Then, in the end, it grows to become a very big crime and the 
credit union can even go bankrupt. Although there is a legal basis in the Credit 
Union Act to circulate employees among different credit unions, we cannot enforce 
the transfer of personnel and staff according to the Act, because all credit unions 
are independent in reality. Therefore, job rotation cannot be carried out properly 
in the credit unions” 
Although there is a lack of staff and insufficient investment to prevent fraud in community banking 
institutions, one interviewee pointed out a valuable insight: segregation of duties and independent 
checks should be done not necessarily by many staff. The creative use of independent check can be 
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devised to prevent fraud. The case of an ice cream store in an American franchise store demonstrates 
a good example. The store has a large sign hanging on the wall behind the cashier, where the sign 
reads: “If you get a star on your receipt, you receive a free cone of ice cream.” In a small store or 
similar retail establishment, in which there are not so many employees, one of the easiest ways to 
perpetrate fraud is to accept cash from customers and either not ring it into the till or ring it in a lesser 
amount. The purpose of the sign in an ice cream store is to encourage customers to receive and 
examine their sales receipts. In order for customers to be able to look for a star, sales receipts must 
be issued. If the cashier charges £2 for an ice cream cone and rings only £1 in the till, sooner or later 
a customer will report the embezzlement (Albrecht et al., 2015). By the same token, a bank manager 
provided a similar opinion during the interview. She maintained that segregations of duties, 
authorization limits and independence checks can be done not only by people but also by the system. 
This can be a very important implication to be considered especially for the small sized banks in the 
second sector. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“There are only two or three employees in a bank office of the second banking 
sector, and they do not think that segregation of duties, checks and balances are 
possible. But should the segregation of duties only be done by staff? I don’t think 
so. The authority of the chief director can be restrained by preventing the power 
from being monopolized and by allowing other directors in the board committee to 
examine the chief’s approval of the loan once more. Segregation of duties can be 
done by the system as well.” 
Interestingly, one interviewee alluded to the rational choice model, in which an employee calculates 
the expected cost and benefit of his/her actions and decides whether to commit fraud or not. 
Opportunity cost, which is a key concept in economics is also cited. Opportunity cost is defined as the 
loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen (Krugman and Wells, 
2015). Generally, the employees in the first sector are thought to have a larger opportunity cost than 
those in the second financial sector. One interviewee argued that this has led the threshold of fraud 
amount bigger in the first sector, because the employees of commercial banks have much more to 
lose once they get caught. To be hired by a commercial bank is highly aspired and very competitive 
among young job-applicants in Korea and their salary is very good.  In contrast, the employees of the 
second sector can be tempted more easily with a small amount of money. Furthermore, having a job 
in a community banking institution is relatively easier than in a commercial bank. Therefore, it is also 
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stressed that receiving an adequate salary is crucial to prevent occupational fraud in the banking 
industry. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“It is due to human nature that fraud occurs. It is the individual's choice to make a 
calculation between the expected benefits you earn by committing a fraud and the 
losses when you get caught. It is always true that humans are easily tempted by 
money. Therefore, it is necessary to pay employees appropriately so that they do 
not fall into temptation……….. Where opportunity costs for committing fraud are 
high, the fraud amount tends to be large. The first financial sector generally has 
higher opportunity cost of committing fraud. Also, as the period of concealment 
increases, the amount of fraud loss increases….” 
 
Computerized pattern analysis for fraud detection is a fast-growing field as many anti-fraud software 
programmes are developing rapidly (Albrecht et al., 2015: Giles, 2012).  Although it can increase the 
employee’s perception of detection and thus can reduce perceived opportunities, it should be noted 
that the system is not a panacea for fraud prevention and detection. One interviewee mentioned that 
even computerized fraud monitoring systems can be circumvented by smart employees. 
(An employee in a local agricultural and fishery cooperative) 
“Clever people are able to circumvent internal controls, so they can commit fraud. 
There is a limitation even if it is always monitored and audited by the computer 
system. There is a pattern in the computer monitoring system, so anyone who 
knows the algorithm can bypass it. There are only 10 percent of cases that are 
prevented in advance and other 90 percent are found after the incident. Between 
ourselves, we are saying like this: if any employee in our bank decides to commit 
fraud, nobody can prevent it in advance.” 
All crimes need access to the target. However, white-collar crime is defined as ‘crimes of specialized 
access’ (Felson et al., 2002). Occupational fraudsters in banks always have a very suitable target 
nearby, which is the money in the safes. One interviewee expressed a fresh opinion in order to reduce 
perceived opportunity to commit fraud. That is, she emphasized that striking a right balance between 
oversights and giving flexibility to employees, was an essential condition to become a successful 
manager in the banking industry. The banking industry is well-known for the intensified regulations by 
the supervising authorities. These regulations can sometimes bring inefficiency and fatigue to the 
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employees. In this regard, she highlighted that striking a right balance between monitoring employees 
and allowing flexibility is a very important condition for fraud risk management. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Employees can easily touch the money at the bank offices. Employees should not 
see the currency in the vault as money, but ought to regard it as just a thing of 
business. However, at a branch office, employees sometimes think that they can 
borrow money and pay it back later…… Bank managers have the manuals to 
monitor their employees, but bankers cannot work efficiently if they always follow 
everything according to the manuals. Similarly, employees are not able to work 
properly if the manager is always monitoring them...... It is often the case that 
employees see this chance of lessened supervision for committing fraud. Therefore, 
managers should sometimes give the feeling to their employees that the boss is 
watching them over, even though the managers usually allow them to have 
flexibility to create a good work-environment. The bank manager who strikes a 
good balance is a competent leader, who is good at managing fraud risk.” 
 
Cressey’s Fraud Triangle suggests the ‘accidental fraudsters’, who are considered to be a good law-
abiding citizen, who would never consider fraud under normal circumstances. The fraudsters in the 
banking industry fit well with this type of accidental fraudsters. Without the perceived opportunity 
coupled with non-sharable financial problems, they might never have considered committing fraud. 
Therefore, strengthening control measures and increasing the probability of detection can reduce 
perceived fraud opportunities. Importantly, strengthening anti-fraud controls can be achieved not 
only by people but also by systems, which has a significant implication for the second financial sector. 
Moreover, in-depth interviews have revealed that even state of the art fraud detection technologies 
should not be regarded as perfect measures for combatting occupational fraud, because clever 
employees can find a way of outsmarting the system. 
 
8.3.3 Rationalization and personal integrity 
Because fraud includes dishonesty and false representation, there are violations of ethics, trust, and 
responsibility at the centre (Clement, 2006). Therefore, rationalization is related to ethics (Rodgers et 
al., 2015). Fraud scale theory developed by Albrecht et al. (1984) slightly amended the Fraud Triangle 
model by replacing rationalization with a more observable component, personal integrity. Integrity 
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can be defined as honesty, sincerity, fairness, and adherence to high moral standards (Audi and 
Murphy, 2006: 14). The benefit of using personal integrity instead of rationalization is that it may be 
more easily recognizable through the review of an employee’s daily conduct and can be used to 
predict the likelihood of the employee’s involvement in fraud (Dorminey et al., 2010). Furthermore, it 
is believed that employees with higher integrity would not easily rationalize unethical behaviours 
because personal integrity can moderate or mediate perpetrator’s rationalization (Dorminey et al., 
2010, 2012).  
Surprisingly, many of the interviewees expressed that bankers’ integrity is the most important factor 
that affects occurrence of fraud in organizations. Plus, moral hazard was also mentioned several times 
as a cause of fraud. Moral hazard is actually an economic term defined as “a situation where one party 
gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is protected against risk and the other party will incur 
the cost” (Krugman and Wells, 2015). It is not certain whether the interviewees used the term of moral 
hazard in relation to this economics definition or they were just confused with moral decay that is a 
term used to describe the decline or fall of the moral values of a society. Calavita and Pontell (1991) 
once attributed the cause of fraud in the financial sector to ‘deposit insurance’. They argued that 
deposit insurance, which was devised to prevent financial panic and contagion, has brought in 
unintended consequences, and actually promotes a unique criminogenic condition for the occurrence 
of white-collar crimes in the financial industry. Regardless of their understanding of the definition of 
moral hazard, it is true that the theme of personal integrity was cited many times by almost all of the 
participants during the interview.  
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“The biggest reason for the occurrence of financial crime is moral hazard.” 
(An employee in a savings bank) 
“We emphasize the significance of integrity for ethical management. We also sign 
a pledge of conduct. In the end, I think personal integrity is the most important.” 
(Official 1 in the FSS) 
“The employees’ ethics in financial institutions are the most important. We must 
keep a good ethics. The next thing is to go auditing as frequently as possible.” 
(An employee in a local agricultural and fishery cooperative) 
“The biggest reason for the occurrence of fraud is moral decay.” 
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(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“I think the executive’s morality of the top management is very important. It is 
necessary to create a system that can control immoral executives to prevent crime.” 
(An employee in a regional bank) 
“………… the monitoring mechanism is already established well. I think that ethical 
culture should be cultivated and ethical education should be strengthened.” 
Despite the stressed importance of ethics and integrity, there were mixed opinions found during the 
interviews how to cultivate them. Some of them showed doubt on the usefulness of ethics education, 
but others still expressed the importance of ethics trainings. 
(A manager in a credit union cooperative) 
“Of course, when an organization is rational, the incidence of financial crime is 
reduced. The second-financial sector is a family-like small business and composed 
of the employees that have been working for decades with the same people. 
Therefore, no matter how many trainings are conducted, it is really difficult to 
change the people. Education can be effective when the employees in an office or 
department are circulated. I am very doubtful of the usefulness of ethics education 
unless these preconditions are met in the institutions.” 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“In order to prevent moral hazard, banks should give a message about ethical 
management once a week. It is recommended that bank managers provide their 
employees with an ethics training programme at least once a week by email, memo, 
notes, and a case study. However, disadvantage is that repeated education can 
always become perfunctory and just for cosmetic.” 
(An employee in a regional bank) 
“Even if education sometimes becomes so formal, education should be continued 
all the time. It is as same as the marketing strategy. Even if a certain product is 
already selling very well in the market, advertisement of the product is still 
necessary. We should continue ethics trainings to increase fraud awareness among 
the employees.” 
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8.3.4 Collusion 
The ACFE’s (2014) Report to the Nation shows that when collusion is involved, monetary amounts 
associated with fraud losses increase substantially. Bishop et al (2017) examined differences between 
collusive fraud and solo-offender fraud by using survey data collected by the ACFE on worldwide fraud 
cases from 2002 to 2013. The results showed that collusive fraudsters are younger and more likely to 
be male. Regarding behavioural red flags, collusive fraudsters are less likely to exhibit addiction 
problems or excessive control issues which seem to suggest an individual problem and focus, but more 
likely to have unusually close associations with vendors or customers and to have a wheeler-dealer 
attitude, and thus be capable of forming a team. Regarding incident characteristics, collusive frauds 
are more likely to involve financial statement fraud, are larger, and are of shorter duration. 
Furthermore, collusive frauds are more likely to be discovered by a tip or complaint, internal audit, 
law-enforcement, or by accident, each of which can be a costly method to discover fraud, as normal 
controls and supervisor reviews failed to detect the problem. Finally, they discovered that collusive 
fraud is less likely in US organizations, possibly reflecting a greater individualistic culture in the US. 
Qualitative studies can reveal deeper aspects of phenomenon that cannot be explained solely by 
quantitative study (Kim, 2010). Although a recent study by Bishop et al (2017) filled in some of the 
gaps of the literature on collusive fraud, which had been argued by researchers for the future studies 
of fraud to be headed for (Akelola, 2012; Free, 2015), one interview in the current study has 
discovered that when collusion with outside parties is involved in occupational fraud, the bank 
industry has a tendency to disguise the nature of fraud by making only the external accomplices 
exposed to the public, thus minimizing the adverse publicity and criticism from the mass media. 
Adverse publicity against a corporation was highlighted as the one of the most significant 
consequences that corporate illegalities can face (Clinard and Yeager, 1980). Therefore, an incentive 
arises for the bank to disguise themselves just as a victim of fraud. However, an interviewee admitted 
that there is actually more fraud between insiders and outsiders and it is more difficult to prove 
collusive fraud than single-offender fraud. 
(An employee in a local agricultural cooperative) 
“Because bank systems are computerized very well internally, they have to collude 
with external appraisers to increase the amount of lending. When examining a loan, 
four people are required to check each other for loan-applications. However, when 
employees conspire with an external appraiser, this check and balance function 
becomes paralyzed. The only thing that middle officer has to do for a loan 
application is to confirm that there is no abnormality in the collateral appraisal 
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paper. In this regard, there was an order asking not to trust the external appraisers 
completely and to double check the current price of the collateral by asking other 
external appraisers too. In most cases, loan fraud happens because loan officers 
and external appraisers take bribes from clients to increase the amount of loan.” 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“It is very difficult to detect a fraud if the conspiracy is carried out together with 
the inside and outside people. If we classify the types of financial crime into three 
categories, we can categorize like these: only internal, internal and external 
together, and only external. For example, forged checks are a case of an external 
offender, which is very simple. Also, the incident caused by the internal staff can be 
relatively easily detected. However, when internal employees and outside people 
conspire, it is very difficult to detect the fraud. Plus, the amount of loss increases 
significantly and there is a high probability that its social impact will be disastrous. 
But the problem is that it is very difficult to prove the conspiracy between the 
internal employees and external conspirators. It is usually seen as an external crime 
because external conspirators try to protect the insider when they are detected. It 
is very difficult for the internal auditors in a bank to investigate telephone-call 
records between the conspirators. It is much better for banks to just blame outside 
parties, because, then, the bank can receive less criticism from the mass media and 
public. Therefore, there is an incentive that the bank wants to be represented as 
just a victim. However, there are actually a lot of internal and external collusive 
frauds.” 
Arjoon (2008: 78) defines a slippery slope as ‘a gradual decline in the ethical behaviour in which no 
one event makes one aware that he or she is acting unethically.’ In The Phantom Capitalists (Levi, 
2008), slippery-slope frauds where deceptions spiralled, often occurs because the individual tries to 
rescue an insolvent business, which in reality have no hope of repaying their debts in the future. In a 
similar vein, an interviewee stated the slippery slope theory; normally honest, but unlucky employees 
can be exploited by inadvertently socializing too closely with customers, who actually intend to extort 
the banker to extract more funds from the bank. At the same time, the interviewee emphasized the 
importance of anti-fraud education to prevent inexperienced staff from falling for a slippery slope 
scam and becoming an accidental fraudster.  
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 (A manager in the credit union federation) 
“Especially, the employee in the loan department has a lot of risks. At first, a 
customer invites a loan officer to dinner. After that, they drink together. And the 
employee receives sex-entertainment. Then, the customer asks and threatens the 
loan-officer to make an inadequate loan. At first, it starts from a small amount of 
money, but the amount increases gradually and it becomes a very big incident of 
loan fraud in the end. The banker had a too close relationship with the customer to 
deny his undue requests. Inexperienced staff is more likely to be exploited by the 
customer who bribed the staff. The employees should refuse inadequate requests 
by saying no to them. Therefore, the employees in the financial institutions must 
have a high moral standards and ethical values so that they do not receive any 
money or entertainments. I think this can be achieved by a constant education. Plus, 
it is very important to have a stop system to prevent someone from falling into a 
slippery slope. We also need a system to alleviate punishment when employees 
confess and come clean to the bank by himself.” 
 
Chapter 8.4 Organizational factors 
8.4.1 Tone at the top   
There is an old Korean saying that emphasizes importance of having a good tone at the top. It is “The 
downstream water cannot be pure unless the upstream water is clean”. Research in moral 
development strongly suggests that honesty can be best reinforced when a proper example is set, 
which is sometimes referred to as ‘the tone at the top.’ Management of a corporation cannot act one 
way and expect the employees in the corporation to behave differently. Management must reinforce 
to its members through its actions that dishonest, or unethical behavior will not be tolerated. 
(Albtrecht et al., 2015; Schwarts et al., 2005). Albrecht et al. (2006) have proposed an ethical 
development model (EDM) that explains why people make unethical behaviors, which is shown in 
Figure 8-2. 
 
Figure 8-2: Ethics Development Model (Source: Albrecht et al., 2015: 73) 
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The foundation of ethics, the stage of Personal Ethical Understanding, represents the most basic 
ethical boundaries of personal action. It involves learning the difference between right and wrong, 
developing a sense of fair play, learning basic principles of integrity and acting in a consistent manner, 
with the values a person knows to be right. The second level of the ethical development model, 
Application of Ethics to Business Situations, is being able to apply one’s ethical understanding to the 
business world in which people make a living. Most of the people who participated in the notorious 
financial scandal such as Enron regarded themselves to be honest people. However, when faced with 
decisions about whether to accept a request to ‘cook the books’, they made the wrong decision. They 
did not know how or were afraid to translate their personal ethical values to the real business world. 
The third level of the model is Ethical Courage. Ethical courage is the strength and determination to 
behave appropriately in difficult, or questionable situations. Finally, the highest level, ethical 
leadership, which is related to the tone at the top, is instilling in others a desire to cultivate ethical 
awareness and courage. This higher form of ethical behavior requires an individual to inspire others 
through word, examples and good management (Trevino et al., 2000). 
Notably, many interviewees stressed the importance of the tone at the top and ethical leadership as 
a vital factor to combat occupational fraud in the organization. One interviewee in a nationwide bank 
mentioned the recent fraud scandal in Wells Fargo bank in the US. As discussed in Chapter 7.5, Wells 
Fargo bank in the US, was sanctioned by the US regulating authority because millions of fake accounts 
were made without customer’s consent by some of their employees. The cause was attributed to the 
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inadequate organizational ‘practice’ and ‘pressure’ from the top, which measured success by the 
average number of products held by a customer (The New York Times, 2016). This case again 
represents the significance of the tone at the top in the banking industry.  
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“Tone at the top and management’s mindset is the most important in preventing 
fraud. It is pivotal for the top executives to set directions and show willingness to 
pursue ethical management. Even if an occupational fraud occurs just once, the 
financial company can collapse and disappear. The ghost-account case in Wells 
Fargo Bank in the United States occurred due to the fact that the management has 
linked the number of bank accounts with the employees’ performance. It is 
important how often the management communicates the messages to prevent 
fraud in the executive’s speeches, e-mails, and corporate meetings. They must 
know how to find a balance for the benefit of the organization rather than the 
executives’ their own interests. It is often the case that such a negative tone at the 
top spreads to the lower-level employees unknowingly, and by that influence, some 
employees in the bank fall into a temptation to commit a dishonest act.” 
 
Recent research suggests that organizational leaders, in particular CEOs, inculcate their personal 
values throughout their organizations, which become evident in decisions made by employees at all 
levels throughout the firm. Therefore, the ultimate responsibility for an effective tone at the top 
begins with the CEO (Hunton et al., 2011). Moreover, it is possible that CEOs with more power are 
more likely to get away with breaching internal controls and can commit more serious fraud within 
companies (Hunton et al., 2011). One interviewee working in a nationwide bank that is part of an 
international banking group, recommended an effective way to improve CEO’s ethical conduct in the 
banking industry. She suggested that the CEO’s conduct should be evaluated regularly by the audit 
department. The conduct score should make up of the CEO’s performance score, which is, thus very 
important for every CEO to put effort to behave ethically. She also pointed out that some executives 
in the Korean banks emphasize too much on employees’ performance, thus possibly creating 
‘instrumental climate’ and criminogenic conditions that might promote the occurrence of fraud 
(Calavita and Pontell, 1991; Murphy and Free, 2016).   
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
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“The executives of some banks put great values on money and performance. It 
seems that the executives themselves sometimes have a lot of incidents of fraud 
such as bribery and corruption cases. What the employees of such banks can see is 
the power struggles between the top executives. Therefore, the bank's internal 
control score seems not very good. If the leader of a bank emphasizes performance 
too much, the bank employees fulfill their performance by creating fake 
accounts…….. Some international banks are required to do qualitative and 
quantitative assessments of the compliance conduct of the CEO when evaluating 
their CEO. However, Korean banks do not usually evaluate the CEO’s score of 
conduct when evaluating them. My bank evaluates the CEO’s score of conduct 
every month. If a fraud happens in the bank, the CEO cannot receive a good score 
of conduct, hence, more efforts are made to prevent fraud by the CEO. ” 
 
8.4.2 Management override 
Management override refers to “the ability of management or those charged with governance to 
manipulate accounting records and prepare frauds by overriding these controls, even where the 
controls might otherwise appear to be operating effectively” (FRC, 2009). It should be noted that any 
internal control system cannot prevent or detect the occurrence of occupational fraud entirely, 
because it is always possible that any control systems can be overridden by managers and top 
executives. Interestingly, Albrecht et al (2010) analyzed the cases of management and accounting 
fraud cases by the Korean conglomerates (also called as chaebols) such as Hyundai, Daewoo, Samsung, 
and SK. They argued that the founders of Korean chaebols worked so hard to achieve economic 
success and they have made it. Yet, within the chaebol organizations, family prominence with its lack 
of independence, plays an important role for both opportunity and incentive of fraud. Simply put, they 
sometimes relied on fraudulent means to keep their family’s ownership within the conglomerates, 
and as a result, have caused the frequent fraud scandals and negative consequences to the companies 
and the whole Korean society (Albrecht et al., 2010).  
One of the important systems of preventing management override comes from the effective oversight 
from the board of directors, especially outside-directors (non-executive directors) to independently 
check the management of company. Boards of directors are sitting at the top of the corporate 
organization and have responsibility for protecting the corporation’s assets, disciplining members of 
upper management, and setting the ethical tone for the corporation. Plus, the ethical behaviour of 
employees throughout the organization is importantly influenced by the board’s decisions and actions 
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as well. Therefore, effective oversight by the company’s board of directors seems very essential to 
setting a proper tone at the top (Schwartz et al., 2005).  
One more important factor for the independence check of management comes from external audit. 
However, the public generally expect that hidden fraud will be examined and detected when a 
company receives external audits by professional auditors such as certified public accountants (Lee, 
Ali and Bien, 2009). Yet, the task of external auditors (CPA) is not to detect fraud, but to express their 
opinion that the financial statements are proper in accordance with the accounting standards and 
principles. This mismatch is commonly known as 'audit expectation gap'. Simply put, the external audit 
does not guarantee the truthfulness of financial statements of companies. Even if an external auditor 
makes an 'unqualified' opinion17 on an entity's financial statement, it does not assure that there is no 
fraud in the financial statements (Albrecht et al., 2015, Kim, 2006). 
In particular, the percentage of occupational fraud detected by external auditors accounted for only 
3.3 percent, whereas 43.3 percent of occupational frauds were detected by tips and complaints (ACFE, 
2012). This is because external auditors are not the experts in white-collar crimes such as 
embezzlement or bribery, thus, they are not in a good position to discover fraud rather than the 
employees or customers who know the company's internal circumstances better than the external 
auditors (Albrecht et al, 2015). By the same token, the Supreme Court of Korea recently ruled that the 
accountants, who audited Busan Savings Bank that brought a big financial scandal in 2011, were not 
guilty if they had followed the fair procedures according to the accounting principles (The Hankyoung, 
2015). Therefore, not external auditors but the CEO of a firm takes an ultimate responsibility for the 
integrity of control system to prevent fraud.  
By the same token, despite the crucial responsibility and important role of the board of directors and 
external auditors, many concerns and skepticism were found during the interviews regarding their 
proper role for the check and balance system in corporate governance structure of the banking 
industry.  
(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“I think overriding is more serious than collusion at the financial institutions. The 
most difficult part of work-life is dealing with the overriding problem. If executives 
push employees hard from above to do malpractice, the lower-level employees has 
no choice but to follow the order. To change this organizational culture, the high-
                                                          
17 An unqualified opinion is an independent auditor's judgment that a company's financial records and statements are fairly 
and appropriately presented, and in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. (Investopedia, 2018. 
Retrieved on Mar 12, 2018 from  https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unqualified-opinion.asp#ixzz59XckhPCu) 
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level management and executives should have a different mindset from now. Even 
if there are fraud reporting hot-channels, the workplace is so small that the 
subordinates cannot report their boss. The employees are afraid of being retaliated 
by the boss if they report fraud…… Non-executive directors cannot play a role in 
checking the management. There are outside (non-executive) directors in the board 
committee. If the chairperson of a bank appointed his persons and friends as the 
outside directors, the check and balance system will be ineffective and useless. 
Some members in the board of directors do not know what they should do and they 
are present in the committee just for a cosmetic purpose and to fill only the number 
of people counts in the board committee” 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“Some Korean banks cannot provide auditors and inspectors with an independent 
power to check the management. At least, the employees working for the review 
of loan, inspection, compliance and personnel management must have the 
independent authority. Without ensuring job independence and autonomy, if a 
bank’s management presses the employees from the top, a fraud will definitely 
occur. If someone in the top-management has a risk of committing fraud, the bank 
has to be equipped with a check and balance system against those with a high risk 
in the corporate governance system. Banks should give autonomous power to 
those who are doing inspection and auditing job. Plus, nobody should interfere with 
the independent authorities of the inspectors.” 
 
8.4.3. Whistle-blowing system 
Whistleblowing is defined as “the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations 
that may be able to effect action” (Near and Miceli 1985: 4). Johansson and Carey (2016) found that 
there is a positive association between the presence of an anonymous reporting channel (ARCs) and 
reported fraud. Organisations with ARCs detected a higher incidence of fraud and a greater number 
of frauds. However, Dussuyer et al. (2015) has revealed that when wrongdoings are reported by 
whistle-blowers, managers or supervisors are perceived to respond less by thanking the employee for 
bringing it to their attention, but more to ignore what is reported or worse to make the whistle-blower 
a scapegoat for bringing it to their attention. In consequence, they argued that social psychological 
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processes in corporations when reported wrongdoings are mistreated, can produce forms of 
psychological martyrdom and organisational trauma. In the current study, many of the interviewees 
also evaluated the whistle-blowing system is not working properly in the banking industry. 
(Official 1 in the FSS) 
“Even if there is a fraud reporting hot-line in each bank and bankers are encouraged 
to use it, there are not so many employees who really report fraud via the hotline. 
I really cannot figure it out whether frauds really don’t exist or they simply don’t 
use it.” 
(Official 2 in the FSS) 
“The reason why the whistle-blowing system does not work properly in the 
organization is that anonymity cannot be guaranteed. After all, those who are 
responsible for handling the reports are the members of the same organization and 
there are only a handful of people who might possibly know the circumstances of 
the report and could report the problem, so some colleagues can tell who reported 
the fraud case and a rumor begins to spread creating a difficult situation for 
whistleblowers.” 
As officials in the FSS have mentioned above, the small number of people in bank offices might have 
enabled to guess who the whistle-blower is among the co-workers in a workplace. In order to protect 
anonymity of whistleblowers, one participant in the interview suggested a novel recommendation. 
That is the audit department should have a power to transfer a whistleblower to other department or 
office. Currently, the audit department in a bank should ask the HR department to transfer faithful 
whistleblowers to other branch office or department, but she recommended that the HR department 
and audit department should collaborate to promote the usage of fraud reporting hotline and to fully 
protect whistleblowers. 
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“The HR department and audit department need to share their information and 
collaborate well to create a synergy effect. In order to truly protect a whistle-
blower, the audit department should also have a power to transfer the 
whistleblower to other branch or department to prevent any negative side effect 
such as retaliation. However, this is not an easy matter because it should be 
decided by the top management in the bank.” 
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Furthermore, Trevino and Victor (1992) noted that generally, co-workers do not welcome the role of 
peer reporter. Group norms are likely to prohibit tattling and to prescribe severe consequences for 
tattlers. They argued that these group pressures can decrease members' inclination to report a peer's 
misconduct. Thus, they recommended that managers attempting to influence the climate for peer 
reporting should take into account the complex, social pressures surrounding this highly sensitive 
behaviour and the potential impact on a work group.  
 
8.4.4 Limited authority and some constraints 
In Chapter 4, the banks in two financial sectors were compared and the theme of a limited staff and 
fund issue to fight fraud has been already discussed. The institutions in the second financial sector are 
community banks and are small and medium sized entities. As a result, they have limited personnel 
and budgetary investment to undertake anti-fraud tasks. However, more importantly, the study has 
discovered the impact of organizational investment on occupational fraud frequency in Chapter 7. The 
result of structural equation modelling (SEM) showed that increased investment in anti-occupational 
fraud has improved the employees’ perceptions of ‘monitoring control effectiveness’ and ‘ethical 
corporate culture’ in the banking institutions, which are regarded as two vital weapons in the battle 
against occupational fraud. 
In this section, a recurrent theme is the limited resources in small and medium sized banking 
institutions. However, another important issue has emerged, which is the limited ‘authority’ in 
investigating internal fraud, by the banks themselves. One employee in a local agricultural and fishery 
cooperative expressed frustration when the bank could not trace illegal funds beyond their bank’s 
accounts. There was a case that a suspect received a bribe from customers in the past, but the 
employee secretly kept the money in a different bank’s account. When the internal audit department 
in the bank started to investigate the corruption case, they could not look through the other bank’s 
accounts because they lacked the authority to examine the accounts. This limited authority is also 
related to the strengthened personal data protection legislation, which was discussed in Chapter 6, 
why pre-screening controls have become unpractical.  
 
(An employee in a local agricultural and fishery cooperative) 
“Now that the Privacy Act is in place, no matter how strong the audit department 
is, it is impossible to freely look at personal information. Even if the consent form 
is received from employees, the bank only can examine our own bank’s financial 
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transaction history, and it is impossible to inquire about other banks’ financial 
transaction history. We can only track if the embezzled money is kept in our bank’s 
account. But, if the employee hid the money in other banks’ account, we cannot 
trace it. There is a limit in examining illegal funds because there is no investigative 
authority at the bank. We are different from the police.” 
 
Furthermore, the different relationship between individual credit unions and the central federation of 
the unions has been revealed during the interview. In commercial banks, the branch-office and 
headquarters of the banks have a similar relationship as a front and back-office. The headquarters of 
commercial banks are composed of many supervisory and supporting departments for the branch-
offices around the country. Consequently, the headquarters can efficiently supervise and intervene in 
each branch-office.  However, each credit union is not the branch-office of the central federation. 
They are separate entities, but the federation exists to support the individual unions. However, the 
federation cannot intervene directly until a problem has occurred in a credit union. One interviewee 
in the credit federation outlined the difficulty in managing each credit union from the federation office 
and raised concerns about the collaboration between them. 
(A manager in the credit union federation) 
“In my opinion, fraud is more likely to be detected in the first banking sector. In the 
first financial sector, the internal auditors and supervisors are able to go to a field 
office to examine the situation of the branch-office, because they are in a branch-
headquarters relationship. Yet, we, credit unions are different from the first-sector 
banks. We monitor individual credit unions indirectly only in the back office in the 
federation building. We are not directly affiliated with individual credit unions. We 
are not like the headquarter-branch relationship. We haven’t worked together in 
the same office, thus, we are limited in discovering fraud in a distant credit union. 
As a result, some employees are exploiting this weak supervisory power and 
circumvent internal control to commit fraud.”  
8.4.5 Criminal investigation and prosecution 
Due to the large expense and prolonged time involved in investigating and prosecuting occupational 
fraudsters, many organizations simply fire dishonest employees, hoping to eradicate themselves of 
the problem (Albrecht et al., 2015). However, what these organizations fail to comprehend is that such 
action is rather myopic. While they have succeeded in removing themselves of one occupational 
offender, they have sent a wrong message to other employees in the organization that the fraudsters 
  
210 
 
do not suffer significant penalties for their misdeeds. Fraud perpetrators are usually normal people 
who command respect in their jobs, families and communities. If they are marginally sanctioned or 
just dismissed, they seldom inform their families and others for the real reason for their termination. 
Furthermore, lack of prosecution can give other employees perceived opportunities that can bring in 
additional frauds in the organization. Perceived opportunities can be removed when the perpetrators 
are criminally punished, not just detected. It sometimes happens that an individual who committed 
fraud but not prosecuted, resumes the fraudulent behavior because his previous victim organization 
can be used to embellish his resume and has helped him secure better job by merely firing the 
employee (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
In a similar vein, Trevino and Weaver (2001) discovered that some companies may adopt mostly 
inconsistent and decoupled approaches to ethical issues, while other companies may adopt ethics 
programme features which show that the company is serious about following through on ethical 
concerns and problems. They argued that, in the former, the ethics programme may be perceived by 
employees as mere ‘window dressing’ that is detached from everyday organizational activities. 
However, a company may make serious efforts to follow up on reports of problems or questions about 
issues, and may engage in appropriate, serious discipline for persons who violate ethical standards. 
Therefore, organizations that fail to ‘follow-through’ on their ethics policies may be viewed as violating 
employees' expectations of procedural and retributive justice.  
In this regard, filing a criminal suit against perpetrators and prosecuting them should be a requisite 
for every organization to pursue after detecting employee fraud and other illegal activities in their 
organization. There was a general concern that the banking industry might not rely on criminal 
investigation and prosecution because they are afraid of negative publicity that can damage their 
valued corporate image. However, the interviews revealed that the Korean banking industry has 
established punishment protocol generally well that every occupational offender is being reported to 
the Korean law enforcement agencies, such as the police or the prosecutor’s office.   
 
 (A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“There is no case where the bank does not ask for a criminal investigation. He/she 
can flow into other financial institutions and can commit the same crime in the 
future if we just sack him/her. There were several cases before; he was an 
employee who had committed fraud at the other financial institution, and was 
rehired by another bank and committed fraud again. So, we now make sure to 
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report the detected employees to the police and to cooperate with the law 
enforcement agencies to convict them criminally.” 
(A manager in the credit union federation) 
“We must file a criminal suit against every occupational fraudster, and if we do not, 
we need to get approval from the top director of the bank, but there has been no 
exception so far.” 
Trevino and Weaver (2001) discovered that when employees perceive that their organization is fair 
and ethics programmes are followed through, there is less unethical behaviour and greater willingness 
to report such behaviours. Therefore, the trend of reporting every detected perpetrator to the law 
enforcement agency can help employees have increased perceptions of organizational justice.  
 
Chapter 8.5 Sociocultural and national factors 
8.5.1 Sociocultural factors 
Ramamoorti et al. (2009) proposed the A-B-C model for the analysis of fraud: a bad Apple, a bad Bushel, 
and a bad Crop. The bad apple is an individual, the bad bushel is about collusion and management 
override, and the bad crop refers to cultural and societal mechanisms that are related to the macro-
level contributory factors of fraud. In particular, the concept of the bad crop implies that sociocultural 
factors can possibly affect the occurrence of fraud. While research on the impact of sociocultural 
factors on fraud is very thin, many believe this is an important area for future study (Albrecht et al., 
2010; Johansson and Carey, 2016). 
Albrecht et al., (2010) have analysed the four largest chaebol scandals in Korea. They argued that many 
of the scandals that have occurred within Korean society were viewed as smart financial tactics rather 
than unethical corrupt acts; cultural rationalizations such as this kind of fraud-tolerant attitude 
significantly impact the likelihood of fraud in cultures throughout the world. In other words, as long 
as leaders and employees of organizations consider fraudulent acts as acceptable, frauds will continue 
and become widespread in an organization (Coleman, 1987). Watson (2000), for instance, has hinted 
Relativity Theory of Fraud, which is that even though some fraudulent acts are always considered 
universally to be unethical, there are other fraudulent acts that in a culture may be considered as a 
legitimate social practice.  
These interesting hypotheses proposed by the previous studies are beyond the scope of the current 
study. Plus, no interviewee mentioned any unique Korean sociocultural factors that promote the 
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incidence of fraud. On the other hand, many of the interviewees did raise concerns about the 
sociocultural factors that hinder the protection of whistle-blowers in the Korean society. However, 
viewing whistle-blowers negatively is not confined to the Korean culture (Trevino and Victor, 1992). 
Yet, the more hierarchical group culture in Korea might have worsened the problem compared to the 
more individual and equality-style western cultures (Batzeveg et al., 2017; Jang and Hwang, 2014).    
(A manager in nationwide bank 2) 
“Because Korea has a culture that emphasizes patience, nobody thinks whistle-
blowers are good. This is a cultural difference between the advanced countries and 
ours….. We think that the person who raises his hand and accuses someone else is 
a person who is against this culture. A good thing is a good thing after all. 
Perseverance and forgiveness are virtues. It is not easy to accept whistle-blowers 
in such a culture that does not have the diversity and acceptability to accommodate 
it. Our society is not mature enough to accept speaking up and whistle-blowing. 
The law for whistleblowing is quite well prepared in Korea, but the maturity of 
those who keep it is not ripened yet.” 
 
 (A manager in the credit union federation) 
“I, myself, blew whistle at the misdeeds of my bank’s president, but, because of 
that, I has been transferred to a local branch in a rural area for 9 years although 
the president eventually received a criminal punishment by the court. We generally 
see whistleblowers as traitors. Protecting whistleblowers is a textbook story. Social 
culture is not in the stage to accept it yet. Our people have traditionally thought 
that way for thousands of years.” 
These theme appeared during the interview concurs with the idea of Trevino and Victor’s (1992). In 
the absence of social structures supporting whistle-blowing, co-workers operate under severe 
pressures that prohibit whistle-blowing behaviour. However, they suggested two social context 
conditions to ease this difficult problem of implementing whistleblowing systems in organizations. 
According to Trevino and Victor’s (1992), sharing of the consequences of a violation by group members 
and prescribed responsibility for the whistleblowing role in an organization, can influence the 
acceptability of whistleblowing and group members’ inclination to engage in the behaviour. In other 
words, when groups share the cost of a violation or adopt a code of conduct that mandates the 
reporting of violations to authorities, whistle-blowers are more likely to be positively evaluated by 
their peers. Therefore, the banking industry should clearly detail a whistleblowing procedure in their 
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anti-fraud policy and make sure everybody is aware that a negative corporate publicity will be borne 
out by all the members of the bank as adverse publicity occurs due to the fraud. In 2011, the Korean 
government enacted the Act of Protection of Public Interest Report, which aimed to protect and 
support those who reported any conduct that is detrimental to the public interest. However, there is 
a limitation in the Act, because reporting occupational fraud was not included in the protection list 
that the Act proscribed as the whistle-blowers (Oh, 2018). 
 
(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“Korea has a strong culture that asks us to be loyal to organizations. Yet, because 
of this culture, we have a tendency to view whistle-blowers in organizations very 
negatively. I think….our country should change so that we can protect whistle-
blowers to the end. Our culture must be transformed to see a whistle-blower not 
as a traitor but as a righteous person, and it must be improved for our future 
generations.” 
     
8.5.2 National anti-fraud measures 
A national fraud infrastructure is essential in combatting occupational fraud (Button and Gee, 2013). 
The important elements are the supervisory agencies for financial institutions and national legislation 
to control fraud. This section focuses on the role of the supervisory agencies and adequate legislation 
to govern the financial institutions in Korea. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Financial Services 
Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) are responsible for supervising and 
examining all banks, including specialized and government-owned banks, as well as securities and 
insurance companies. The FSC is the Korean government's highest financial regulator and it sets 
financial policies, and directs the FSS. The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) is the integrated financial 
regulator that examines and supervises all the Korean financial institutions under the oversight of the 
FSC (The Bank of Korea, 2008). Participants in the interview generally expressed positive opinions on 
the roles and duties of the current supervising authorities in Korea. 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 1) 
“The role of the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) is being done properly in Korea. 
The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) conducts a comprehensive audit on all 
aspects of the bank's operations. I heard that supervisory agencies in foreign 
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countries tend to conduct in-depth investigations and inspections. In Korea, the first 
financial sector is afraid of the FSS due to similar reasons.” 
 
(A manager in nationwide bank 3) 
“The first financial sector, under the supervision of the FSS and mass media, get 
severely affected if fraud happens. Therefore, the first financial sector is always 
exposed to surveillance and this makes us transparent…… Eventually, I think the 
legislation should be mandated to have a fraud control framework in every bank. 
In addition, it is necessary to establish an effective internal control system with 
anti-fraud specialists. Plus, banks should build a system to offset the performance 
score of management if frauds have occurred in the bank in the past three years. 
In particular, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) should go directly to supervise 
all financial institutions that caused occupational fraud accidents.” 
 
Furthermore, in 2017, Korea has enacted the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies. 
The aim of the Act is to ensure the sound management of financial companies and the stability of 
financial markets and to protect depositors, investors, and consumers by prescribing basic matters 
concerning the governance structures of financial companies. This Act included requirements for 
qualification for executive officers of financial companies, the organization and management of the 
board of directors, and the internal control system. In the past, corporate governance legislations in 
Korea were complicated and differed depending on the type of financial companies. To solve this issue, 
the Financial Services Commission (FSC) proposed the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies (The Chosun Ilbo, 2018). 
 
(Official 2 in the FSS) 
“Last year, Korea enacted the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies, 
which can positively impact on the reform of governance structures and enhanced 
internal control systems in the financial institutions.” 
 
Yet, the Act is still under criticism because some people believe that the Act still has limitations. For 
example, credit unions were excluded in the regulation of the Act. Furthermore, even offenders who 
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committed large scale fraud and embezzlement can still become major shareholder of financial 
company because an Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (discussed in 
Chapter 4) is not included in the Article that limits shareholder’s qualification to become executive 
officers of financial companies. Simply put, the offender who has perpetrated large-scale occupational 
fraud (the violation of Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes such as 
embezzlement and breach of trust) can become the major shareholder of financial companies and can 
participate in bank management (Kim and Chang, 2016).  
Plus, the bank of Korea, which was founded to maintain price stability, plays a relatively small and 
indirect role with regard to overseeing financial institutions. The bank does not have a supervisory 
role for other financial institutions but performs the functions of a central bank, such as issuing 
currencies, making and implementing monetary policy, and serving as the banker’s bank (The Bank of 
Korea, 2008). An official working in the Bank of Korea expressed his concern on the weak governance 
structure in the second financial sector during their interview.  
 
(An official in the Bank of Korea) 
“The Bank of Korea is actually overseeing only the first financial sector. The second 
banking sector is in fact not being supervised. The directors of the second financial 
sector are elected by the members, but elected people are not necessarily ethically 
correct people. Rather, they have all the personnel authority for their employees, 
so when he is elected as the chief director of a local agricultural cooperative, he 
frequently recruits his relatives as an employee. Because the period is fixed, he tries 
to fill his pocket during his time. Therefore, there should be a mechanism to monitor 
the elected positions of the second financial sector. Outside directors should be able 
to play a role of the check and balance. However, there are so many people who 
are cooperating with presidents of local agricultural cooperatives and being 
arrested for corruption. Ethical culture should be established in a financial company, 
but there is not enough time to cultivate such a culture.” 
 
In-depth interviews further revealed that the financial institutions in the second financial sector are 
supervised by the different Korean government ministries, whereas all the commercial banks in the 
first sector are supervised directly by FSS. For example, community credit cooperatives are under the 
supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, credit unions are under the supervision of the 
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Ministry of Strategy and Finance. This fragmented supervisory system has resulted in difficulty in 
overseeing the second financial sector as expressed by one interviewee below. 
 
(A manager in a community credit cooperative) 
“The second sector has grown to the point where its role as a public financial 
institution cannot be ignored. The second sector also thinks that the internal 
control system should be settled properly and we think that the second sector also 
needs to be supervised and supported by the FSS, like the first-sector banks. 
Community credit unions have not been established with a finance purpose but we 
have been founded to contribute to local communities. However, it has been said 
that we should cease to be supervised by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety. As 
we are growing in size as a big financial institution, there are growing opinions that 
we should be supervised by the Financial Supervisory Service directly.” 
 
8.5.3 Criminal justice system 
Button et al (2015) have shown that there has been an increase in resources in fraud investigation in 
the UK by using Freedom of Information requests to all the major UK police forces. Nonetheless, they 
have concluded that although the resources are increasing, they are still not commensurate to the 
scale of the problem of economic crime and more resources are still required. In Korea, the police 
agency and prosecutor’s office are in charge of criminal investigation and prosecution of fraud (KNPA, 
2016). However, from the author’s own experience, having worked as a police inspector for more than 
10 years in Korea, mostly in the field of fraud investigation, the author finds the situation of law 
enforcement officers, strikingly similar between to the UK (Whitaker (1979)). However, the similarity 
and differences in fraud investigation between nations may be an important area for future research, 
but is not the focus of the current study. 
“…the fraud squad is a relatively small unit, so chances of promotion are restricted. 
We can’t stand in a man’s way if he finds his opportunity for promotion in another 
branch slipping away. Consequently, new men have continually to be recruited 
from the regular force, and volunteers are not always forthcoming. After about 
four years many members, just at the time when they are gaining experience in 
threading their way more easily through balance sheets and prospectuses, revert 
to wholly different types of police work elsewhere…. (Whitaker, 1979: 86).”  
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Levi (2008) noted in his book of The Phantom Capitalists, which is about the long-firm fraud 
(bankruptcy fraud), that fraud is increasing cross-sectionally and longitudinally but less than half the 
defendants charged with fraud in the UK pleaded guilty. He also found that some fraud trials lasted 
for more than six months, only to be abandoned or expensively retried. Moreover, some convictions 
were defeated in the court of appeal if they failed to give sufficient weight to all the defence evidence. 
Lastly, those suspects who were charged with fraud would seek to cast the blame for the fraud upon 
those who were not charged. In addition, the judges in the UK rarely imposed severe sentences on 
fraudsters for rehabilitation reasons (Levi, 2008; Sentencing Council, 2013).  
This tendency was also mentioned during the interview in Korea. Especially, some powerful fraudsters 
even received an amnesty and were reinstated by the Korean President. This can have a very negative 
effect on the perceived justice at the national level.  For example, in the case of SK Global, one of the 
largest conglomerate’s scandal in Korea, the CEO who committed $1.3 billion accounting fraud, after 
serving prison time, received the pardon from President and returned to his previous position as 
director of the organization. This again suggests a failure of the criminal justice system to control 
corporate fraud in Korea. One interviewee expressed unjust feelings and strongly argued that prison 
sentence to the powerful corporate executives who committed occupational fraud should be 
strengthened to deter other similar cases reoccurring.   
(An employee in a regional bank) 
“Even if the president of chaebol who embezzled huge corporate money was 
arrested, the punishment of the Korean criminal court was too weak and even 
President of Korea pardoned him/her later. Our courts are too generous towards 
financial criminals. The CEO of SK received imprisonment for just three years and 
even received an amnesty from the President. In general, even if a man steals a 
small amount, he gets arrested and is sent to jail for a long time. The corporate 
executive embezzled a huge amount of money from the company, but it is so unfair 
to receive a pardon because some say that their imprisonment has a large ripple 
effect on the economy. I think unnecessary legislations should be minimized, but I 
suggest that criminal punishment should be strengthened against the financial 
criminals, especially the powerful corporate executives. Intensifying the 
punishment and showing it to the public will deter and reduce the incidence of 
fraud in other places. The criminal justice system should establish strong 
punishment against financial criminals.” 
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Chapter 8.6 Implications and conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the issues that relate to the last research question: “what and how to be 
improved to reduce occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry?” For that, qualitative in-depth 
interviews were analyzed based on three different hierarchical levels; the micro (perpetrator), meso 
(organizational) and macro (national) aspects of occupational fraud prevention and detection. 
At the micro level, firstly, the study revealed that the pressure or incentive of fraud stems mostly from 
financial motives such as failures of investing in stock market or future trade, not by job-related 
pressures. Furthermore, a theme appeared that some female offenders committed fraud for the 
protection of her family or other close people rather than financial motives. Plus, more fraud is likely 
to be committed when employees feel unsecure about their job stability. However, the interviewees 
displayed scepticism on the usefulness of employee support programme that was invented to lessen 
the pressure of employees because many believed that the condition for successful implementation 
of the programme was not ready yet in the banking industry. In order for the banks to prevent 
employees from investing excessively in highly volatile speculative markets, anti-fraud education 
should be administered to the bankers about the severe consequences of excessive investments in 
those markets. Furthermore, the red flags of fraud discovered by Albrecht et al., (1984) should be 
trained to the employees in the financial sector to find and support their co-workers with those red 
flags prior to fraud being committed. 
Secondly, poor segregation of duties and infrequent job rotations were underscored as one of the 
main contributing factors of fraud opportunities. Plus, the small size and limited-staff issue in the 
second-sector banks were very frequently mentioned as a reason for those internal controls not being 
properly implemented in the sector. Although there are issues regarding the lack of staff and 
insufficient investment to prevent fraud in the small-sized banks, a valuable insight was suggested in 
the interview that segregation of duties and check and balance systems can be conducted by a creative 
method not necessarily by a large number of staff. An example of an ice-cream store was suggested 
as the method. A theme has emerged that although computerized fraud monitoring system (fraud 
pattern analysis system) can increase the employee’s perception of detection, some employees can 
still bypass the system and commit fraud. Moreover, concentrated regulations and monitoring 
controls in the industry might cause inefficiency and fatigues to the bankers. Therefore, striking a right 
balance between monitoring and allowing leeway to employees is stressed as a very important 
condition for bank managers to have in order to successfully manage fraud risk in the bank. 
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Thirdly, many of the interviewees expressed that bankers’ integrity is the most important factor that 
affects occurrence of fraud in organizations. However, despite this significance, there were mixed 
opinions found whether ethics training is effective in enhancing personal integrity of the employees. 
Some participants disclosed disbelief on the usefulness of ethics education, but others expressed the 
importance of ethics trainings to cultivate personal integrity. A recent study has found the evidence 
that comprehensive ethics training is positively related to ethical organizational culture such as 
observed unethical behaviour, intentions to behave ethically, and perceptions of organizational 
efficacy in managing ethics.  Furthermore, the study found that many of these effects persist in the 
years after the introduction of the training programme in the bank (Warren et al., 2014). Therefore, 
the banking industry should change their focus how to make ethics training more effective, not to an 
argument of whether the training really works or not. 
Lastly at the micro level, the current study has detected an important theme that when collusion with 
outside parties was involved in occupational fraud, the banks have a tendency to disguise the nature 
of fraud by exposing only the external accomplices to the public, thus minimizing the adverse publicity 
and criticism from the mass media. A bank interviewee acknowledged that there was actually more 
fraud between insiders and outsiders and the interviewee also stated the difficulty in proving this kind 
of collusive fraud compared to single-offender fraud.  Moreover, the present study found a slippery 
slope passage to bank fraud, where a normally honest, but unlucky employees can be exploited by 
carelessly hanging out too closely with the customers, who actually planned to take advantage of the 
banker and extract more funds from the bank. To prevent this slippery slope for bank works, especially 
loan officers, the importance of anti-fraud education is again underlined. 
At the organizational level, five subjects were discussed; (1) tone at the top, (2) management override, 
(3) whistle-blowing systems, (4) limited authority for fraud examination, (5) corporate policy for 
criminal prosecution. First of all, many interviewees underscored the importance of tone at the top 
and ethical leadership as a vital factor to combat occupational fraud in the banking sectors. To improve 
CEO’s ethical conduct in the banking industry, one interviewee suggested an ingenious way that the 
CEO’s conduct should be evaluated regularly by an independent party or audit department, which is 
not currently being carried out by many banks in Korea. Simply put, the conduct score should comprise 
the CEO’s overall performance score, which is, hence very important for every CEO to behave ethically 
and should put effort to set ethical tone at the top. 
Secondly, many interviewees expressed the view that management override is a serious problem and 
effective check and balance systems against overrides are not working properly in the industry. An 
important system of preventing management override comes from the effective oversight from the 
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board of directors, especially outside-directors (non-executive directors) to independently check the 
management of companies. One more important factor to prevent fraud is related to the quality of 
external audit. However, despite the crucial role of the board of directors and external auditors, many 
concerns and skepticism were found during the interviews regarding their proper roles for the check 
and balance system in corporate governance structure. This theme is also closely related to a national-
level legislation (Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies) that is recently enacted by the 
Korean government in 2017 to lessen the concern about the independent check and balance system.  
Thirdly, protection of whistle-blowers appeared as an important theme during the interviews. It was 
revealed that the current protection system for whistle-blowers is not working properly in the financial 
institutions. The nature of a small number of staff and close relationships among co-workers were 
attributed to the cause of not fully protecting the anonymity of whistle-blowers in the banking 
institutions. A fresh suggestion was made during the interview that the audit/compliance department 
in a bank should have the power to transfer a whistleblower to another department or office to 
protect them; a synergy effect is expected when the HR department and audit/compliance 
department in a bank collaborate to promote the usage of fraud reporting hotline and to prevent 
retaliation against whistleblowers. 
Fourthly, the same theme about the limited resource in the small and medium sized banking 
institutions of the second sector reappeared. However, another subject was mentioned that the lack 
of inter-organizational financial tracing system limits the effective organizational investigation of 
employee fraud. In other words, when the internal audit department in a bank starts to investigate a 
fraud case, auditors cannot look through the other banks’ accounts, because they lacked the authority 
to do so. This is also related to strengthened personal data protection act recently enacted in Korea. 
Therefore, the inter-organizational collaboration on this issue is hard to be solved unless a proper 
legislation is made by the government. At the same time, the different relationship between individual 
credit unions and the central federation of the unions has been discovered during the interviews. In 
commercial banks, the branch-office and headquarters of the bank are something like a front-office 
and back-office relationship. However, the second sector’s different relationship from that of the first 
sector has turned out to restrict the effective oversight in the community banking institutions in Korea. 
Lastly at the organizational level, contrary to the general expectation, it was found that the Korean 
banking industry has established the punishment protocol well that every occupational offender 
should be reported to the Korean law enforcement agency such as the police or the prosecutor’s office. 
This trend of filing a criminal suit against every detected perpetrator to the law enforcement agency 
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would help the bankers in Korea have increased perceptions of organizational justice that can affect 
positively on the deterrence of fraud.  
In the sociocultural and national level, firstly, many of the interviewees raised concerns about the 
sociocultural factors that hinder the protection of whistle-blowers in the Korean society. However, it 
should be noted that this tendency to see whistle-blowers negatively is not confined to Korea. Trevino 
and Victor (1992) have found that in the absence of social structures supporting whistle-blowing, co-
workers operate under pressures that prohibit whistle-blowing behaviour and they suggested that 
groups should share the cost of a violation or adopt code of conduct that mandates the reporting of 
violations to authorities to lessen the problem. In this respect, the Korean society should create a 
social structure that sees whistle-blowers positively and protect them. However, many interviewees 
opined that it will take a long time and will not be an easy task.   
Secondly at the macro level, the role and performance of the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) were 
evaluated generally positively by the interviewees. Furthermore, it was revealed that Korea has 
enacted the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies in 2017. The aim of the Act is to 
ensure the sound management of financial companies and to protect depositors, investors, and 
consumers by prescribing basic matters concerning the governance structures of financial companies. 
This newly enacted act includes requirements for qualification for executive officers of financial 
companies, the organization and management of the board of directors, and the internal control 
system. Yet, the Act is still regarded as imperfect because an Act on the Aggravated Punishment of 
Specific Economic Crimes (a legislations that deals with mass scale fraud and corruption, discussed in 
Chapter 4) is not included to the Article that limits shareholder’s qualification to become executive 
officers of financial companies. However, to accept this public criticism, an amendment bill has now 
proposed in the National Assembly of Korea (The Chosun Ilbo, 2018).  
Finally, at the sociocultural and national level, a theme was found that the Korean criminal justice 
system should pose a harsher stance against white-collar criminals, especially the powerful corporate 
executives who committed mass-scale occupational fraud. It was found that Korean President 
overuses his Constitutional authority to pardon and reinstate CEOs of chaebols, which has a negative 
impact on Koreans, by producing unequal feelings towards the society. The overuse of Presidential 
power to give an amnesty to the powerful, corporate CEOs, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and SK, and 
the dynamics behind this phenomenon is an important area for future fraud research in Korea 
(Albrecht et al., 2010).  
In conclusion, this chapter has contributed to the findings of what and how to be improved to reduce 
fraud in the banking industry, which was not analyzed by the quantitative analyses in the previous 
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chapters. The triangulation can elevate the rigors of research and robustness of investigation 
(Anderson et al, 2011).  In the next chapter, the triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative 
findings will be tried to provide valuable implications and insights to the final problem of managing 
fraud risk effectively in the banking institutions.  
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Chapter 9 Management of Occupational Fraud Risk 
Chapter 9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the quantitative/qualitative findings and to 
integrate these with the extant literature and theory to draw policy implications for effective fraud 
risk management. As outlined in the methodology part, the present study adopted an explanatory 
sequential mixed method, which assimilates a two-stage project where the researcher gathers 
quantitative data in the first place, analyses the results, and then employs the outcomes to conduct 
qualitative research. Previously, occupational fraud in the Korean context (Chapter 4), the 
characteristics of occupational fraud and the profiles of the perpetrators (Chapter 5), the employees’ 
perceptions of fraud risk and the effectiveness of anti-fraud controls (Chapter 6), the impact of 
organizational investment on occupational fraud through the mediating effects of ethical culture and 
monitoring control (Chapter 7), and qualitative study findings (Chapter 8) have been elaborated with 
regard to the five research questions of the current study.  
For mixed method, the current study administered two different questionnaires to more than 450 
survey participants and conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with the bankers and counter-fraud 
experts in the Korean financial industry. Like other white-collar crime, occupational fraud inside the 
banking institutions is inherently a very sensitive subject, which hindered data collection from the 
financial institutions. In order to avoid this sensitivity, the first survey targeted police officers who 
have investigated bank fraud in the last ten years rather than directly targeting fraud perpetrators. 
This method is the same as that of the ACFE for their biennial fraud reports, which are using the 
method of asking Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE) about the fraud cases investigated by their members. 
53 responses were gathered from police officers in the first survey. This is very precious information 
that has become a microscope to view occupational fraud in the banking institutions, which has not 
been exposed extensively in the criminological literature.  
The second questionnaire directly targeted bank employees and successfully obtained a large number 
of responses (n=395). The aim of the second survey was to explore the bankers’ perceptions of fraud 
risk and control effectiveness in their organizations. Comparing the real fraud cases with the current 
bankers’ perceptions can provide more meaningful implications for the effective management of 
fraud if the results of two surveys are dovetailed successfully, which will be tried in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the subsequent qualitative study has underpinned the quantitative findings by filling the 
gaps which were not fully explained by the survey questionnaires. This chapter firstly summarizes the 
quantitative findings (Section 9.2), and then encapsulates the qualitative findings (Section 9.3). 
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Sequentially, the chapter attempts to integrate those two findings and relate them to the theory and 
literature to contribute to the knowledge and practice for countering occupational fraud (Section 9.4). 
Lastly, the chapter draws out managerial implications for reducing fraud in the financial industry 
(Section 9.5). 
Chapter 9.2 Overview of quantitative findings 
9.2.1 Characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking industry 
First of all, the study revealed that corruption was the most serious risk factor in the Korean banking 
industry. In this study, corruption was defined as “one type of occupational fraud, where employees 
use their influence in business transaction to obtain unauthorized benefits contrary to their duties to 
employers” (ACFE, 2012: 6-7). Plus, as discussed in Chapter 2, corruption is regarded as one of the 
oldest white-collar crimes because ‘commercial bribery’, which is something of value offered to 
influence a business decision, has been embedded in some business practices for a long time in human 
history (Albrecht et al., 2015). Goldstraw-White and Gill (2016) have explored how organisations in 
the Middle East cope with the risk of bribery and discovered that culture and tradition have significant 
impacts on organizational practices. Out of the sample collected from the police, corruption 
accounted for 56 percent (28/50), asset misappropriation is composed of 40 percent (20/50) and 
financial statement fraud comprised only 4 percent (2/50). This was a rather surprising result because 
the ACFE’s reports (2012, 2014, 2016) indicated that asset misappropriation was the most frequently 
committed fraud out of three subtypes of occupational fraud. However, in the police investigation 
cases of the study, corruption was committed more frequently than asset misappropriation. 
Furthermore, the study discovered that corruption in the banking industry is closely related to loan 
fraud. According to the ACFE (2015), loan fraud is a multifaceted activity that includes several types of 
criminal activities and larger loan fraud schemes are often related to real-estate lending and collusion 
between insiders and outsiders. In Chapter 4.5.2, the study looked at a case that clearly demonstrated 
a vivid example of how loan fraud was perpetrated in the banking industry. According to the mass 
media reports of the case study, a loan applicant bribed the employees of a credit union not to check 
the authenticity of the forged credit letters. In return for the bribes, the employees of the credit union 
knowingly processed invalid loan applications leading to £68 million of illegal money. The loans were 
used for the repayment of the borrower’s existing loans and also used for entertainment expenses 
that were shared by the bankers for drinks and parties. In the aftermath of the fraud, the credit union 
eventually collapsed and was merged with other credit union (The Kyoungnam Domin Daily, 2015). 
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In terms of fraud loss, corruption on average caused bigger losses than asset misappropriation (£1.6 
million vs £1.3 million) and half of the corruption cases involved bribery (52%). The mean amount of 
bribes was £40,000 in the sample. This finding implies that loan-related fraud (corruption) represents 
the highest risk area for financial institutions (ACFE, 2015). Furthermore, it reminds the Korean 
banking institutions still have a high corruption risk, which was demonstrated in the Savings Bank 
Scandal in 2011 where the financial corporate executives controlled lending and bypassed the 
supervision (The Dong-A Ilbo, 2011). 
9.2.2 Perpetrators and victim organizations 
The typical profile of a white-collar offender is a white male, aged forty, with no prior criminal 
conviction (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016; Button 2008). The study also found a similar profile for 
occupational fraudsters in the Korean banking industry; 70 percent of the perpetrators were male; the 
ages of the 30s and 40s accounted for 79 percent ; 47 percent were ordinary employees; 83 percent 
were working in the branches; 42 percent of the perpetrators had worked for 5-10 years in a bank 
before committing crime; 94 percent did not have any criminal history before; 76 percent committed 
fraud for financial motives; and the rationalization of ‘temporary loan’ comprised almost half (47%) of 
the accounts in the total sample (n=53). 
Furthermore, statistical analysis exposed significant findings : male employees or high-ranking bankers 
are more likely to commit corruption than asset misappropriation (‘gender’ and ‘position’ effect on 
the characteristics of fraud). As the ages and education level of perpetrators increased, which are 
associated with the position of a banker, the average loss of fraud also escalated. In other words, high-
ranking bankers triggered a £2.2 million loss on average, while ordinary employees caused £1.3 million 
loss on average to the bank. By the same token, male offenders caused £1.7 million loss on average 
while female perpetrators caused £0.8 million loss on average. This trend is explained by the fact that 
the female employees in the Korean banking institutions generally have a lower status than the male 
bankers who are more likely to be employed as managers or executives (Daly, 1989). In addition, the 
male employees are more likely to work for loan-related activities that are exposed to corruption risk, 
while the females are more likely to work as a teller or clerk that can have more opportunities for 
embezzlement (Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). 
Therefore, Routine Activity Theory can explain the reason why different types of occupational fraud 
are committed according to ‘gender’ and ‘position’ (Felson and Clark, 1998; Felson, 2002); the 
different nature of job activities at a workplace between men and women has provided with gender-
specific crime opportunities that result in different types of fraud committed (Wheeler and Rothman, 
1982). In a similar vein, because the more entrusted power at workplace is correlated with an 
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individual’s higher position in an organization (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016), the employees who have a 
higher position in a bank are more likely to commit corruption which is associated with more losses 
than asset misappropriation.  
In the sample, 40 percent of fraud cases were committed through collusion while 60 percent cases 
were committed by a single actor. 42 percent perpetrators colluded with outside customers whereas 
58 percent conspired with the insiders (subordinates, colleagues, or supervisors) in the banking 
institutions. Interestingly, when collusion was involved, the average loss per case increased from £1 
million to £2.2 million and the median detection period of fraud also took 6 months longer than a 
single actor fraud (21 months vs 15 months). Furthermore, collusion is more likely to involve bribes, 
which averagely amounted to £40,000 in the study because bribery inherently involves co-offending 
between the bribe payer and the bribe receiver (Button et al., 2018). In this regard, the study has 
contributed to the fraud literature by discovering important evidence that proves more serious nature 
of collusive fraud.  
Considering the victim organization, another very significant finding was revealed through the study. 
Although the community banks in the second sector comprise a smaller percentage in the industry in 
terms of total number of employees, occupational fraud occurred more frequently in the second-
sector banks. In the sample, 64 percent of fraud cases took place in the second-sector banks. However, 
the second sector comprises only 40 percent of total banking employee population. Assuming the 
police did not target and investigate the second-sector banks more than the first sector, this means 
that the smaller percentage of banker population in the second sector has resulted in more 
percentage of fraud investigation in the banking industry. The investigation/population ratio (Table 5-
1) shows that the second sector has almost three times as large ratio as that of the first sector (1.63 
vs 0.59). This implies that the small and medium sized banking institutions have more occupational 
fraud risk than the commercial banks in the first sector, which is one of the major findings of the study. 
Surprisingly, all the high-ranking perpetrators (n=8) came from the second sector in the study. In other 
words, there was no perpetrator with a high position from the first sector (0%, 0/19) while there were 
8 perpetrators with a high position from the second sector (24%, 8/34). As already discussed, the high-
ranking perpetrators are more likely to commit corruption. However, this result does not mean the 
perpetrators in the second sector are more likely to commit corruption. The statistical analysis 
(Chapter 5.8.1) showed that corruption was not associated with the second sector because asset 
misappropriation was also committed frequently at the similar proportion in the second sector. 
Therefore, it should be interpreted that more fraud including asset misappropriation as well as 
corruption is committed in the second sector than the first sector.  
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Lastly, the duration of occupational fraud in the victim organization was found to be 18 months on 
average, which is the same as other fraud studies (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 2016). However, when separately 
analysed by the financial sector, the median duration of fraud in the second sector was 18 months 
while it was 15 months in the first-sector banks. This implies that it takes longer for the second-sector 
banks to detect occupational fraud and this also stands for community banking institutions have larger 
average loss than commercial banks (£1.5 million vs £1.4 million) in Korea. The study also discovered 
that victim banks detected fraud most often by ‘tip or complaint’ and ‘internal audit’ which accounted 
for 28 percent respectively. The study demonstrated that the duration of occupational fraud is 
positively associated with the amount of average loss and this hints that prevention is the best cure 
but early detection is also the second-best option to reduce the amount of loss (ACFE, 2016; Albrecht 
2015).  
9.2.3 The response of the criminal justice system 
Korea has the Act of the Aggravated Punishment for Bribery in the Financial Institutions (the Article 5 
in Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes) and the Act of the Aggravated 
Punishment for the Increased Amount of Loss of Specific Occupational Fraud (the Article 3 in Act on 
the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes). The study revealed that majority of court 
rulings were prison sentences (66%), which is high percentages compared to other crimes in the 
Korean criminal justice system (KIC, 2018). Plus, 70 percent of prison sentences were more than 2-
year imprisonment, which is again a high percentage compared to the sentence for other crimes in 
Korea (KIC, 2018). As the prison sentence of the perpetrator is positively associated with the average 
loss of fraud (Figure 5-41), the Korean criminal court seems to take a harsher stance to occupational 
fraudsters, which contradicts the view of some interviewees. 
However, the vast majority of police investigations (84 percent of the total cases) started reactively 
rather than pre-emptively. Simply put, most of the occupational frauds are referred to the police by 
the victim organization (49%) or a tip from third parties or customers (33%). With regard to the 
recovery of losses, only 16 percent of the cases have succeeded in recovering more than half of the 
loss. However, unfortunately one third of the cases (33 percent) have retrieved zero percent from the 
occupational fraudsters. This finding implies that once occupational fraud occurs in the banking 
institutions, the chance to get back the loss is very low, thus implying that more efforts should be 
made in preventing occurrence of occupational fraud. 
9.2.4 The bankers’ perceptions of fraud risk 
Firstly, the second survey showed that the respondents perceived that asset misappropriation posed 
the most serious risk, followed by corruption, and fraudulent financial statement as the least serious 
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risk. Moreover, the respondents were most worried about the loss of customer and public trust as a 
potential impact of occupational fraud occurrence. When it comes to the enablers of fraud in the 
organization, the most common factor was management override of internal control and the second 
most agreed enabler was inadequate oversight by management. The third most consented enabler 
was collusion and the least agreed enabler was inadequate internal control or compliance 
programmes. This result reminds of the national housing bond embezzlement case in Chapter 4.5, 
where the vice chairman of the bank admitted that although internal control system was well-
equipped in the bank, it did not work properly as expected resulting a massive amount of 
embezzlement for 4 years (The Hankyoung Sinmun, 2013). Lastly, regarding the prediction of risk in 
the future, most respondents generally perceived that the risk of occupational fraud would remain 
the same over the next twelve months.  
The results of independent sample t-tests showed that perceived risks of occupational fraud are 
associated with the ‘positon’ rather than the ‘gender’ of employees (position effect). That is, the 
employees in high positions in the banks viewed the risk of corruption and financial statement fraud 
lower than those in non-high positions in the banks. This is an interesting finding of the study which 
concurs with that of Trevino et al. (2008). They reported in their article of ‘It’s lovely at the top’ that 
perceptions of ethics in organizations varied across different levels, with senior managers’ perceptions 
being significantly more positive and lower level employees’ perceptions being more negative. 
Therefore, the result of this study implies that the task of addressing occupational fraud should involve 
attention to organizational structures and the ways to facilitate interactions among various groups of 
employees across many hierarchical levels.  
Next, logistic regression analysis firstly discovered that employees’ perceived risk of fraud is positively 
associated with the odds of reporting the incidence of occupational fraud with statistical significance. 
In other words, the employees’ fraud risk assessment is significantly related to the knowledge of prior 
occupational fraud in their organization. This shows that risk assessment can be utilized as an indirect 
method of measuring the relative occurrence of occupational fraud in the banking institutions. 
Secondly, the employees’ perceived belief that the potential for management overrides is positively 
associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud, whilst the perceived 
contribution of collusion is not. This underlines that banking employees’ perception that management 
overrides are a more serious risk factor than collusion. These are also noteworthy discoveries of the 
current study. 
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9.2.5 The bankers’ perceptions of anti-fraud control 
First of all, the result of the second survey revealed that the small and medium sized institutions in 
the sample tend to rely on traditional controls, such as segregation of duties, authorization limits, and 
anti-fraud education, which do not require high investment. However, the commercial banks in the 
first sector tend to employ more anti-fraud controls, such as employee support programmes, 
mandatory vacations, and reward programmes for whistle-blowers, demonstrating the difference 
between the two sectors.  
Regarding the perceived effectiveness of anti-fraud controls, the respondents rated constant 
computerized monitoring as the most effective (4.10/5). Surprise audit comes second (3.95/5) and 
both segregation of duties and management review of internal control were rated at third (3.82/5). 
However, the respondents evaluated anti-fraud policy as the least effective (3.26/5). Reward 
programmes for whistle-blowers ranked second least effective (3.32/5), and employee support 
programmes were the third least effective control (3.50/5) among the 14 anti-fraud controls (Giles, 
2012). Subsequent independent sample t-tests showed that the respondents in the second sector 
evaluated 14 anti-fraud controls significantly lower than those in the first sector (sector effect), which 
again clearly demonstrates the sector difference. 
Thirdly, the study discovered that the respondents in the first sector had higher perceptions of almost 
every item measured, such as specific anti-fraud controls, opportunity reduction, and anti-fraud 
culture in their organization (sector effect). Therefore, this result suggests that small and medium 
sized institutions in the second sector have much room to improve their prevention of fraud, which is 
also an important implication of the study. 
Lastly and significantly, logistic regression analysis (Chapter 6.6.3) revealed that the qualitative aspect 
of opportunity reduction through the perceived effectiveness is negatively associated with the odds 
of reporting an historic occurrence of occupational fraud whilst the quantitative aspect of opportunity 
reduction (the number of anti-fraud controls) is not. This is one of the major findings of the study, 
which highlights that how to operate control mechanisms to decrease the perceived opportunity 
among employees is more important than the stale or mere existence of many anti-fraud controls for 
preventing fraud. 
9.2.6 The impact of organizational investment on fraud 
There has been no clear evidence about whether organizational investment works for countering 
occupational fraud, and where to focus the investment if it works. In this regard, the present study 
explored the mediating roles of ethical culture and monitoring control in the ‘organizational 
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investment-occupational fraud’ linkage. Using a sample of 395 Korean banking employees, a series of 
structural equation models (SEM) were estimated. The results showed that the perception of 
increased organizational investment in anti-occupational fraud enhanced two mediating variables, 
ethical culture and monitoring controls. However, only the perception of an improved ethical culture 
was negatively related to the perceived frequency of occupational fraud with statistical significance. 
Therefore, this finding implies that developing an ethical culture is more effective than monitoring 
controls for the banking institutions to prevent occupational fraud. However, it should be noted that 
the two mediating variables in the study were positively correlated (0.624), which indicates that the 
two constructs (ethical culture and monitoring control) interact for the same end like value-oriented 
and compliance-oriented programmes (Weaver and Trevino, 1999). Other studies also found evidence 
of the importance of control effectiveness (Johansson and Carey, 2016; Rae and Subramaniam, 2008). 
Therefore, monitoring control should not be neglected in the banking institutions. 
In summary, the current study’s finding using structural equation modelling (SEM) is very significant 
because the study discovered an effective pathway for fighting occupational fraud in the financial 
companies. In other words, reducing employee fraud can be best achieved through nurturing the 
ethical corporate culture, which suggests that the internalization of values mediates the relationship 
between the increased organizational investments and desired behavioral outcomes of the employees 
(Warren et al, 2014).  
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Chapter 9.3 Overview of qualitative findings 
The qualitative interviews of the study were analyzed according to the three hierarchical levels; micro 
(perpetrator level), meso (organizational level) and macro (sociocultural and national level) regarding 
the last research question: “what and how to be improved to reduce occupational fraud in the Korean 
banking industry?”  Various themes have emerged during the interviews with bank employees and 
counter-fraud experts and major findings are summarized in this section. 
Firstly, at the micro level, the study found that the pressure or incentive of bank employee fraud stems 
mostly from financial motives such as failures of investing in stock market or future trades. Secondly, 
poor segregation of duties and infrequent job rotations were highlighted as one of the main 
contributing factors for creating fraud opportunities in the industry. Thirdly, the personal integrity of 
bank employees has appeared as the most significant factor that impacts on prevention of 
occupational fraud in organizations. Lastly, at the micro level, a tendency was found that banking 
institutions have an incentive to disguise the occurrence of internal-external collusion by making only 
the external accomplices exposed to the public, thus minimizing the adverse publicity and criticisms 
from society and mass media. Moreover, a slippery slope passage to fraud was found, which is, 
normally honest employees can be exploited by the wicked customers, who actually intended to extort 
the bankers to extract more money from them. To prevent this slippery slope pathway for the 
employees in banking institutions, especially loan officers, the importance of anti-fraud education was 
stressed. 
In the meso (organizational) level, firstly, the importance of tone at the top and ethical leadership was 
highlighted as a vital factor that affects fraud in the banking sectors. Secondly, many interviewees 
strongly agreed that management override is a serious problem and effective check and balance 
systems for management override are not working properly in the industry. Thirdly, it was revealed 
that the protection system for whistle-blowers is not functioning well because a small number of staff 
and close relationships among co-workers hamper protecting whistle-blowers in the industry. One 
fresh recommendation was suggested to solve this problem that the internal audit department should 
have authority to transfer a whistleblower to another department or office to protect from retaliation 
or bullying. Fourthly, it was found that the lack of inter-organizational tracing system restricts the 
effective investigation of fraud because internal auditors cannot examine the other banks’ accounts 
due to the lack of authority and strengthened personal data protection act in Korea. Lastly at an 
organizational level, contrary to general expectation, it was found that the Korean banking industry 
established the punishment protocol well for occupational fraudsters because the interviewees, 
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regardless of the sector, said that every detected offender currently must be reported to the law 
enforcement agency without exception. 
In the sociocultural and national (macro) level, firstly, many of the interviewees raised concerns about 
the sociocultural factors that hinder the protection of whistle-blowers in the Korean society. Secondly, 
the role of the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) was evaluated generally positively by the 
interviewees. Furthermore, it was found that Korea has recently enacted an Act on Corporate 
Governance of Financial Companies, which aims to ensure sound management of financial companies, 
by prescribing adequate governance structures of financial companies. Finally, a theme was 
discovered that the Korean criminal justice system should take the harsher stance against white-collar 
criminals, especially the powerful corporate executives who committed massive-scale fraud. It was 
found that Korean President sometimes overuses the Constitutional authority to pardon and reinstate 
the CEOs of conglomerates known as chaebol, which seems to have a negative impact on many 
Koreans by spreading feelings of injustice. To accept this public outcry, an amendment bill of the 
Constitution has been proposed to the National Assembly to restrict this unlimited pardoning power 
of the Korean President (The Financial News, 2018). 
 
Chapter 9.4 Integration of findings and contribution to the theory and literature 
9.4.1 Integration of the findings 
9.4.1.1 Integration of two survey results 
The relationship of two questionnaires in this study is complementary, rather than contradictory 
because the aim and target of each survey was designed to be differentiated. In other words, the first 
survey focused on collecting data on real fraud cases, whereas the second survey centered on 
gathering employees’ perceptions. For this, the first survey was administered to the police officers 
asking the characteristics of occupational fraud, profiles of perpetrators, and responses from the 
criminal justice system. In contrast, the second survey was distributed to bank workers to garner 
information about the perceived fraud risk, effectiveness of controls, opportunity reduction and anti-
fraud culture in the financial institutions, and the frequency and loss of occupational fraud. The reason 
for discriminating the target and aim of the surveys was due to the ethical concern to minimize the 
potential harm that might be caused to the bank employees by exposing sensitive information on 
occupational fraud, as discussed in the ethical section (Chapter 3.5). Overall, the results of the two 
surveys are congruent and produced a synergy effect as expected for drawing out important 
implications. However, there were some mismatches between the police investigation and employee 
perception data, which require some explanations in this section. 
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Firstly, the bank workers perceived that asset misappropriation posed the most serious risk to the 
institutions, followed by corruption and financial statement fraud. However, the fraud investigation 
data in the first survey revealed that corruption was the most frequently investigated fraud (56% vs 
40%), causing more loss than asset misappropriation (£1.6 million vs £1.3 million). Plus, approximately 
half of the corruption cases involved bribery (52%) and the mean amount of bribes was £40,000, 
representing a higher risk than asset misappropriation. This mismatch between the two surveys can 
be explained by the composition of the respondents in the second survey. Among 395 valid survey 
responses, non-high ranking workers accounted for 85 percent of the sample, the vast majority. As 
discovered in the statistical analysis, high position is associated with corruption. This distribution of 
the survey participants who are mostly in non-high position might have led the result of perceiving 
asset misappropriation as more serious risk than corruption because of the participant’s familiarity of 
their daily task as a teller or clerk.  
Secondly, the perception data demonstrated that the workers in the second sector perceived fraud 
risk lower than those in the first sector. In other words, the respondents in the first sector perceived 
occupational fraud risk higher than those in the second-sector banks. However, differently from the 
employees’ perceptions, the analysis of investigation/population ratio of the police data (Table 5-1) 
showed that the second sector had almost three times as higher ratio as that of the first financial 
sector. This incongruity between the employees’ perception and police data clearly suggests that 
there could be a gap between perception and investigation. This might be due to the different level of 
awareness of fraud according to the financial sector (sector effect). That is, the enhanced fraud 
awareness though the increased anti-fraud investments in the first sector might have caused higher 
perceived risks among the employees. This also implies that higher awareness of fraud risk is actually 
beneficial to prevent occupational fraud, because the first sector actually has the smaller police 
investigation cases per capita. 
Thirdly, in a similar vein with the perceived risk of fraud, the perceived frequency of fraud in the last 
5 years was significantly higher in the first-sector banks than in the second-sector banks (4 vs 2). 
However, again the fraud investigation/population ratio was the opposite showing the more fraud 
cases were investigated by the police in the second sector. Similarly, the result of logistic regression 
analysis demonstrates that low awareness of fraud risk is associated with smaller odds of employees 
reporting the occurrence of fraud in the organization. This finding provides an important evidence 
supporting the ‘fraud iceberg’ phenomenon that more fraud might be hidden and ongoing in the small 
and medium sized organizations because of the staffing and budget limitations on detecting fraud 
(Bussman and Werle, 2006; Johansson and Carey, 2016, Tunley, 2011).  
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9.4.1.2 Integration of quantitative and qualitative findings 
The quantitative study was based on Research Questions from 1 to 4 and the qualitative study was 
centered on Research Question 5. Therefore, the relationship between the two findings is considered 
to be complementary and give strengths to understanding the results of the research questions. 
Simply put, the results of the quantitative study have provided descriptive and inferential discoveries, 
showing an overall picture of the problem while the qualitative study has given in-depth explanations 
and prescription for the problem of fraud like showing the details of the forest. Especially, the mixed 
method approach was very effective to explain the sector differences. The sector differences were 
explored in terms of the four risk assessment factors: (1) the nature of business, (2) operating 
environment, (3) control effectiveness, and (4) ethical culture (ACFE, 2015). 
Specifically, the qualitative interviews of the present study revealed the reason why small and medium 
sized banking institutions have a riskier nature and environment. First of all, in terms of the nature of 
business, the customers in the second-sector banks usually have lower credit ratings than those in the 
first-sector banks. The clients who have a good credit rating generally have less incentive to go to the 
second-sector institutions, which normally have higher interest rates for borrowing money. Those who 
have difficulty in gaining credit service from the first-sector banks tend to go to the second sector. 
Therefore, the nature of business is inherently riskier in the second financial sector. Regarding the 
operating environment, the financial institutions in the second sector generally have a weak corporate 
governance structure than those in the first sector. In other words, separation of ownership from 
business administration is not properly working because anyone can become a chief director or 
chairman of the financial companies, whether they have previous experience or skills in bank 
management or not. This unprofessionalism in business administration leads to riskier environment 
in the second sector. 
With regard to control effectiveness, a small number of staff and limited budgets have restricted the 
capacity of even the basic control systems, such as separation of duties and job rotation in small and 
medium sized institutions. Lastly, regarding ethical culture, the second-sector banks generally have a 
serious risk factor that the elected chief directors or large shareholders tend to hire his or her relatives 
or friends during their term time, creating an environment of nepotism and cronyism. Furthermore, it 
was discovered that the small number of employees in the community banks thwart effective 
implementation of whistleblowing system and protection of whistle-blowers which posit higher fraud 
risk.  
Without the qualitative interviews on the sector difference, the results of statistical analysis might 
have been difficult to be understood clearly. In the quantitative study, the respondents in the first 
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sector had higher perceptions of almost all items such as fraud risk, anti-fraud investment, the 
effectiveness of specific controls, opportunity reduction, anti-fraud culture, and perceived frequency 
of occupational fraud in their organization. Therefore, the qualitative interviews have become the 
lynchpin knowledge to fully explain why the results have been obtained. 
Furthermore, some valuable insights have been drawn from the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative findings. It was surprising that three pre-screening checks (credit, certification, and criminal 
history) were located at the bottom part of the implementation rate in the banking industry (Table 6-
6). Hiring honest employees is regarded as a very important first step to create a good anti-fraud 
culture in organizations (Albrecht et al., 2015; Button and Brooks, 2009; Gill and Goldstraw-White, 
2010). However, the interviews with bank employees indicated that the strengthened legislations for 
protecting personal information in Korea have made it very difficult for the institutions to verify 
applicants’ background directly. To make matters worse, Korea does not have any data sharing 
systems on fraud convicts, hence, resulting in inefficiency of preventing fraud in the industry. 
Lastly, the way of supervision by the FSS is also highlighted as a factor that makes a difference in fraud 
risk management between the two sectors. The commercial banks in the first sector are directly 
regulated by the FSS. However, the banking institutions in the second sector are indirectly regulated 
by the FSS. This indirect regulation has emerged as an important factor that impedes effective fraud 
risk management in the second-sector banks. This means that some community banking institutions 
can be neglected through the oversight of the FSS. A recent case in a community credit cooperative 
clearly demonstrated this situation, where a contract worker embezzled £6.7 million and the cause 
was attributed to lax oversight by the financial authority (KBS News, 2018).   
 
9.4.2 Contribution to the theory and literature 
9.4.2.1 Routine Activity Theory 
Routine Activity Theory is based on the assumption that crime can be committed by anyone who has 
the opportunity and the theory assumes that for crime to occur there must be a convergence in time 
and space of three essential elements: a ‘likely offender’, a ‘suitable target’, and the ‘absence of 
capable guardian’ (Felson, 1998). Furthermore, Felson (2002:119) defined white-collar crime as 
‘crimes of specialized access’. According to him, occupations, professions, and organization provide 
offenders with practical routes to their targets and legitimate features of the work-role offer a chance 
to commit crimes. In this regard, this study finds an interesting association that supports the Routine 
Activity Theory. Fraud occurs due to opportunity in organizational settings situated in various time 
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and location. The current study about the profiles of bank fraudsters has demonstrated that the male 
or high-ranking perpetrators are associated with corruption (‘gender’ or ‘position’ effect). This can be 
explained that the employees who are working with more opportunities of corruption (loan-related 
activities) are more likely to commit corruption. In contrast, the employees who are working with 
more opportunities for embezzlement (i.e. women or lower-level employee at a bank) are more likely 
to commit embezzlement. 
In this regard, Figure 9-1 below describes the relationship between opportunities and frequency of 
specific types of fraud. 
Figure 9-1: The relationship between opportunities and frequency of crime 
 
These figures depict the positive relationship between opportunities and frequency of crime. However, 
Goldstraw-White (2012) argued that women, when located in similar occupational positions to men, 
were equally able and prepared to take advantage of opportunities. That is to say, if the female 
workers are assigned more to the loan-related task in the banking institutions, they might be more 
likely to be associated with corruption than the current situation. Her argument concurs with the 
current study’s finding in a sense that opportunity rather than individual factor (i.e., gender) promotes 
crime. Therefore, the present study is significant because it finds evidence supporting the Routine 
Activity Theory by showing that occupational fraud is positively correlated to crime opportunities in a 
banking institution. 
  
237 
 
Furthermore, opportunity was defined as (1) internal controls are weak and (2) the chances of 
detection and punishment are remote (Dorminey et al., 2010; Rodgers et al., 2015). In this study, 
opportunity reduction was measured by 10 items adapted from the Dorminey et al (2010). The study 
showed that perceived opportunity reduction is negatively associated with the odds of employees 
reporting an occurrence of occupational fraud. In other words, if an employee agrees that opportunity 
is reduced more effectively in the organization, then the odds of the employee reporting the 
occurrence of occupational fraud are statistically significantly smaller. This is one of the key findings 
of the study, which highlights that how to operate control mechanisms to shrink perceived 
opportunity is more important than simply large number of anti-fraud controls in organizations. Lastly, 
the logistic regression analysis of the study also corroborates the Routine Activity Theory argument 
that opportunity is a root cause of crime, by demonstrating a positive association between perceived 
opportunity and fraud occurrence. Therefore, the study provides valuable empirical evidence that 
reducing opportunity is very crucial in decreasing crime. 
9.4.2.2 Fraud Triangle Theory 
Fighting fraud is sometimes compared to extinguishing a fire (Albrecht et al., 2015). Firefighters try to 
put out fire by eliminating any one of the three elements that are necessary for a fire: (1) oxygen, (2) 
fuel, (3) heat. However, people who attempt to prevent fraud usually focus on only one of the three 
elements of the fraud triangle: ‘opportunity’. Because people generally believe that having good 
internal controls can eradicate opportunities, they put all or most of their efforts on implementing 
controls and ensuring adherence to them (Caplan, 1999). Therefore, it was criticized that anti-fraud 
efforts are rarely focused on removing pressures or rationalizations (Albrecht et al., 2015). By the same 
token, Murphy and Free (2016) argued that the current framework, the Fraud Triangle, has a limited 
scope of analysis by just diagnosing fraud as the problem committed by immoral individuals who 
should be ‘monitored’ through control mechanisms. They argued that this has led to assess fraud risk 
in a narrow approach focusing only on monitoring aspects of internal control. 
However, some recent studies have suggested that having an ethical culture/climate is a solution to 
eliminate the other elements of the Triangle, ‘rationalization’ and ‘pressure’ (Murphy and Free, 2016; 
Rodgers et al., 2015). Despite the suggested link between the ethical culture and the two elements, 
empirical analysis for this expanded solution was not being implemented in the fraud literature. In this 
regard, the present study has extended the Fraud Triangle Theory by measuring ethical culture in 
organizations, rather than directly assessing individual offender’s perceived pressure and 
rationalization. As a result of the estimation of SEM, the study has verified that developing an ethical 
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culture (eliminating rationalization/pressure) is more effective than monitoring controls (removing a 
part of opportunities) to prevent occupational fraud in the banking industry.  
9.4.2.3 Counter fraud framework 
The present study proposes ‘differential deterrence’ for countering occupational fraud. Thomas et al 
(2013) have discovered evidence that ‘differential deterrence’ or that the effect of sanctions, is not 
uniform across persons, which means across-individual variability in risk perceptions can be associated 
with individual characteristics such as IQ. For example, individuals who are traditionally viewed as 
being high in criminal propensity are more affected by arrest. Their findings support the idea that high-
propensity offenders are more responsive to formal sanctions, and thus more deterrable than low-
propensity individuals. However, the current study suggests ‘differential deterrence’ based on 
individual moral development rather than individual IQ. According to Kohlberg’s (1969) moral 
development model, at stages of the pre-conventional level, an individual is concerned with concrete 
consequences, particularly external rewards and punishments. At the conventional stage, ‘right’ is that 
which conforms to the expectations of good behavior of a larger society, a family or peer group. Finally, 
at stages of the principled level, ‘right’ is determined by universal values or principles. These principled 
individuals are expected to be ethical despite situational pressures toward unethical behavior.  
Button (2008) applied Lukes’ (1974) three dimensions of power to a security setting and claimed that 
the third-dimensional power should be the primary basis for security systems. As Button (2008) argued 
that third-dimensional power such as creating mentalities to achieve outcome subconsciously should 
be the primary basis for security systems, the counter-fraud system also should be principally built on 
creating an ethical environment to deflate possible rationalizations and pressures. These strategies 
will be most suitable for accidental fraudsters, who are most deterrable (Shepherd, 2016) like the 
white-collar employees in the banking industry. However, as the ultimate security system should be 
erected upon all three dimensions of power, such as exerting it overtly, compliance in an organization 
can be achieved by the threat of punishment and reducing opportunities to serious malefactors such 
as predators (Button, 2008).  
In this regard, the profiles of perpetrators of the present study showed that most occupational fraud 
is committed by ‘first time’ offenders (50/53, 95%), who have no prior criminal history, not by 
‘predators’ who are career criminals and immune to moral appeals (Dorminey et al., 2010, 2012; 
Paternoster and Simpson, 1992). Therefore, the present study indicated that setting ethics as the first 
line of defence is very effective in decreasing normal employees’ fraud in banking institutions (ERC, 
2010; Giles, 2015). However, it should be noted that ‘anti-fraud culture’ and ‘opportunity reduction’ 
are not the independent constructs for financial industry security, but they should interact creating a 
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combined effect to countering fraud (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Weaver and Trevino, 1999). In 
summary, expanded from Fraud Triangle Theory, the present study suggests ‘differential deterrence’ 
strategy as a revised counter fraud framework, which focuses on creating ethical culture first, but also 
being supported by the secondary measures of opportunity reduction.  
 
Table 9-1: Differential deterrence strategy  
Dimension Differential Deterrence Strategy Main Target 
Primary measure 
Cultivating an anti-fraud culture 
to lessen possible rationalizations 
and pressures 
Accidental (first time) 
offenders 
Secondary 
measure 
Anti-fraud controls 
to reduce perceptions of 
opportunity 
Predators or career criminals 
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Chapter 9.5 Policy implications for managing fraud risk 
To develop a holistic security system to counter fraud risk, three stages were suggested by Button 
(2008). The first embraced strategies to identify the problem such as risk assessment. The second part 
entailed the development of strategies to address the problem such as risk management. Finally, it 
was important to monitor the problem and adapt the system accordingly. 
The current study found evidence that the community banking institutions in the second sector have 
more fraud risk (sector effect). Plus, it was revealed that corruption risk increases as an employee rises 
to a higher level (position effect). Once fraud risk assessment has taken place, the banking institutions 
should identify the controls and procedures that are needed to mitigate the identified risks. In this 
respect, the study also discovered some vulnerability of control systems and procedures, such as poor 
job rotation, weak segregation of duties, and the lack of checks and balances in systems for 
management overrides. Unfortunately, the limited resources and funding for countering fraud in the 
second financial sector stem from its nature of business and operating environment. This is an 
inherent restriction of the financial sector. However, as the importance of the second sector continues 
to grow,  effective risk management should be implemented to enhance control effectiveness and 
ethical culture to offset the risk factors. 
Based on the quantitative and qualitative findings of the study, the author proposes a counter-fraud 
model for the banking industry. Figure 9-2 below demonstrates the risk management tools of the 
model. In the figure, fraud is figuratively compared to flies from dirty environments. Corruptive 
management who can negatively affect the entire organization is the first target of the fraud 
mitigation. Weber (1947) introduced power as the probability that a person can carry out his or her 
own will despite resistance. There are five types of power: (1) reward power, (2) coercive power, (3) 
expert power, (4) legitimate power, (5) referent power (French and Raven, 1959). The directors or 
executives of banking institutions are regarded as having those powers and can influence their 
employees. Therefore, setting the tone at the top is the first place to begin. The board of directors and 
other senior management in a financial company should set a positive tone at the top by (1) providing 
effective anti-fraud education and promoting a well-defined code of conduct and ethics and (2) 
becoming a good example or appropriate role model (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
In this regard, creating anti-fraud culture should be the primary measure to fight fraud in the 
organization (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). This anti-fraud culture is compared to fresh air in the 
figure. Surely, this fresh anti-fraud/ethical corporate culture can increase anti-rationalization by 
boosting individual moral awareness and can prevent employees from having pressures due to 
unethical behaviors, such as addicting to gambling (Albrecht et al., 2015; Trevino, 1986). In other 
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words, there are fewer flies in the clean air. At the same time, the detection and sanction strategy 
should become a secondary measure that can catch fraudsters like a sticky spider-web can catch as 
many flies as possible. If many flies see the strong spider-web, they will be deterred to fly around the 
web. This implies that perceived decreased opportunity can reduce the occurrence of fraud. Thirdly, 
organizations should have bright sunshine that can dry and sanitize the dirty environment which is like 
corruptive management. Effective check and balance systems like outside directors or independent 
check by auditors in the banking institutions should play the role of preventing management’s 
overrides and corruption. Finally, the government or financial supervisory authority should become 
an excavator that can remove corrupt management in the financial companies when necessary. 
Importantly, it should be emphasized that the excavators should be careful not to get dirty when 
eradicating the filthy origin because ‘regulatory capture’ can happen when a regulatory agency is 
lobbied by the special interest groups and the interests the agency set out to protect are ignored in 
favor of the regulated industry's interests (Hardy, 2006; Investopedia, 2018). 
Figure 9-2: Suh’ counter-fraud model for the banking industry 
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Chapter 9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized the quantitative and qualitative findings and integrated them with the 
extant fraud theory and literature. Utilizing a mixed method approach and various methods of analysis, 
the present study has discovered many significant findings and has provided important insights for 
managing occupational fraud in the banking industry. First of all, the study has found evidence 
supporting the Routine Activity Theory by demonstrating the ‘gender’ and ‘position’ effect on the 
characteristics of occupational fraud. In other words, the study shows that occupational fraud 
responses positively to the specific crime opportunities in a banking institution. Secondly, the present 
study has contributed to broadening the Fraud Triangle Theory by displaying that ethical corporate 
culture that is related to rationalization/pressure should be considered importantly which has been 
neglected in the fraud triangle framework. This was a response to calls for more research on the 
relationship between fraud and organizational culture to broaden the limited scope of Fraud Triangle 
Theory. Thirdly, the study has suggested ‘differential deterrence’ strategy as a revised counter fraud 
framework, which argues that cultivating anti-fraud culture should be a primary measure against 
accidental offenders, who composes normal organizations. However, the secondary measure of 
reducing perceived opportunity should work in tandem and underpin the primary measure, creating 
a synergy effect for countering fraud simultaneously. Finally, based on the findings of the study, a new 
counter-fraud model was proposed for managing fraud risk in the financial industry, which 
encompasses comprehensive problem-specific measures to effectively manage occupational fraud 
risk in the banking institutions. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter 10.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to make a contribution to financial industry security in light of managing 
occupational fraud risk in the banking institutions. There were several reasons for choosing this 
research subject. First of all, in terms of annual pecuniary crime losses, the most important crime was 
internal fraud or theft within the industries (Langton and Hollinger, 2005: 27). In particular, financial 
institutions are known to have the greatest risk of fraud in their workplace, such as asset 
misappropriation or corruption (ACFE, 2012; 2014; 2016). For example, the total number of 
embezzlement incidents from 2010 to 2014 in the Korean financial institutions amounted to 361 cases 
resulting in a total loss of £103 million, which demonstrates the significance of the problem (Koo and 
Lee, 2016). In addition, occupational fraud that occurs in financial institutions can cause financial panic 
and lead to bankruptcies, causing catastrophic impacts on the national economy (Krugman and Wells, 
2015). In this regard, the current study focused on the most basic security vulnerability factor, which 
is the inside threat that might originate from the employees who have a specialized access to 
organizational assets and a possibility to misuse their positon for private benefits (Felson 2002; Gill 
and Goldstraw-White, 2010). The current study’s effort exploring this area has much more potential 
to contribute to criminal justice studies since the difficulties in data collection from financial industry 
have hampered empirical studies so far.  
For the mixed method approach of the study, two supplementary survey platforms and in-depth semi-
structured interviews were adopted. Collected sample sizes were satisfactory to conduct relevant 
analyses and the interview participants were selected proportionally from the bank employee 
population. Furthermore, financial specialists such as the officials of the FSS and the Bank of Korea 
were included in the interview. Overall, the triangulation was very harmonious and successful in 
producing many valid points.  Previously in the study, a wide range of issues and topics were discussed 
in detail in each chapter: literature review (Chapter 2), research methodology (Chapter 3), 
occupational fraud in the Korean context (Chapter 4), characteristics of fraud (Chapter 5), the bank 
employees’ perceptions of fraud  and controls (Chapter 6), impact of organizational investment on 
occupational fraud (Chapter 7), and qualitative study findings (Chapter 8) and the fraud risk 
management for the banking industry (Chapter 9). Finally, this chapter is closing the study by making 
reflections on the research questions, summarizing the main findings and implications, providing 
policy recommendations, discussing the limits of the study and suggesting directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 10.2 Reflections on the research questions  
The goal of research was to investigate the characteristics of occupational fraud and to see employees’ 
perceptions of fraud risk and the effectiveness of the counter-fraud by comparing the two financial 
sectors (commercial banks vs community banking institutions) in Korea. The study intended to devise 
and suggest more effective counter-fraud strategies and methods to reduce occupational fraud in the 
financial industry. There were five research questions for the guidance of the findings. In this section, 
each research question is reviewed by summarizing the findings for the respective question. 
The first question asked: “What are the characteristics of occupational fraud committed in South 
Korean banking industry? Is there any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an 
effect on the characteristics of occupational fraud in the banking industry?” 
In response to the first research question, the study revealed that in terms of characteristics of 
occupational fraud, corruption accounted for the largest proportion in the banking industry. With 
regard to gender, position, and financial sector effect on the characteristics of occupational fraud, the 
study has found statistically significant effects of the variables on the characteristics of occupational 
fraud. To be specific, there was a gender effect showing that male employees were more likely to 
commit corruption. There was a position effect meaning that high-ranking bankers were more likely 
to commit corruption. There was also a financial sector effect demonstrating that the high-ranking 
perpetrators are more likely to come from the second financial sector. 
Moreover, the study has discovered that the smaller percentage of population in the second sector 
has resulted in more percentage of occupational fraud investigations in the entire banking industry. 
The investigation/population ratio (Chapter 5.4) has showed that the second sector has almost three 
times as high ratio as that of the first sector. This result implies that the community banking 
institutions in the second sector have more fraud risk than the commercial banks in the first sector, 
which is also supported by the findings of qualitative study. 
Next, the second research question asked: "What are the bank employees’ perceptions of 
occupational fraud risk? Is there any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect 
on the perceived risk of occupational fraud?” 
The study has obtained mixed results. Firstly, there was no gender effect on the perceived fraud risk 
in the banking industry. In other words, male and female employees perceived the fraud risk not 
significantly differently. However, the study has found that ‘position’ and ‘sector’ had significant 
effects on the perceived risk of occupational fraud. To be specific, the results of statistical analysis 
indicated the employees in a high position viewed the risk of corruption and financial statement fraud 
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lower than those in non-high position. This stands for high-ranking bankers relatively had loosened 
perceptions of the fraud risk than middle-level or low-ranking employees. Similarly, there was a 
financial sector effect on the perceived risk of fraud. The respondents in the first sector perceived 
occupational fraud risk higher than those in the second sector. In other words, because the first-sector 
workers knew more about fraud occurrence (the mean number of perceived fraud: 4 vs 2), the riskier 
they perceived the threat of fraud. However, in reality, the second sector had more fraud investigation 
cases per capita (0.59 vs 1.63). 
The third research question asked: “What are the bank employees’ perceptions of the effectiveness 
of anti-fraud controls? Is there any evidence that gender; position; or financial sector had an effect 
on the perceived effectiveness of anti-fraud controls?” 
Similar to the results of the second question, there was no gender effect found, but there were 
‘position’ and ‘sector’ effects on the perceived effectiveness of anti-fraud controls. Simply put, high-
ranking bankers agreed more with an enhanced level of opportunity reduction and an elevated level 
of anti-fraud culture in their institutions than other employees. The results represent that the 
employees’ attitudes towards anti-fraud control effectiveness (i.e., specific anti-fraud controls, 
opportunity reduction, and anti-fraud culture) become more positive as the employee’s position 
escalates in the hierarchical ladder in the organizations. In a similar vein, the respondents working in 
the first sector evaluated their anti-fraud control effectiveness more positively than the employees 
working in the second-sector banks. It can be interpreted that because the first-sector banks had 
detected fraud more frequently (4 vs 2), the first-sector workers perceived a higher effectiveness of 
anti-fraud controls in their institutions compared to those in second-sector institutions (the mean 
score of opportunity reduction: 3.79 vs 3.19).  
The fourth question asked: “Is there any statistically significant association among the perceived risk, 
counter-fraud effectiveness, and frequency (occurrence) of occupational fraud?” 
Regarding this question, the study discovered significant findings through logistic regression analysis.  
The employee’s perceived risk of fraud was positively associated with the odds of reporting the 
occurrence of occupational fraud in the organizations. That is, the more employees agreed that 
occupational fraud was a significant risk to their organization today, then the odds of the employee 
reporting an occurrence of occupational fraud in their bank were significantly higher. This result 
provides empirical evidence that risk assessment can be utilized as an indirect method of measuring 
the historic occurrence of occupational fraud in the banking institutions. Secondly, the perceived 
opportunity reduction (the qualitative aspect of anti-fraud control effectiveness) was negatively 
associated with the odds of employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud, whilst the 
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quantitative aspect of anti-fraud controls (the number of anti-fraud controls) was not. This is also one 
of the very important findings of the study implying perceived opportunity reduction really matters to 
decrease fraud whereas the mere presence of many controls is not effective in reducing fraud in the 
banking institutions. Thirdly, the employee’s perceived management override was positively 
associated with the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud whilst the perceived 
collusion was not. This result represents that the employees in the banking industry perceived that 
management override was the more serious risk factor than collusion. 
Lastly, the fifth research question asked: “What and how can systems be improved to reduce 
occupational fraud in the Korean banking industry?” 
In order to answer this final question, the mixed method was utilized. Based on the findings from 
Research Question 1 to 4, the interviewees were asked about the last research question and the 
results were analyzed according to three hierarchical levels. As a result, a new model for counter fraud 
in the banking institutions was proposed by the author (Figure 9-2 in Chapter 9.5). 
In the model, the corruptive senior management, which can contaminate the entire organization, is 
set as the first goal of fraud mitigation. The chief directors or executives of banking institutions, 
especially who are working in the second financial sector, have potential to abuse their position and 
power. As demonstrated in the S&L Debacle in the US and the Savings Banks Scandal in Korea, some 
of them even regarded the institution as their personal piggy bank (Krugman and Wells, 2015). 
Therefore, ethical leadership and tone at the top are always pivotal and should become the starting 
point to fight fraud (Albrecht et al., 2015). The board of directors and senior management of a financial 
company should set a positive tone at the top by investing in ethical corporate culture. Nurturing 
ethical culture can be established by effective anti-fraud education and well specified code of conduct 
and ethics that should be applied to all members of the organization (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). 
Plus, the directors and executives of banking institutions should be checked and balanced by the 
financial supervisory authority, independent auditors, law enforcement agency and mass media which 
can work like sanitizing sunshine in the proposed model. 
Furthermore, the interviews showed that pressure or incentive for employee fraud in the Korean 
banking industry turns out to mostly originate from financial motives such as failures of investing in 
stock market or future trade. Therefore, to prevent employees from investing excessively in those 
markets, anti-fraud education should be emphasized to the banking industry about the risky nature of 
volatile markets and devastating consequences of speculative investments. Figuratively, these 
measures can create and spread fresh and clean air to reduce possible pressure and rationalization in 
the industry. 
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Secondly, detection and punishment should become another important measure that focuses on 
reducing fraud opportunities. Especially, poor segregation of duties and infrequent job rotations were 
highlighted as one of the main contributing factors of fraud opportunities. Although there is a lack of 
staff and insufficient investment to prevent fraud in small-sized institutions, a valuable insight was 
suggested in an interview that separation of duties and check and balance systems can be 
implemented by a creative system, not necessarily by a large number of staff. Establishing effective 
check and balance systems such as by providing autonomous power to auditors and by guaranteeing 
independent check roles to the board of directors can eliminate fraud opportunities of senior 
management who otherwise can overuse their authority for personal benefits. It was stressed that 
these measures are required especially in the second financial sector. 
Finally, the government or financial supervisory authority should become a competent excavator that 
can remove the corruptive management in the financial companies. For example, the FSS should go 
to audit and examine occupational fraud more frequently across the nation. By the same token, the 
police should initiate investigation more pre-emptively. The Korean government should pay more 
efforts to revise the fraud-related legislations such as the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial 
Companies by strengthening qualifications of becoming corporate executives of financial companies 
in Korea (The Chosun Ilbo, 2018).  
 
Chapter 10.3 Summary of main findings and implications 
Although there are many important findings and detailed discussions about them, this section 
summarizes three most significant findings that can contribute to the literature and theory of fraud.  
First of all, the study revealed ‘position’ and ‘sector’ play a more crucial role on occupational fraud 
than ‘gender’. In other words, Chapter 5.4 showed that the employees with higher positions generally 
caused larger average losses in their organizations. This phenomenon demonstrates that those in high 
managerial or executive position commit more serious fraud than those in lower positions due to more 
authority trusted to the position by the institution. However, unfortunately, it was also discovered 
that those in a high position tend to have more complacent perceptions of fraud risk and more 
optimistic attitudes towards the counter-fraud effectiveness in organizations. This big discrepancy of 
the high-ranking bankers’ perceptions suggests that counter-fraud activities should consider this 
‘position’ effect prudentially when assessing the risk of fraud in the banking industry. Plus, the finding 
contributes to the Fraud Diamond Theory (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004). In the Fraud Diamond Theory, 
capability was added as the additional element and it entailed the authoritative position in an 
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organization. This study concurs with the Diamond Theory in a sense that authoritative position plays 
a significant role for promoting fraud, especially in the organizational and occupational settings as 
demonstrated in Figure 10-1 below. That is, the higher the perpetrator’s position is, the more serious 
damage the perpetrator is likely to cause to the organization. Therefore, more efforts should be paid 
to prevent management override and senior management fraud. 
 
Figure 10-1: The relationship between the perpetrator’s position and seriousness of fraud 
 
In a similar vein, financial sector had a significant effect on the perceived risk of fraud and counter-
fraud effectiveness. Again same as the position effect, the second-sector banks had lower-level 
awareness of fraud risk and lower-level perception of counter-fraud effectiveness (sector effect). 
Especially, tone at the top (3.54 vs 3.00) and ethical corporate culture (3.93 vs 3.21) were perceived 
far lower by the respondents in the second sector than those in the first sector. Moreover, the serious 
problem was clearly demonstrated by the fact that all the high-ranking perpetrators came from the 
second sector in the police investigation cases. This result represents that the second-sector banks 
should improve much more in terms of cultivating anti-fraud culture as well as eliminating fraud 
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opportunities.  In this regard, the fraud risk management model (Chapter 9.5) proposed by the study 
should be more urgently applied to the second-sector institutions in Korea.  
Secondly, the study also found empirical evidence that perceived opportunity is positively associated 
with fraud occurrence with statistical significance. In other words, the study showed that reducing 
opportunity is significantly associated with the decreased level of perceived fraud in organizations. 
Previous studies simply defined fraud opportunity as (1) internal controls are weak and (2) the chances 
of detection and punishment are remote (Rodgers et al., 2015). However, there has been no further 
research regarding the relationship between the perceived opportunity and occurrence of fraud. To 
fill the gap, opportunity reduction in this study was ingenuously measured by 10 items which focused 
on strengthening internal control and enhancing deterrence (Dorminey, 2010, 2012). This could be 
very significant in criminal justice studies because some studies have criticized that opportunity 
merely determines the time and place of crime, but does not cause it, then the expected result of 
reducing opportunity would simply be to displace crime (Clarke, 2012; Wortley, 2010). However, this 
study has succeeded in providing statistical evidence that perceived opportunity reduction is 
negatively associated with the odds of the employee reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud. 
Simply put, if employees agree more that opportunity is reduced more effectively in the organization 
(measured by ten items), the odds of reporting the occurrence of occupational fraud in their 
organization are significantly smaller. Therefore, counter-fraud effort should focus on eliminating 
fraud opportunities by combining prevention and deterrence measures which are corroborated by the 
study. 
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Table 10-1: The measures to reduce the perception of fraud opportunities 
The measures 
to reduce the perception of fraud 
opportunities 
Good design of internal control  
Internal control operational as designed 
Continuous monitoring 
Effective auditing software tools 
Well-established punishment protocol 
Open communication with employees, vendors, and 
customers 
Proper employee activity monitoring 
Effective hotlines 
Whistle-blower protections 
Monitoring of contractual parties 
 
 
Thirdly, the Structural Equation Modelling of the study (Chapter 7) showed that the perception of an 
improved ethical culture was negatively associated with the perceived frequency of occupational 
fraud. In other words, if employees agree more that they have more elevated ethical culture, it is less 
likely that the employees have observed occupational fraud in the organization. This finding implies 
that developing an ethical culture is as effective as opportunity reduction in preventing occupational 
fraud and should be considered just as important as opportunity reduction when managing the risk of 
fraud. In this regard, counter-fraud activities can also have a very fruitful outcome if they focus on 
boosting ethical culture in organizations, as demonstrated in Table 10-2 below. 
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Table 10-2: The measures to boost anti-fraud culture 
The measures to boost 
anti-fraud culture  
Setting proper tone at the top 
Strong ethical corporate culture 
Integrity of workplace  
Meaningful code of conduct 
Effective anti-fraud training programme 
 
Therefore, the study concludes that fraud risk can be effectively managed by having financial 
companies’ fraud prevention systems being designed and implemented via those two axial measures 
(‘eliminating opportunities’ and ‘boosting anti-fraud culture’) (Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010), like 
crime can be prevented through environmental design and its implementation (CPTED) (Jeffery, 1971; 
Newman, 1972). In other words, occupational fraud can be prevented through organizational design 
as well (FPTOD). 
 
Chapter 10.4 Recommendations  
The findings of this study are based on the comprehensive analyses of 53 police investigation cases, 
approximately 400 survey responses from the banking industry and 16 in-depth interviews with 
bankers and counter-fraud specialists in Korea. Based on these, this section has generated some 
recommendations for managing fraud risk in the banking industry. 
Most of all, the banking industry should put more efforts on the counter-fraud activities which were 
diagnosed as weak points by the survey respondents. Among the 10 opportunity reduction items 
(Table 10-1), the study revealed that anti-fraud communication with employees and customers (3.36), 
monitoring third parties (3.34), whistle-blowing systems (3.20), and protection of whistle-blowers 
(2.98) were evaluated below the average (3.50). In a similar vein, among the 5 anti-fraud environment 
enhancing items (Table 10-2), strong ethical culture (3.58) and tone at the top (3.28) were rated below 
the average (3.65) by the respondents. As mentioned above, the study has demonstrated the 
‘opportunity reduction’ and ‘boosting anti-fraud culture’ were negatively associated with the 
occurrence of occupational fraud through the statistical analysis. Therefore, if the banking industry 
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focuses more on improving the weakest links of the items identified by the bank employees, then the 
occurrence of occupational fraud can be significantly decreased. Furthermore, in order to create an 
ambience of reduced opportunities and elevated culture, entire orchestrating effects of organizational 
design and implementation is far more important than the mere presence of many fraud controls. 
Secondly, the banking industry should establish a consolidated fraud data sharing system to boost 
collaboration for fraud prevention and detection between the different financial sectors and 
institutions. The qualitative study detected serious concerns among the interviewees that pre-
screening checks and staff vetting are not properly conducted due to the difficulties in gaining 
personal information such as certificate verification and criminal history. This situation emerged 
recently due to the strengthened data protection act in Korea. However, the interviewees opined that 
the banking institutions are currently relying solely on the documents that are provided by the job 
applicants but have difficulty in verifying the authenticity of the information. 
This situation posits a very serious challenge about the current study’s proposal of the ‘differential 
deterrence strategy’, which argues that the anti-fraud investment and organizational efforts should 
be devoted to creating anti-fraud/ethical culture firstly, rather than increasing surveillance. The 
proposal can be valid only if the bank employees are hired by robust screening processes that can 
successfully screen out ethically problematic candidates, thus, increasing the possibility of the 
employees located in more advanced moral development stages (Kohlberg, 1969). As discussed, hiring 
the right kind of employees is one of the essential elements in creating a culture of honesty (Albrecht 
et al., 2015; Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). Therefore, the banking institutions should invest time 
and resources to set up a consolidated fraud data sharing system in the industry. If they can share the 
information regarding convicted fraudsters data like the fraud intelligence systems in the UK (Cifas, 
2018), the Korean banking industry can significantly benefit from this system to prevent fraud. The 
study strongly recommends that a consolidated fraud data sharing system should be built as a top 
priority. 
Thirdly, the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) should increase the scope of its direct 
supervision to the second financial sector. As mentioned, the FSS is a quasi-governmental supervisory 
authority founded for integrated financial supervision. However, a serious weakness was revealed 
through the interviews that its effective oversight usually ends within the boundary of the first 
financial sector. In other words, the FSS tends to entrust its supervisory authority to the respective 
federations of cooperatives and it only intervenes ad-hoc basely once fraud occurs. For example, 
community credit cooperatives are not currently supervised by the FSS, but are overseen by the 
Ministry of the Interior and Safety, which is responsible for the local autonomy and decentralization 
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issues in Korea (MOIS, 2018), thus lacks expertise in fraud risk management. The statistics of 
investigation/population ratio of the study also supports the hypothesis that indirect oversight of the 
second sector by the FSS is correlated with higher fraud investigation ratio. Therefore, the FSS should 
engage more actively in supervising the second financial sector, which was exposed to more serious 
fraud risk. 
Finally, the findings of this study should be embraced by South Korean banking industry. For example, 
the respondents in the second sector had a significantly lower level of awareness about occupational 
fraud. However, the investigation/population ratio analyzed by the study has clearly demonstrated 
that small and medium sized banking institutions in the second sector actually have more occupational 
fraud cases investigated per employee. Furthermore, the average loss in the second sector was larger 
than that of the first sector (£1.5 million vs £1.4 million). This is a very surprising finding considering 
the relatively small size of the second sector compared to the first sector in the entire financial industry. 
However, this finding is unknown to the bank workers. Therefore, this incongruity between the low 
fraud awareness and the high fraud investigation ratio should be educated in the industry to alert the 
seriousness of the problem and to boost fraud awareness, especially for the second financial sector. 
Furthermore, the importance of ethical culture and personal integrity should be communicated to the 
financial employees. Unfortunately, some studies have discovered that the overall levels of honesty 
and integrity are decreasing in most of the advanced countries, which can make the fraud problems 
more serious (Albrecht et al., 2015: 35). This overall moral deterioration in societies and some 
criminogenic conditions of the financial industry can be a serious challenge for financial industry 
security (Calavita and Pontell, 1991; Tillman, 2015). As revealed by the survey results and semi-
structured interviews of the study, personal integrity and ethical culture are the most important 
foundation to prevent fraud although it sounds a little like an old-fashioned idea. Moreover, the 
slippery slope passage of bank employees leading to fraud should be trained to prevent inexperienced 
staff from becoming an accidental fraudster.  At the same time, the seriousness of investing in risky 
markets such as future trade should be alerted to stop the employees from having non-sharable 
financial problems (Cressey, 1953). 
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Chapter 10.5 Limitations of research and future research 
10.5.1 Limitations of the study 
Due to reputational risk, occupational fraud is generally regarded as so secretive by organizations that 
it is very difficult for researchers to obtain the official statistics such as offenders’ profiles and fraud 
frequency (Button, 2008; Gill and Goldstraw-White, 2010). Therefore, to overcome data sensitivity, 
the study adopted indirect methods to collect the fraud data from the banking industry. Firstly, the 
study gained the information from the police officers asking about the characteristics of fraud, profiles 
of fraudsters, and the motives and rationalization accounts of the offenders. However, this method 
inherently has limitations compared to directly interviewing fraud offenders like some previous 
studies did for the studies of white-collar criminals (Button et al, 2017; Cressey, 1953; Goldstraw-
White, 2012; Schuchter and Levi, 2016; Zeitz, 1981). Furthermore, the police fraud data only consist 
of detected cases. 
As a result, the current study does not deny the limitation of the data collected by this method. 
However, the author would like to point out that the Korean police officers investigate almost all of 
the criminal cases including white-collar crimes in the criminal justice system and the police 
investigators should examine offender’s motivation and rationalization accounts while completing 
their documentation duties in the process of police investigation (KNPA, 2016). Therefore, the study 
assumed that the police officers are in the best position to understand the circumstances of 
committing fraud besides offenders themselves. This is the same method, the ACFE uses to examine 
the profiles of offenders and characteristics of occupational fraud. Moreover, there is no reason to 
believe that detected fraud sample is significantly different from the dark figures of occupational fraud 
because of the bounded organizational settings which are quite different from other crimes. Therefore, 
many criminological studies still rely on police statistics for data collection (Castelbajac, 2014). 
Secondly, the study asked banking employees about the number of observations of occupational fraud 
in their organization. Naturally, there might be gaps between actual and perceived fraud levels in 
companies. Plus, this method of asking the perceived frequency of fraud might have caused a social 
desirability bias, where respondents’ tendencies are to answer in a more socially acceptable way (Kim 
and Kim, 2016). However, to minimize such biases, the study paid attention to the fact that 
occupational fraud could be detected most frequently by employees in a company (ACFE, 2012, 2014, 
2016) and respondents are more likely to report that they observed others’ unethical behaviour, 
rather than their own (Trevino et al., 1998).  
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Thirdly, there is a limit in a way that the study adopted convenient sampling. For the generalizability 
of the findings to other settings, random sampling is regarded as ideal. Random sampling, which is a 
probability sampling, selects sample randomly so that each unit in population has the same probability 
of selection. However, probability sampling can be very costly and time consuming. Furthermore, 
random sampling is only possible when the sampling frame, the listing of all units in the populations 
is properly established (Bryman, 2016). Unfortunately, the current study could not obtain the sampling 
frame because the Korean banking industry is very broad. In fact, even probability sampling can have 
a bias (Babbie, 2007; Bryman, 2016) and there is widespread use of non-random sampling methods in 
the real world research (Robson, 2011). In this respect, the study also admits that non-probability 
sampling was selected as the second-best option due to practical limitations. 
10.5.2  Areas for future research 
Although this research has provided many important implications regarding the management of 
occupational fraud risk, such as the profiles of offenders, measures to eliminate fraud opportunities 
and factors to boost anti-fraud culture, and where to focus anti-fraud investment, the author believes 
that there are still several areas for further work. Therefore, this section suggests some areas for 
future research. 
Firstly, the further research should consider to how anti-fraud culture in an organization can be best 
achieved. The significance of ethical culture, leadership (tone at the top), and personal integrity has 
been highlighted by the current research as one of the vital factors to combat occupational fraud. 
However, some of the interviewees expressed scepticism about the current ethics programmes and 
codes of conduct in their organizations. Of course, some previous studies, especially from the business 
ethics literature, have touched on this issue. For example, Warren et al (2014) found positive effects 
of formal ethics training on organizational culture. Plus, McCabe et al (1996) discovered that the self-
reported unethical behavior was inversely associated with the implementation strength and 
embeddedness of the code of conduct in the company. However, the necessary or best conditions for 
the programmes to be effective in the Korean context have not been robustly researched in the 
existing literature. In this regard, the author believes that this area needs more attention in the future. 
Secondly, how to implement whistle-blowing systems and how to protect whistleblowers well should 
be researched more in the future. Trevino and Victor (1992) have found that in the absence of social 
structures supporting whistle-blowing, co-workers can be severely pressurized not to use whistle-
blowing systems. In this respect, the relationship between organizational/social culture and whistle-
blowing programmes deserves more attention to help the establishment of good systems in Korea. 
This theme has emerged very strongly during the interviews and one interviewee suggested that the 
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audit department should work closely with HR departments to protect whistle-blowers. Comparative 
study designs across various organizational settings would be appropriate to derive meaningful 
implications for developing whistleblowing systems in Korea. 
Finally, more research is required on the collusive fraud and management override, which are 
regarded as the feeblest points of the fraud prevention. Button et al (2018) suggested the ‘corruption 
pathogen’ model arguing that organisations should endeavour to avoid human pathogens using due 
diligence and recruitment screening methods. In a similar vein, an interviewee admitted that there 
are actually more frauds between insiders and outsiders in the banking industry. Importantly, the 
current study corroborated the more serious nature of collusive fraud by showing that when collusion 
was involved, the average loss per case increases substantially and the median detection period of 
fraud also takes longer than a single fraud (Chapter 5.6). Therefore, taking a baton from findings of 
the current study, more research is required on collusion and management override, which keep 
ringing the alarming bell due to the seriousness of the problems. 
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Appendix A-1 – Self-completion Questionnaire for the Police Officers 
Form Q2 Consent  
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
SURVEY CONSENT FORM (to appear as the splash screen in the web-based 
survey) 
REC Ref No:  [REC Ref No:     ]           
Thank you very much for taking part in my research study and agreeing to complete a web-based 
questionnaire. Participation is voluntary but your responses are highly appreciated.  
I am a student of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Portsmouth (Telephone 
010-4282-5446 or 44-23-9284-3923). My study is part of my PhD research exploring the characteristics 
of occupational fraud, the profiles of the perpetrator, and the responses of criminal justice system.  
You are invited as a potential respondent because you might have experience of investigating 
occupational fraud which occurred in the Korean banking industry in the last ten years. The 
investigation should have been completed and the fraudster should have been successfully 
prosecuted so that no breach of the Criminal Act Article 126 is made. 
You will not be asked for your name or any identifying details; the questionnaire can be completed 
anonymously and all reasonable measures will be taken to ensure confidentiality. Withdrawal from 
the research is possible at any time during the survey without any reason. Responses from completed 
questionnaires will be collected for analysis. Once this is finished and my thesis has been submitted 
then the questionnaires will be destroyed. Until this phase, completed questionnaires will be saved 
electronically in my personal computer. I will write and let you know when my thesis is submitted so 
that you may learn more about the results of the research if you wish. If you have any concerns 
regarding this research please contact me, or my supervisor, Professor Mark Button.  
My e-mail address is joon.suh@port.ac.uk and my supervisor, Professor Mark Button, can be 
contacted at mark.button@port.ac.uk. By moving to the next screen you display your agreement to 
participate in the survey. 
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Section A: The Characteristics of Occupational Fraud  
<The Year of Investigation> 
1. In what year, did you investigate occupational fraud in the banking industry that you are reporting 
now?  
                          (The Year of_____________) 
 
<The Type of Bank> 
2. In what type of bank did the occupational fraud occur? (Please check √ in the blank) 
- Bank in the First Financial Sector  
 1) Nationwide Bank (           )     
 2) Local Bank (           ) 
 3) Special Bank (           )    
- Bank in the Second Financial Sector 
 4) Local Agricultural & Fishery Cooperatives Bank (           )     
 5) Community Credit Cooperative Bank (           ) 
 6) Credit Union Bank (           )    
 7) Savings Bank (           )    
 
<The Type and Loss of Fraud> 
3. What was the type of the occupational fraud that you investigated? (Please check √ in the blank) 
1) Asset Misappropriation 
- Cash (          )  
- Bond (           ) 
- Securities (          ) 
- Other asset (Please write what asset it was :                              )   
2) Loan related fraud with bribe (          ) 
3) Loan related fraud without bribe (          )  
4) Fraudulent Financial Reporting (           ) 
5) Others   (Please write the type of fraud:                                                                        ) 
 
4. If it was asset misappropriation, what was the total amount of loss?  
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__________________________________ Korean Won 
 
5-1. If it was loan related fraud, what was the amount of the loan approved illegally by the bank worker? 
 
__________________________________ Korean Won 
 
5-2. If it was loan related fraud with bribe, how much bribe or the equivalent amount did the bank 
worker accept? 
 
__________________________________ Korean Won 
 
5-3. What was the relationship between the person who give bribe and the bank worker who accept 
the bribe?  (_________________________________________________) 
1) Friend 
2) Family 
3) Lover 
4) Coworker 
5) The third party 
6) Others  
 
6-1. Did the scheme involve fraudulent manipulation of the financial statement in order to make the 
bank appear more or less profitable than it really was? (Do not mark yes, if the financial statement 
were only falsified to conceal misappropriated assets.) 
1) No 
2) Yes 
 
6-2. By what amount were the financial statement misstated? 
_____________________________________Korean Won 
 
7. If it was other type of fraud, please specify detail and amount of loss  (                                                              ) 
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Section B: The Profile of the Perpetrator and the Method of Operation 
<The Profile of the Perpetrator> 
8. What was the gender of the perpetrator? 
1) Female        2) Male 
 
9. What was the perpetrator’s position in the bank? 
1) Contract worker  
2) Ordinary worker 
3) Middle-level manager 
4) High-level manager 
5) CEO or Chairman of the Bank 
 
10. Which division did the perpetrator work for? 
1) Branch office 
2) Internal control department 
3) The business department in headquarter 
4) The support department in headquarter 
5) Others  
 
11. What was the perpetrator’s last education? 
1) Middle School or Under 
2) High School   
3) 2 Year College  
4) Bachelor  
5) Master or Over 
 
12. How old was the perpetrator? 
1)20s 2)30s 3)40s 4)50s 5)60s  
 
13. How long had the perpetrator worked for the victim organization? 
1) Less than one year 
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2) 1-5 years 
3) 6-10 years 
4) 11-15 years 
5) More than 16 years 
 
14. What was the perpetrator’s criminal history before this fraud? (Multiple choice possible) 
1) None 
2) Drunk Driving (__________times) 
3) Gambling (__________times)  
4) Violence or assault (__________ times) 
5) White-collar crime (_____ __times) 
6) Others (Please write: __________________________) 
 
<Detection> 
15. How long did it take for the perpetrator’s fraud to be detected since it is firstly committed?  
 
( _____________________  Months)  
 
16. How was the fraud first discovered? 
1) Tip or complaint (from employee, customer, or other source) 
2) Internal audit 
3) External audit 
4) Internal Control (including management review) 
5) Investigation by law enforcement 
6) By accident 
7) Confession of fraudster 
8) Do Not Know 
9) Others (Please write: __________________________________) 
 
<Collusion> 
17-1. Were there any accomplices in the bank? 
  
276 
 
1) No ------> Move to question number 18 
2) Yes (then how many people?  _______________) 
 
If there were any accomplices in the bank, 
17-2. What was the relationship between the perpetrator and accomplice? 
1) The accomplice was the perpetrator’s supervisor. 
2) The accomplice was the perpetrator’s colleague.  
3) The accomplice was the perpetrator’s subordinate. 
4) The accomplice was the perpetrator’s third party. 
5) Others (Please write: _____________________________)  
 
<Pressure/Motive> 
18. What was the perpetrator’s main motivating factor to commit fraud? 
 (_________________________________________________) 
1) Living beyond his/her means 
2) Personal debt 
3) Greed 
4) Gambling or stock addiction 
5) A close association with customer 
6) Extramarital affairs 
7) Work related dissatisfaction   
8) Undue family or peer pressure 
9) Others  
 
<Opportunity> 
19. What kind of opportunity did exist for the perpetrator to commit the fraud? 
  (________________________________________________) 
1) Excessive authority  
2) Laxity of internal control 
3) Insufficient management supervision 
4) Difficult to measure perpetrator’s performance 
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5) No opportunity required 
6) Do not know 
7) Others  
 
<Rationalization/Attitude> 
20. What was the rationalization (excuse) the perpetrator took? 
1) “I am protecting the company” (Moral justification) 
2) “This is nothing compared to….” (Advantageous comparison)  
3) “I am trying to level the playing field” (Euphemistic labelling) 
4) “I cannot see that it hurts anyone” (Ignore consequences) 
5) “It all ends up cutting covered by insurance anyway” (Denial of the victim) 
6) “Everyone else was doing it” (Diffusing responsibility) 
7) “I deserved more money” (Entitlement) 
8) “What I am doing is not illegal” (Disbelief) 
9) “I fully intended to pay back the money that I took” (Temporary loan) 
10) No rationalization 
11) Do not know  
12) Others  
 
<Fraud Scale and Culture> 
21. After reading each paragraph, please check where the most relevant agreement is located. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
(3) 
Agree 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
  1 
The perpetrator was under certain 
pressure. 
     
2 
There was lack or laxity of internal 
controls. 
     
3 
The perpetrator had a low personal 
integrity. 
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4 
The perpetrator had a special 
capability to commit fraud. 
     
5 
There was a frail law-abiding culture in 
the bank. 
     
 
Section C: Criminal Justice System 
<Police Fraud Investigation> 
22. How did you initiate this fraud investigation? 
1) Pressing charge from customer, vender, or the third party (tip or complaint). 
2) Pressing charge from the bank 
3) Pre-emptive investigation by police  
4) Confession of fraudster 
5) Others  
 
23. Was the perpetrator in police custody while he/she was investigated? 
1) No 
2) Yes 
 
<Court Ruling and Recovery> 
24. To the best of your knowledge, what was the court ruling against the perpetrator?  
1) Acquittal 
2) Fines: ___________ Korean Won 
3) Probation: _________ Year 
4) Prison sentence: ___________ Year 
5) Others (Please write:                     ) 
6) Do not know  
 
25. To the best of your knowledge, how much money was recovered from the perpetrator? Please 
write down the recovery percentage out of the total amount of loss. 
 
 (_________________%) 
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Appendix A-2 – Self-completion Questionnaire for Bank Workers 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
SURVEY CONSENT FORM (to appear as the splash screen in the web-based 
survey) 
REC Ref No:  [REC Ref No:     ]           
Thank you for taking part in my research study and agreeing to complete a web-based questionnaire. 
Participation is voluntary but your responses are highly appreciated.  
My name is Joon Bae Suh and I am a member of Korean Anti-money Laundering Working Group, and 
a full time student of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Portsmouth 
(Telephone 44-23-9284-3923). My study is part of my PhD research gauging the perceptions of 
occupational fraud risk and the effectiveness of the current internal controls by comparing the 
differences between the banks in two different financial sectors. Eventually, I intend to devise and 
suggest more effective counter-fraud methods to reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry.  
You will not be asked for your name or any identifying details; the questionnaire can be completed 
anonymously and all reasonable measures will be taken to ensure confidentiality. You will be asked 
about your experience of occupational fraud that was officially reported to your organization and 
sanctioned by your organization or authorities only. Withdrawal from the research is possible at any 
time during the survey without any reason. Responses from completed questionnaires will be 
collected for analysis. Once this is finished and my thesis has been submitted then the questionnaires 
will be destroyed. Until this phase, completed questionnaires will be saved electronically in my 
personal computer. I will write and let you know when my thesis is submitted so that you may learn 
more about the results of the research if you wish. If you have any concerns regarding this research 
please contact me, or my supervisor, Professor Mark Button. 
My e-mail address is joon.suh@port.ac.uk and my supervisor, can be contacted at 
mark.button@port.ac.uk. By moving to the next screen you signify your agreement to participate in 
the survey. 
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Section A: Perceived Occupational Fraud Risk 
In the following section, you will be asked about your perceived occupational fraud risk such as 
prevalence, nature, and impact of occupational fraud. Please state your level of agreement 
regarding the following statements.  
No. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree,  
3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 =strongly agree. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
I perceive occupational fraud to be a significant risk for 
my organization today.  
     
2 
I perceive misappropriation of assets such as cash, 
bond or securities to pose the most significant factor 
to my organization.  
     
3 
I perceive corruption such as loan related bribery or 
conflict of interest to pose the most significant factor 
to my organization.  
     
4 
I perceive fraudulent financial reporting such as 
intentional misstatement of revenue, asset, or 
liabilities to pose the most significant factor to my 
organization. 
     
5 
In addition to the direct dollar costs, my organization 
would be most concerned about the loss of public 
trust if it were to experience occupational fraud.   
     
6 
In addition to the direct dollar costs, my organization 
would be most concerned about legal fines and 
sanctions if it were to experience occupational fraud.   
     
7 
In addition to the direct dollar costs, my organization 
would be most concerned about the loss of new or 
existing customers if it were to experience 
occupational fraud  
     
8 
In addition to the direct dollar costs, my organization 
would be most concerned about the loss of ability to 
attract and retain good employees if it were to 
experience occupational fraud  
     
9 
In addition to the direct dollar costs, my organization 
would be most concerned about the damage to the 
company’s share price if it were to experience 
occupational fraud  
     
10 
During the next 12 month, I see misappropriation of 
asset risk increasing. 
     
11 
During the next 12 month, I see corruption risk 
increasing. 
     
12 
During the next 12 month, I see fraudulent financial 
reporting risk increasing. 
     
13 
In my opinion, inadequate internal control or 
compliance program enables occupational fraud to 
occur most within the organization today. 
     
14 
In my opinion, management override of internal 
control enables occupational fraud to occur most 
within the organization today. 
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15 
In my opinion, inadequate oversight enables 
occupational fraud to occur most within the 
organization today. 
     
16 
In my opinion, collusion between employees and 
customers enables occupational fraud to occur most 
within the organization today. 
     
No. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree,  
3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 =strongly agree. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 
In my opinion, collusion between management and 
customers enables occupational fraud to occur most 
within the organization today. 
     
18 
In my opinion, collusion between employees and 
management enables occupational fraud to occur 
most within the organization today. 
     
19 
I perceive the amount of funding dedicated in my 
organization to combatting occupational fraud is 
appropriate today. 
     
20 
I perceive the amount of human resources dedicated 
in my organization to combatting occupational fraud 
is appropriate today. 
     
 
Section B: Counter-Fraud Controls and Their Effectiveness in Organization 
In the following section, you will be asked about your company’s counter-fraud controls and your 
perception of the effectiveness of them. Please state your level of agreement regarding the 
following statements.  
No. 1 = Yes, 2 = No, 3 = I have no idea 1 2 3 
21 
Does your company conduct criminal background check before 
hiring a new employee? 
   
21-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
22 
Does your company conduct credit check before hiring a new 
employee? 
   
22-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
23 
Does your company conduct certificate verification before 
hiring a new employee? 
   
23-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
24 Does your company have proper separation of duties? 
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24-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
25 Does your company have a use of authorizations? 
   
25-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational? In your 
view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
26 Does your company have physical safeguards? 
   
26-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
27 Does your company have job rotation? 
   
27-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
28 Does your company have mandatory vacations? 
   
28-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
29 
Does your company have employee support programs to assist 
employees struggling with addiction, mental/emotional health, 
family or financial problems? 
   
29-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
 
30 
Does your company have an open-door policy that allows 
employees to speak freely about pressures, providing the 
management the opportunity to alleviate such pressures 
before they become acute? 
   
30-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
31 
Does your company conduct anonymous surveys to assess 
employee morale? 
   
31-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
32 
Does your company have ongoing counter-fraud training 
provided to all employees of the organization? 
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32-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
33 
Does your company have an anonymous reporting channel such 
as a hotline, available to all employees? 
   
33-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
34 Does your company have whistle-blower protection programs? 
   
34-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
35 
Does your company have a reward program for whistle-
blowers? 
   
35-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
36 Does your company perform surprise audits? 
   
36-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
37 
Does your company have continuous auditing software used to 
detect fraud? 
   
37-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
38 Does your company have the internal audit department? 
   
38-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
39 Does your company have external audits conducted regularly? 
   
39-1 
If there is, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? In 
your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
40 
Are fraud risk assessments performed to proactively identify 
and mitigate the company’s vulnerabilities to occupational 
fraud? 
   
40-1 
If there are, how effective it is to counter occupational fraud? 
In your view on a scale of 1-5 where 5 is strongly effective, 4 is 
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somewhat effective, 3 is neutral, 2 is not effective, 1 is strongly 
not effective. 
 
Section C: Perceptions of Counter-Fraud Methods in the Organization 
Focusing on Reducing Opportunities and Rationalizations 
In the following section, you will be asked about your perception of counter-fraud methods in your 
organization focusing on reducing opportunities and rationalizations. Please state your level of 
agreement regarding the following statements.  
No. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree,  
3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 =strongly agree. 
1 2 3 4 5 
41 Counter-fraud controls are properly designed. 
     
42 Counter-fraud controls are well operating as designed.  
     
43 
Fraudsters who are caught receive appropriate 
punishment. 
     
44 Employee activity is properly monitored. 
     
45 Contractual parties are properly monitored.   
     
46 
Proper tone at the top such as management’s honesty 
and integrity is well established.   
     
47 Strong, ethical corporate culture exists. 
     
48 Work place of integrity is strong.  
     
49 Meaningful code of conduct exists. 
     
50 
Fraud awareness program is frequently trained to all 
employees. 
     
51 
Overall, fraudsters are highly likely to get caught in my 
organization. 
     
52 
Overall, I perceive that counter-fraud controls in my 
organization are effective. 
     
 
Section D: Experience of Officially Reported Occupational Fraud  
In the following section, you will be asked about your experience of occupational fraud that was 
officially reported to your organization and sanctioned by your organization or authorities between 
January 2011 and the time of present survey participation. 
53. Have you ever heard about occupational fraud that occurred in your organization that was 
officially reported to your organization and sanctioned by your organization or authorities between 
January 2011 and the time of present survey participation? 
1) Yes 
2) No    Move to Socio-demographic Section 
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54. How many occurrences of occupational fraud cases have you heard during the period? 
 (                         Cases) 
 
55. In your experience, what method has detected fraud most often during the period?  
 1) Tip 2) Internal audit 3) Management review 4) By accident 5) Internal control 
 6) External audit 7) Notified by law enforcement 8) Confession of fraudster 9) Others 
  
Section D: Socio-Demographic Questions 
56. What is your gender? 
1) Female      2) Male 
 
57. What type of bank are you working for? 
- Bank in the First Financial Sector  
 1) Nationwide Bank (           )     
 2) Local Bank (           ) 
 3) Special Bank (           )    
- Bank in the Second Financial Sector 
 4) Local Agricultural & Fishery Cooperatives Bank (           )     
 5) Community Credit Cooperative Bank (           ) 
 6) Credit Union Bank (           )    
 7) Savings Bank (           )    
 
58. What is your position in your bank? 
1) Contract worker  
2) Ordinary worker 
3) Middle-level manager 
4) High-level manager 
5) CEO or Chairman 
 
59. Which division do you work for? 
1) Branch office 
2) Internal control department 
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3) The business department in headquarter 
4) The support department in headquarter 
5) Others  
 
60. What was your last education? 
1) Middle School or Under 
2) High School   
3) 2 Year College  
4) Bachelor  
5) Master or Over 
 
61. In age, where do you belong to? 
1)20s 2)30s 3)40s 4)50s 5)60s  
 
62. How long have you worked for your organization? 
1) 0-5 years 2) 6-10 years 3) 11-15 years 4) 16-20 years 5) More than 21 years 
 
63. How many total employees does your financial institution have? 
  (                         People) 
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Appendix B – Semi-structured interview 
Form IE Invite  
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
 
Study Title: Occupational Fraud Risk Management in the Banking Industry in South Korea 
REC Ref No:  15/16:41 
Dear         
I would like to confirm your consent for [                                         ] to participate in a research study 
that I am engaged in as part of a PhD research project into managing occupational fraud risk in the 
banking industry. The aim of my research is to gauge the perceptions of occupational fraud risk and 
the effectiveness of the current internal controls by comparing the differences between the banks in 
two different financial sectors. The researcher eventually intends to devise and suggest more 
effective counter fraud methods to reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry in Korea.  I 
would love to interview the above named person for my research as one of many respondents. 
Participation in my research is entirely voluntary and I anticipate that the above named person’s  
engagement will require approximately 60 minutes of his/her time in an interview that I will conduct 
at a time and place of their choice. Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time before the 
data I am collecting being analysed but, in any case, the contribution to my research will be in 
confidence and references in my final published research will be anonymous. The information sheet 
provides greater clarification on this issue and I will ask the above named person to complete a 
consent form when we meet. 
You may contact me at the University at the postal or e-mail address above or by telephone on 010-
4282-5446. If I could ask you to confirm in writing to me your agreement that I may approach 
[NAME], I would be very grateful. 
Yours sincerely 
Joon B. Suh  
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Form I1 Invite  
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
 
Study Title: Occupational Fraud Risk Management in the Banking Industry in South Korea 
REC Ref No:  15/16:41 
Dear  
I would like to confirm your consent to participate in a research study that I am engaged in as part of 
a PhD research project into managing occupational fraud risk in the banking industry. The aim of my 
research is to gauge the perceptions of occupational fraud risk and the effectiveness of the current 
internal controls by comparing the differences between the banks in two different financial sectors. 
The researcher eventually intends to devise and suggest more effective counter fraud methods to 
reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry in Korea.  I would love to interview you for my 
research as one of many respondents. 
Participation in my research is entirely voluntary and I anticipate that your engagement will require 
approximately 60 minutes of your time in an interview that I will conduct at a time and place of your 
choice. Withdrawal from the research is possible at any time prior to the data I am collecting being 
analysed but, in any event, your contribution to my research will be in confidence and references in 
my final published research will be anonymous. The information sheet provides greater clarification 
on this issue and I will ask you to complete a consent form when we meet. 
You may contact me at the University at the postal or e-mail address above or by telephone on 010-
4282-5446. 
I look forward to seeing you on [DATE]. 
Yours sincerely  
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Form I2 Consent 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Study Title: Occupational Fraud Risk Management in the Banking Industry in South Korea 
REC Ref No:  15/16:41                                                                 Please initial box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet (version SAE1.1) for  
the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions  
and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any  
point before the data is analysed time without giving any reason.  
 
I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at by individuals from  
the University or from regulatory authorities. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my data. 
 
I agree to my interview being audio recorded and to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant:     Signature: 
 
 
Person taking consent: Joon B. Suh   Signature:  
Form I3E Host Confirmation Information Sheet 
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Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh  
joon.suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
HOST ORGANISATION INFORMATION SHEET 
Study Title: Occupational Fraud Risk Management in the Banking Industry in South Korea 
REC Ref No:  15/16:41 
Further to our telephone conversation, I write to confirm that I would like a member of your 
organisation to take part in my research study and I would like you to understand why the research 
is being done and what it will involve for your employee and your organisation. Please feel free to 
talk to others about the study if you wish and do not hesitate to ask if there is anything unclear.  
 
The aim of the research is to gauge the perceptions of occupational fraud risk and the effectiveness 
of the current internal controls by comparing the differences between the banks in two different 
financial sectors. The researcher eventually intends to devise and suggest more effective counter-
fraud methods to reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry in Korea.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
In terms of outcomes, I hope to: 
 Look at the perceptions of occupational fraud risk among the bank workers and compare the 
differences between two different financial sectors 
 Evaluate and compare the perceptions of the effectiveness of counter-fraud controls and 
diagnose the weaknesses and suggest solutions to the problems  
 Establish a framework for occupational fraud risk management in the banking industry in 
South Korea  
Why has your organisation been invited?  
The research method for the study will be sixteen semi-structured interviews. The interviews are 
planned with experts on fraud risk management comprising professors and representatives of the 
bank, the Korean Financial Supervisory Service, the Bank of Korea, and the Associations of Banks. 
Your organisation falls within those groups and I believe that one of your employees have 
particularly relevant knowledge of the issues. 
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Do you have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide if you will allow me to approach your employee to ask him/her to join the 
study. When we meet I will take them through the study, explain the contribution they will be asked 
to make and then I will then ask them to sign a consent form if they wish to proceed. Before then I 
need to discuss the nature of the information that may emerge from that discussion with your 
employee. 
What will happen to my organisation if we agree to allow our employee to take part?  
I would like to conduct an interview with your employee that will take approximately 60 minutes. 
Subject to their consent I will make an audio recording of the interview and will later transcribe that 
so that I can compare and analyse the various responses from all of the interviews I will perform. 
Whilst the interview will be stored with a reference to help me identify your employees name, after 
the data has been analysed and if the data appears in my final thesis, it will be entirely anonymous 
both in terms of your employee and your organisation. I expect that my research will take a number 
of years to conclude but your employee’s involvement will be limited to the 60 minutes. You should 
be aware that your employee may divulge information of a sensitive or confidential nature or which 
concerns details of specific instances of occupational fraud although I have targeted those 
employees who ordinarily manage this type of information and will be aware of the sensitivity of it. I 
will not be asking for any confidential data or details about current or planned criminal 
investigations or prosecutions. 
 
What will my employee have to do?  
I have a schedule of about fifteen questions and I am interested in their responses, opinions and 
attitudes to the questions. They relate to managing occupational fraud in the banking industry and 
do not require any specialist knowledge beyond that which they possess by reason of their current 
or prior position. They will not be asked to provide any information which is confidential or which 
would embarrass them or your organisation professionally or constitute a breach of confidentiality 
or breach of fiduciary duty. If I suspect that any information provided in the interview represents 
such a breach I will suspend the interview to ensure that my research does not rely on information 
provided in error. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
Your employee will be inconvenienced for 60 minutes and may divulge information that you would 
not wish him to divulge. I cannot envisage any other disadvantage or risk.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There will be no financial reward for participation but you and your employee may well benefit from 
the knowledge that you are contributing to research, which may advance or improve the fight 
against occupational fraud in the banking industry, or promote further educational research or 
generate policy documents or greater awareness of a problem. 
 
Will my employee taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
When your employee joins the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be seen by 
authorised persons from the University of Portsmouth or by those engaged by regulatory 
authorities. Because my research is supervised, others may look at the data to check that the study 
is being conducted correctly. All of those people will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a host 
organisation and to your research participant and will do their best to meet this duty.  
 
In any event, your confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. The interview will 
be audio recorded (with your employee’s consent) and then transcribed and analysed using software 
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programmes. At all times the data will be saved securely and it will be retained only until the final 
thesis is approved. At that point it will be destroyed. At any time before destruction, my research 
supervisor may review the data to ensure the study is proceeding correctly. 
 
What will happen if my employee doesn’t want to carry on with the study?  
Your employee may withdraw from the study at any time before providing consent and until the 
data from any interview has been analysed, at which time it will be anonymous but may have been 
integrated with other responses from other interviewees and so will be difficult to exclude from the 
study.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may speak with me or write or speak to 
Professor Mark Button, my supervisor. We will both do our best to answer your questions. Professor 
Button can be reached by e-mail at mark.button@port.ac.uk or by telephone on 023 92843923. If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this by writing to Dr Phil Clements, 
the Head of Department who can be reached at phil.clements@port.ac.uk.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
I will notify you when my thesis is published although it will be several years before the research is 
completed. Your organisation will not be identified in any report/publication unless you have given 
your consent. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The University of Portsmouth is sponsoring my research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a 
favourable opinion. 
 
Concluding statement 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. 
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Form I3 Information Sheet 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
St Georges Building,  
Portsmouth,  
PO1 2HY  
Tel: 44-23-9284-3923 
 
Researcher: Joon B. Suh 
Joon b. Suh@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Professor Mark 
Button 
mark.button@port.ac.uk 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Study Title: Occupational Fraud Risk Management in the Banking Industry in South Korea 
REC Ref No:  15/16:41 
You have agreed to take part in my research study and I would like you to understand why the 
research is being conducted and what it will involve for you. Please feel free to talk to others about 
the study if you wish and do not hesitate to ask if there is anything unclear.  
 
The aim of the research is to gauge the perceptions of occupational fraud risk and the effectiveness 
of the current internal controls by comparing the differences between the banks in two different 
financial sectors. The researcher eventually intends to devise and suggest more effective counter-
fraud methods to reduce occupational fraud in the banking industry in Korea.  
 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
In terms of outcomes, I hope to: 
 Look at the perceptions of occupational fraud risk among the bank workers and compare the 
differences between two financial sectors 
 Evaluate and compare the perceptions of the effectiveness of counter-fraud controls and 
diagnose the weaknesses and suggest solutions to the problems  
 Establish a framework for occupational fraud risk management in the banking industry in 
South Korea  
 
Why have I been invited?  
The research method for the study will be sixteen semi-structured interviews. The interviews are 
planned with experts on fraud risk management comprising professors and representatives of the 
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bank, the Korean Financial Supervisory Service, the Bank of Korea, and the Association of Banks. 
Your organisation falls within those groups and I believe that you have particularly relevant 
knowledge of the issues. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide to join the study. When we meet I will take you through the study, explain 
the contribution you will be asked to make and then I will then ask you to sign a consent form if you 
wish to proceed. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
I would like to conduct an interview with you, which will take approximately 60 minutes. Subject to 
your consent I will make an audio recording of the interview and will later transcribe that so that I 
can compare and analyse the various responses from all of the interviews I will conduct. Whilst the 
interview will be stored with a reference to help me identify your name, after the data has been 
analysed and if your data appears in my final thesis, it will be entirely anonymous. I expect that my 
research will take a number of years to conclude but your involvement will be limited to the 60 
minutes. 
 
What will I have to do?  
I have a schedule of questions and I am interested in your responses, opinions and attitudes to those 
questions. They relate to managing occupational fraud risk in the banking industry and do not 
require any specialist knowledge. You will not be asked to provide any information which is 
confidential or which would embarrass you professionally or constitute a breach of confidentiality or 
breach of fiduciary duty. If I suspect that any information provided in the interview represents such a 
breach I will suspend the interview to ensure that my research does not rely on information 
provided in error. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
You will be inconvenienced for about 60 minutes but I cannot envisage any other disadvantage or 
risk.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There will be no financial reward for participation but you may well benefit from the knowledge that 
you are contributing to research, which may advance or improve the fight against occupational 
fraud, promote further educational research or generate policy documents or greater awareness of 
a problem. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
When you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be seen by authorised 
persons from the University of Portsmouth or by those engaged by regulatory authorities. Because 
my research is supervised, others may look at the data to check that the study is being conducted 
correctly. All of those people will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and 
will do their best to meet this duty.  
 
Subject to the provision that any offer of confidentiality may sometimes be overridden by law, your 
confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. The interview will be audio recorded 
(with your consent) and then transcribed and analysed using software programmes. At all times the 
data will be saved securely and it will be retained only until the final thesis is approved. At that point 
it will be destroyed. At any time before destruction, my research supervisor may review your data to 
ensure the study is proceeding correctly. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
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You may withdraw from the study at any time prior to providing consent and until the data from any 
interview has been analysed, at which time it will be anonymous but may have been integrated with 
other responses from other interviewees and so will be difficult to exclude from the study.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you may speak with me or write or speak to 
Professor Mark Button, my supervisor. We will both do our best to answer your questions. Professor 
Button can be reached by e-mail at mark.button@port.ac.uk or by telephone on 44-23-9284-3923. If 
you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this by writing to Dr Phil Clements, 
the Head of Department who can be reached at phil.clements@port.ac.uk.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
I will notify you when my thesis is published although it will be several years before the research is 
complete. You will not be identified in any report/publication unless you have given your consent. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The University of Portsmouth is sponsoring my research. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, called a 
Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a 
favourable opinion. 
 
Concluding statement 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and for agreeing to meet with me. 
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About the interviewee 
 Name: 
 Age: 
 Occupation: 
 Department and position:  
 Length of employment in current role: 
 Date of interview: 
 Time:  
Planned Semi-structured Interview Questions 
What & How to Improve to Reduce Occupational Fraud Other than Above Questions 
Introduction 
 Purpose and Nature of Study 
 Risk of Inadequate Disclosure Awareness 
 Confirming Consent 
Counter-fraud Controls to Reduce Opportunities 
1 1. Are counter-fraud controls are properly designed? 
2 2. Are counter-fraud controls operated as designed? 
3 3. Is continuous monitoring properly operated? 
4 4. Are auditing software tools effective? 
5 5. Do Fraudsters who are caught receive appropriate punishment?  
6 6. Are communications with employees and customers open all the time? 
7 7. Is employee activity monitoring proper? 
8 8. Is tip-hotline effective? 
9 9. Is whistle-blower well protected?  
10 10. Is monitoring of contractual parties proper? 
Counter-fraud Environment to Deflate Possible Rationalization 
11 11. Does proper tone at the top exist? 
12 12. Does strong, ethical corporate culture exist? 
13 13. Is workplace integrity high enough? 
14 14. Does meaningful code of conduct exist? 
15 15. Are antifraud training programs effective? 
 
Conclusion  
Anything Else, Open Questions and Answers 
Any Concerns regarding Interview 
Contact Details 
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